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 Acts of political violence under the broad categorisation of ‘Islamic terrorism’ are a 
pervasive socio-political problem in the modern geo-political environment.  Furthermore, in 
the nearly two decades since September 11th 2001, Salafi-Jihadist organisations such as Al-
Qaeda and ISIS have emerged to symbolise potent counterpoints to models of legitimacy and 
sovereignty championed by Western powers, and rely on narratives of justified violence to 
achieve their ultimate ambitions which defy parameters of conventional Western morality in 
an increasingly globalised world.  This thesis attempts to broaden academic and policy 
discussions regarding the endurance of the threat posed by violent Salafi-Jihadism by re-
examining actors according to their own socio-cultural reference points, and in relation to 
those classified as ‘other’.  It intends to provide a holistic examination in a manner which has 
yet to be undertaken in the fields of terrorism, international relations, or religious studies.   
 This thesis employs a Foucauldian genealogy of ISIS to deconstruct the 
problematisation of Islamic terrorism in the context of the Global War on Terror by 
scrutinising fundamental aspects of social group dynamics, the potency of religious ideology, 
and the symbiotic relationship between violence and ideology.  It further reconstructs the 
emergence of ISIS by drawing on reference points unique to its own self-perception of 
cosmological and temporal history.  Finally, this thesis analyses and reconsiders the utility of 
current frameworks in use for the study of terrorism.  By genealogically scrutinising ISIS, and 
de-constructing the very understanding of the term ‘terrorism’ as employed by Western actors 
as a fluid concept in a power-knowledge nexus, this thesis argues for the necessity of alternate 
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 On the US Presidential campaign trail in 2012 and following the death of Osama Bin 
Laden, former president Barak Obama confidently asserted that “Al-Qaeda is on the run” and 
“Al-Qaeda’s core leadership has been decimated”.1  This declaration represented a symbolic 
victory over the perpetrators responsible for the atrocities of September 11 2001, and the 
group that had become synonymous with Islamic terrorism.  Four years later in 2016, 
however, Al-Qaeda affiliates had seized control of 370 miles of Yemeni coastline, and 
provided infrastructural and welfare services in the areas they autonomously governed. 2   
Despite the fact that Al-Qaeda’s territorial ambitions in Yemen were short-lived, this 
resurgence of a group thought to be in its death throes came as an eerie reminder to powers 
and observers in the West that the radical organisation could not so easily be dismissed with a 
high-profile decapitation of leadership.   
Following the tumultuous events of the U.S. led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well 
as the momentous shifts embodied by the Arab Spring, in June 2014 ISIS declared a 
Caliphate, and thus claimed victory over both foreign powers in the Middle East as well as the 
hegemonic geopolitical systems they upheld, and it also assumed self-proclaimed vanguard 
status in the Salafi-Jihadist movement while simultaneously declaring Al-Qaeda itself to be 
apostate and defunct.3  Almost two years to the day later, a coordinated military operation was 
executed by Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces with U.S. support.  This effort succeeded in 
retaking Fallujah from ISIS, and commanders declared that the operation was “done, and the 
city is fully liberated”.4  These comments and battlefield successes were accompanied by 
predictions that within a short period of time ISIS would not only be physically decimated in 
the region, but also that the group would cease to have any operational capacity anywhere in 
 
1 Obama, Barak, In Lucas, Fred, “Obama Has Touted Al Qaeda’s Demise 32 Times since Benghazi Attack”,  
CNNNews.com,  November 1, 2012.  http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-touts-al-qaeda-s-demise-32-
times-benghazi-attack-0 (Accessed 8 January 2018) 
2 Riyadh, Mohammad, “Al-Qaeda Is Taking Control of a Pivotal Middle-East Country”, The Fiscal Times, February 
24, 2016.  http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/02/24/Al-Qaeda-Taking-Control-Pivotal-Middle-East-Country 
(Accessed 8 January 2018) 
3 Vick, Karl, “ISIS militants declare Islamic ‘caliphate’, TIME, June 29 2014.  https://time.com/2938317/isis-
militants-declare-islamist-caliphate/ (Accessed 21 May 2020) 
4 Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, in “Iraqi Commander: Fallujah ‘fully liberated’ from ISIS”, FoxNews, June 26 
2016.  https://www.foxnews.com/world/iraqi-commander-fallujah-fully-liberated-from-isis (Accessed 29 June 
2020).   
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the world due to international cooperation in the spheres of migratory regulations, financial 
monitoring, and economic development packages. 5   
In February 2019 U.S. President Trump declared that ISIS had been “100 percent 
defeated”6, and later that year caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a U.S. special forces 
led raid.7  Despite these military victories, ISIS structural evolution had enabled an 
international diaspora of ideological adherents, and it also continued to engage in violence in 
conflict zones where the group conducted multiple attacks in Iraq in April 2020.8   
 This chilling narrative raises a number of poignant questions.  Most pressing perhaps is 
a three-part question.  What makes these violent organisations so consistently resilient in the 
face of overwhelming military, tactical, and financial odds, and why do governments, the 
media, NGOs and intellectuals in the West fail to see and understand this phenomenon in 
order to adequately address it?  Furthermore, what drives and enables the longevity of 
ideological platforms espoused by certain groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda that exist in 
evolutionary contention with one another but that fall under the broad categorisation of 
‘Islamic terrorism’? These bold questions do not suggest that by simply understanding a 
phenomenon one can presume to put an immediate halt to worldwide terrorism and sources of 
radicalisation.  They do however suggest that assertions of victory over terrorism have been 
grossly overstated, and that perhaps the methods used to combat terrorism have stemmed from 
inadequate conceptualisations of the phenomenon and therefore have failed to yield desired or 
expected results because they were misjudged in their inception and initial formulation.   
 Persistent violent extremism carried out worldwide in the name of Islam is one of the 
most critical and dangerous threats of our time, and developments over the past decades, and 
more internationally visibly since September 11th 2001, affirm the fact that conventional 
international relations paradigms and military responses fail as effective and definitive 
 
5 U.S. Department of State, “Bureau of Counterterrorism’s FY 2017 Request”, Statement Before the House 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee: Terrorism, Nonproliferation & Trade, Washington DC, May 17 2016. https://2009-
2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/257307.htm (Accessed 23 June 2020) 
6 Faulders, Katherine, “Trump claims ‘100 percent’ of ISIS caliphate defeated in Syria”, ABCNews, February 28 
2019.  https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-claims-100-percent-isis-caliphate-defeated-
syria/story?id=61388529 (Accessed 21 May 2020). 
7 Hennigan, W.J., “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is Dead.  Where Does That Leave ISIS?”, TIME, October 27 2019.  
https://time.com/5711828/al-baghdadi-dead-isis-future/ (Accessed 21 May 2020). 
8 Mills, Cory, “Don’t Ignore Increased ISIS Attacks in Iraq”, NewsMax, May 4 2020.  
https://www.newsmax.com/corymills/independence-zubair-erbil-haliburton/2020/05/04/id/965879/ Accessed 
21 May 2020). 
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responses.  To address this critical issue, we must be able to not simply respond to an evolving 
threat, we must be able to understand its aspirations, justifications, and resonance in specific 
cultural and historical contexts.  In so doing it becomes possible to deconstruct and scrutinise 
the violent narratives that are relied on, in order to posit alternative and more soundly based 
paradigms on which to build platforms for counter terrorism and hopefully stem the flow of 
radicalisation.  This thesis, therefore, aims to demonstrate that a scholarly exploration of the 
intellectual, social, cultural, and religious history that informs and is manifest in dangerous 
and violent ideologies should be developed as a cornerstone in the framing of successful 
paradigms and policies to confront violent Islamic extremism, and understand the ongoing and 
future evolution of political violence.       
 For this to take place, the study of violent extremism carried out in the name of Islam 
must be removed from the exclusive academic realms of security and terrorism studies, and 
international relations.  While these disciplines are both valid and necessary, the academic and 
policy discussions regarding Salafi-Jihadist groups must be broadened by locating them in 
socio-cultural context.  By broadening the scope of inquiry, it may be possible to re-orient the 
direction of the discussions pertaining to understanding and countering violent Islamic 
extremism.  Subsequently, Western paradigms in academia and policy, which assume the 
supremacy of the Westphalian state as a baseline of analytic normalcy in geopolitics may be 
effectively challenged.  This mentality is one of the consequences of numerous developments 
in the Western intellectual tradition which seeks to deconstruct objects of inquiry to yield their 
smallest component parts in order that they may be scrutinised independently to ascertain how 
they may best perform their specific functions as part of a whole.  This method of 
investigation was partially applied to polity building and informed revolutionary 
conceptualisations of society during the era which birthed the modern nation state, and largely 
relegated religious and numerous civil entities to a newly conceived private sphere.  This 
trajectory was not emulated in the Islamic world, yet assumptions regarding the appropriate 
interactive roles between violence and global actors permeate discussions regarding Islam and 
the Middle East today.  This orientation frames geopolitics as a zero-sum game in which 
actors can only participate if they adhere to specific models of state building and governance.   
 To mention a piece of both tactical and intellectual advice that has been cited so often 
as to almost be cliché; if to achieve victory in whichever form that manifests itself we must 
know both ourselves and our enemy, then comprehension of not only the immediate reasoning 
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of Islamist violence is necessary, but so are the mechanisms by which it is informed, 
presented, and understood in context.  To complement this, we must also evaluate the process 
by which we seek to comprehend acts of Islamist terrorism, and by doing so we may come to 
the conclusion that seemingly random acts of violence are not random at all; they are simply 
being interpreted through a cultural lens other than the one through which they are being 
carried out.  In an attempt to bridge this gap as a stepping stone between comprehension and 
response formulation, and to address the three-part question mentioned above, this thesis asks 
the following question: Is it accurate and useful to label violent Islamic groups like ISIS as 
terrorist organisations, and study as well as counter them accordingly within existing 
frameworks for understanding and defeating terrorism which rely on the conceptual ordering 
of global politics that assumes the intellectual, moral and legitimate supremacy of the Western 
nation state?   To answer this question, a comprehensive ideological case study of ISIS will be 
used which will place the group in the context of Islamic history, modern jihadism, and 
current regional as well as global political events.  This case study will explore the narratives 
and ambitions embodied by ISIS and the mechanisms relied on for their attainment in order to 
explain both its ideological longevity and potential to alter the future of violent political 
contestation.   
 Asking this is critical because in the years since 9/11, there has been a striking lack of 
historical and contextual studies which seek to comprehend terrorism and violence itself 
within a wider scope of cultural analysis.9  This must be remedied, because those who commit 
acts of violence in the name of Islam do so with a deep sense of attachment to their collective 
history, cultural context, and place within a divine mandate.  We must be able to understand 
them and their actions against their own historical and socio-cultural reference points instead 
of grafting them onto our own.  Despite the fact that imagined Sharia utopias and expressions 
of communal grievances put forth by extremist organisations may be misguided or 
inflammatory, they are nonetheless valid to those willing to kill on their behalf and hold great 
mobilising power.  For that reason they must be paid diligent attention.  As was noted by an 
American general, “We’re not just fighting a force, you know, we’re fighting an idea.”10  
 
9 Gordon, Avishag, “Can Terrorism Become a Scientific Discipline?  A Diagnostic Study”, Critical Studies on 
Terrorism 3:3 (2010), 437-458.   
Sageman, Marc, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, Terrorism and Political Violence 26:4 (2014), 565-580.   
10 General John Allen, in Alexander Yonah and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State; Combatting the Caliphate 
without Borders (New York: Lexington Books, 2015), 36.   
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Although ideology alone is insufficient to drive people to action because opportunity is needed 
as well, military solutions or economic incentives aimed at defeating the physical contextual 
opportunities that give rise to violent extremism are doomed to short-lived success and are 
bound to be trapped in an ongoing cycle of escalating violence if root ideologies are not also 
addressed.  While this is certainly an ambitious undertaking, it is of critical importance to 
begin to take creative and proactive measures in this direction to better understand global 
threats and the environments in which they exist.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis seeks to address the question of whether it is accurate and useful to label 
groups like ISIS as terrorist organisations, and study as well as counter them based on this 
categorisation and the resultant analytical frameworks.  As was stated in the introduction, to 
answer this question an in depth case study of ISIS will be utilised which will attempt to 
understand the group as it views itself, and explore its aspirations and justifications against its 
own reference points and in the context in which it exists both culturally and geopolitically.  
To adequately conduct this investigation, the methodology chosen must reflect both the 
complexity and depth of the subject under scrutiny, as well as the underlying ambitions 
inherent in the research question, and therefore this thesis will employ genealogy as its 
primary research tool.  
 Genealogy as it is currently used traces its origins to Michel Foucault, who used it to 
produce ‘political histories of truth’ and demonstrate the inseparability of power and 
knowledge based on previous arguments by Friedrich Nietzche that reality had no singular 
ontological status and that genealogical inquiry should be used to produce historical-
philosophical accounts of how specific realities came into existence.11  Foucault described 
genealogy as a history of the present that intended to demonstrate the contingency of said 
present against a backdrop of various historical narratives and socio-political trajectories that 
embodied distinct understandings of the use, formulation, and function of power.12  To 
produce these political histories of truth, genealogy as a research tool focuses on uncovering 
 
11 Vucetic, Srdjan, “Genealogy as a research tool in International Relations”, Review of International Studies 37 
(2010), 1295-1312, 1295.   




accurate problematisations of socio-political phenomena as a preparatory mechanism for 
normative intervention.  Foucault argued that the purpose of genealogical inquiry was not to 
scrutinise behaviour, but to make problems themselves active and expose their complexity in 
order to connect them to the experiences of individuals.  He further argued that by examining 
social phenomena in such a way, through “difficult cases, movements of rebellion, reflections, 
and testimonies, the legitimacy of a common creative action can also appear.”13   In this sense, 
a genealogical study is one which employs an in depth cultural critique to produce a historical 
account, justified by relevant social and political evidence, and seeks to uncover how a certain 
social phenomenon became a problem, and simultaneously questions the manner in which that 
phenomenon should be studied.14  
 To accomplish this, Foucault argued for the necessity of reversing certain analytical 
progressions in that he believed that deducing concrete phenomena and their intelligibility 
from a consensus regarding universal statements was inferior to beginning with a scrutiny of 
collective practices in context, and then analysing the validity of universals against the 
meaning of the aforementioned practices.15  As it relates to the objectives of the above stated 
research question, this thesis will strive to analyse ISIS collective practices and cultural 
contexts that inform them, to then retroactively pass universals in the form of prominent 
Western definitions and frameworks for terrorism through the intellectual grid formed by these 
practices and their significance.  This juxtaposition is necessary insofar as genealogy is a 
political-ethical critique of values in that it holds that there is no universal truth, but a 
scientific one that recognises cultural domains in which specific regimes of truth are made and 
validated.16  In the context of the ongoing global war on terror, a genealogical study of ISIS 
may prove valuable in that religious terrorism is a term charged with political and ethical 
connotations stemming from diametrically opposed cultural contexts. 
 As a research tool, genealogy uses episodes, examples and effectiveness to deconstruct 
the origins of social problems to better comprehend their origins and significance.  While no 
 
13 Foucault, Michel, “An Interview with Michel Foucault”, in Faubion, James D. (ed) and Robert Hurley (trans),  
Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: New Press, 2001), 288.   
14 For the uses of genealogy and its applicability to the social sciences, see Koopman, Colin, Genealogy as 
Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2013). 
15 Senellart, Michel, Francois Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, and Arnold I. Davidson (eds), and Graham Burchell 
(trans), The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979 (New York: Pallgrave Macmillan, 
2008). 
16 Vucetic, 1298. 
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concrete rules exist for the selection of episodes and examples, they form the basis for case 
studies, and should be concrete and relevant to the overall analysis and utilise a comparative 
method due to the fact that the objective of genealogy itself is to “demonstrate the diversity 
and specificity of battles between different interpretations of social items”.17  In this regard, 
effective genealogies will be those that try to discover how a specific social problem, which 
came to be understood as relatively normal and definable, came into existence in light of 
specific contingencies and dynamics of power, and how it was constructed as a social reality.  
Put succinctly, effective genealogies rely on relevant episodes and examples to intervene in 
the past in order to diagnose the present.18 
 Foucault envisioned his genealogical methodology and collection of works as 
comprising a toolbox, from which researchers could draw in order to apply to specific areas of 
interest.19  He perceived the concept of discourse as unifying this toolbox, and discourse in 
this regard is any practice through which individuals give meaning to their immediate reality 
and existence through the form of a collective consciousness embedded in and created by 
human language.20 Thus understood, discourse should be evaluated as a practice of power and 
knowledge rather than simply language in use, thereby focusing on the agency and interactive 
roles of individuals who produce and experience the discourse in question.  The importance of 
discourse within the goals of an effective genealogy lies in its ability to constitute subjects of 
study, insofar as it is a powerful mechanism for rewarding or punishing “ideas, institutions, 
and practices that are congruent/deviant with the pre-set political boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion.”21  Furthermore, discourse creates meaning in that it is by nature 
cumulative, given that new narratives that result from specific socio-political environments 
may build on pre-existing discourse in order to impose upon and transform old meanings.  In 
this regard, and due to the fact that discourse is a social construction of meaning and reality 
that implies specific expectations for future courses of action, it is open to multiple 
 
17 Vucetic, 1301. 
18 Kendall, Gavin and Gary Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods (New York: Sage Publications, 2015), 4.   
19 Gutting, Gary, Foucault: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 112-113. 
20 This position is also the foundation for discourse analysis from the vantage point of the sociology of 
knowledge.  See Ruiz Ruiz, Jorge, “Sociological Discourse Analysis: Methods and Logic”, Forum: Qualitative 
Social Research 10:2 (2009), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-10.2.1298 (Accessed 23 June 2020) 
21 Vucetic, 1300. 
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contestations and critiques from the vantage points of disparate actors who will be affected by 
any future course of action.22   
 This thesis will strive to produce a genealogical study of ISIS in order to provide a 
deeper understanding of the construction of ISIS and the global, regional, as well as 
intellectual context in which it emerged and exists.  It will do so to reconcile the Weberian 
institutionalism prevalent in the current discourses of counterterrorism with the political 
construction of different subjective realities, as well as their repercussions and significance.23  
This approach is relatively new in the study of critical subjects such as terrorism, but perhaps 
first gained mainstream attention in 1987 with the work of James Der Derian.24  Der Derian 
used a genealogical approach to test the hypothesis that many tactics of Western diplomacy 
originated to mediate alienation, and he did so by utilising paradigms attributed to Marx and 
Hegel to deconstruct historical narratives and demonstrate that practices which were initiated 
towards non-diplomatic problems gradually became co-opted for diplomatic purposes when 
relationships with a socially constructed ‘other’ became problematic.25  In 1995, Jens 
Bartelson used genealogy to explore the social construction of sovereignty in order to raise 
questions related to assumptions of universality of the status of normalcy in global politics and 
international relations.  He concluded that sovereignty should be conceived of as contingent 
upon the complex history of political science; not fundamentally universal to it.26  In 2018, 
Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson produced a genealogical study of terrorism itself, and through 
historical analysis which explored the symbiotic relationship between the birth of the modern 
nation state and terrorism, deconstructed the term to articulate the position that it is a mode of 
 
22 For the construction of reality through discourse and its ontological contestation, see Joseph, Jonathan and 
John Michael Roberts, “Introduction”, Roberts, John Michael and Jonathan Joseph (eds), Realism, Discourse and 
Deconstruction (London: Routledge, 2004), 1-19. 
23 Institutionalism in this sense can be described as the study of “who gets what”, and was largely rejected by 
Foucault for its narrow understanding of the dimensions of power.  See Flyvberg, Brent, Making Social Science 
Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it can Succeed Again (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
117. 
For the methodological reconciliation, see Hay, Colin, “Constructivist Institutionalism”, Rhodes, Sarah Binder 
and Bert Rockman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
56-75. 
24 See Der Derian, James, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1987). 
25 Warren, Mark, “On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. By James Der Derian”, The Journal of 
Politics 51:1 (February 1989), 208-211.   
26 Bartelson, Jens, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).   
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social defence that can be appropriated and wielded subjectively on behalf of factions within a 
contested power dynamic.27  
 The goal of this thesis is not necessarily the exploration of causal mechanisms that lead 
to manifestations of terrorism, rather it is the discovery of the ways in which individual and 
collective subjects and worldviews are constituted via the dynamics of the power/knowledge 
continuum.  While substantial academic investigation has been devoted to explaining the root 
causes of terrorism, this thesis will attempt to account for distinct manifestations of violence in 
historically specific structures and processes, and the meanings behind them, in order to 
answer the research question regarding whether ISIS should be considered a terrorist 
organisation.28  Furthermore, this thesis will utilise the same vantage points to reconsider the 
universality of what constitutes terrorism both in its current political usage and as a fluid 
concept that exists in the nexus of the power/knowledge relationship.                      
 ISIS is simultaneously a religious and revolutionary political entity, and this blended 
existence intellectually challenges platforms for mediation and prevention which are founded 
on the separation of religious belief and political action that underlies hegemonic international 
structures.  As a methodology, genealogy accounts for historical disjuncture and 
transformations that can be religious, social, political, and ethical, and the ways in which these 
experiences shape individual and group experiences and worldviews.  This type of holistic 
genealogical approach that seeks to both explain and understand has yet to be applied to a case 
study of ISIS, and will be beneficial in that the political and ethical analysis that must 
necessarily follow can be grounded in novel conceptualisation of how actors invest their world 
with meaning in such a way that dictates complicated world relationships.29  Although 
genealogy has not been widely used for this type of study, its ability to analyse multiple 
overlapping narratives simultaneously; religious, historical, ontological, epistemological, and 
ethical; makes it a powerful tool to attempt to answer the research question posed in the 
introduction to this thesis.      
 
 
27 Erlenbusch-Anderson, Verena, Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2018). 
28 For a collection of essays on this subject, see Bjørgo, Tore (ed), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and 
ways forward (New York: Routledge, 2005).   




The research question this thesis will attempt to answer is complex.  It grapples both 
with the applicability of frameworks for conceptualising and countering terrorism in a state-
centric geopolitical environment, and a subject of inquiry, ISIS, that defies categorisations 
which are inherent in that same environment.  It is religious, it is political, and it is violent in 
manners commensurate with tactical and transcendent aspirations simultaneously.  It is also 
unique in that it embodies diverse socio-political trajectories which inform its worldview, 
narrative, and potential for endurance.  Understanding ISIS, and subsequently using this 
understanding to reach a conclusion regarding the applicability of current frameworks for 
studying terrorism, requires employing the genealogical method outlined previously, and 
therefore this thesis will be structured to achieve the aims set out.  The structure will reflect a 
holistic approach, beginning with fundamental human social constructs and dynamics, in order 
to incorporate these into an analysis of ISIS in a manner that reflects the genealogical method 
of problematisation.  Each chapter of this thesis will therefore build on previous ones to reach 
a culminating argument.    
 Chapter 1 will outline current definitions of terrorism in use in academia and policy to 
demonstrate the lack of consensus regarding precisely what terrorism is, and it will further 
elaborate specific frameworks for approaching terrorism studies that were developed after 
9/11.  In this regard, this chapter will concurrently serve as a literature review of the field of 
terrorism studies.  Chapter 2 will discuss social groups, the ways they form and behave, and 
the reasons individuals join social groups.  This chapter will explore the competitive dynamic 
between groups for survival, the relationship between groups and individuals, and will present 
sociological paradigms which will be crucial in prosecuting the ISIS case study.  Chapter 3 
will introduce religion, and will explore it as a deliberately created concept linked to political 
development which fulfilled tangible social requirements, and individual needs for 
significance.  It will also present the birth of monotheism as a radical departure from existing 
religious practices, in a manner that reflected competitive social group dynamics.  This 
discussion of religion as a human construct linked to social aspirations and political structures 
is necessary in order to later comprehend the power of religious framing employed by ISIS.  
Chapter 4 will analyse violence, its philosophical justifications, and the fact that in a social 
context, violence is not meaningless.  It will approach violence as a powerful tool to convey 
significance, aspirations, and frustrations, and will analyse the ways in which both religion and 
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violence fulfil many of the same functions in a socio-political context.  Chapter 5 will 
constitute the climax of the previous three, and will discuss the ways that religion and violence 
interact, rely on each other, and have been wielded in tandem in the context of social group 
dynamics. 
 Chapter 6 will narrate the birth of Islam from the vantage point of competitive social 
dynamics that was previously elaborated.  It will discuss the socio-political and cultural 
conditions that were experienced by members of Muhammad’s community, and how these led 
to specific theological doctrines regarding violence and relationships with the ‘other’.  These 
formulations remain central in ISIS worldview construction, so understanding their genesis as 
the result of contemporary circumstance which was framed as transcendentally applicable is 
crucial to the genealogical study of ISIS.  Chapter 7 will commence with a discussion of the 
emergence of Salafism in the modern period, and will progress to briefly analyse defensive 
modernisation in the Middle East, and the inception of political Islam.  It will then recount the 
radical transformations that took place within Salafi-jihadism in the 1960s and during the 
Afghan Soviet war.  In this context, it will also discuss the creation of al-Qaeda, and its role in 
the jihadist community prior to 9/11. 
 Chapter 8 will build on the groundwork created in the discussion of Chapters 6 and 7 
to recount the U.S. led war in Iraq.  It will deliberate on the justifications for violence used by 
Western actors and jihadists to demarcate both differences and similarities.  It will also 
identify emerging cleavages within jihadism that U.S. strategic policy failed to recognise 
during the course of the war, and will scrutinise the competing aspirations within jihadism that 
were intellectually pursued in Iraq.  Chapter 9 will focus on ISIS re-emergence following the 
Iraq war, and will analyse the sociological significance of events triggered by the Arab Spring.  
It will explore the nuances in intellectual thought within jihadism and the factors which ISIS 
capitalised on during the Syrian civil war.  Chapter 10 will begin with the declaration of the 
ISIS caliphate, and will devote significant attention to the group’s self-portrayal, aspirations, 
and justifications.  By engaging in discourse analysis from the perspective of the sociology of 
knowledge, which seeks to understand the very production of thought in its socio-historical 
setting to grasp its dissemination and impact on individual thought and action, this section will 
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explore ISIS according to its own reference points.30  It will also juxtapose this with references 
to counterpoints offered from within Islam that dismissed ISIS justifications, and also with the 
way ISIS was perceived and countered by a Western coalition in order to demonstrate the 
disconnect between the somatic reality created by ISIS and the manner in which it was 
confronted.   
 Chapter 11 will revisit Chapter 1 in that it will insert the ISIS case study into the 
definitions and frameworks provided in the latter to argue that ISIS does not fit any of 
prominent models currently in use for understanding terrorism.  It will also argue that these 
frameworks inform policy decisions, and that successful policy in the future therefore depends 
on successfully understanding ISIS, its legacy, and its potential, outside of the frameworks.  
The conclusion chapter will constitute the culmination of the thesis.  It will offer new ways to 
conceive of terrorism which require viewing it as a fluid tool for social construction, and not a 
definable pattern of political violence which exists in opposition to the crystallisation of the 
Western Nation State.  It will discuss the symbiotic emergence of terrorism as both a tactic 
and rhetorical tool in the French Revolution that accompanied the birth of the Nation State, 
and will argue for understanding terrorism and socio-political construction as fluid 
components of a constantly evolving cultural landscape.  With this foundation, the conclusion 
will answer the research question posed in the introduction, and offer propositions as to why 









30 For more on this perspective and its utility, see Schutz, Alfred, “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the 
Social World”, in Broderson, A. (ed), Collected Papers.  Vol II: Studies in Social Theory (The Hague: Martinus 




Terrorism in Contemporary Geopolitics 
 
Since before September 11 2001, international terrorism has been described as an 
existential threat to national sovereignty, global security, and human rights.31 Despite the 
danger it poses and the staunch positions advocated by governments to combat it, terrorism 
continues to defy definitional parameters, and in the absence of a singular definition, policies 
intended to counteract it lack ideational fortitude.  This chapter will present the dominant ways 
of conceptualising terrorism in the field of study, and identify the problems and questions 
inherent in dealing with the subject matter.  It will progress to summarise the generalised 
theory that attempts to group terrorist organisations categorically, temporally, and 
ideologically, as well as scholarly contributions that have been made to build on and also 
question this theory.  This chapter will culminate with an appraisal of the current methods and 
efforts to place ISIS within these dominant models, and evaluate their effectiveness.  It will 
conclude with a paradigmatic alternative to the study of ISIS as a violent religious social 
group to enable a deeper understanding of it as an enduring actor in contemporary geopolitics.   
 
1.1 Terrorism (un) Defined 
 Before 9/11 the field of terrorism studies was comprised of a small but committed, 
resilient, and diverse group of scholars.  In their seminal 1988 work, Schmid and Jongman 
identified only 32 researchers devoted to the active production of knowledge related to 
terrorism.  Furthermore, in this same study, the authors compiled 100 definitions of terrorism 
yet found none of them independently adequate.32  9/11 brought terrorism to the forefront of 
Western agendas, and transformed it from a distant threat that happens “over there” to a 
critical danger that can happen “over here”.33  Academics from diverse backgrounds began 
 
31  Crelinsten, Ronald D., “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World: Challenges and 
Opportunities”, In Taylor, Max and John Horgan (Eds) The Future of Terrorism, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 
170-196.     
32 Schmid, Alex Peter, A.J. Jongman, and Michael Stohl, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories & Literature (New York: Transaction Books, 1998), Chapters 1-2.   
33 United States Congress, The 9/11 Commission Report, 362.  
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf (Accessed 2 October 2019) 
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applying their distinct methodologies to the scrutiny of terrorism in efforts to define, 
understand, and confront the phenomenon.  Despite, or perhaps fueled by this convergence, 
there is no consensus regarding a precise definition of terrorism.  The distinguished historian 
and scholar of political violence Walter Laqueur proposed that a definition of terrorism may 
not be necessary for policy-makers to adequately address it,34 and Gilbert Ramsay argued that 
a unified concept of terrorism would ultimately prove un-useful insofar as the phenomenon 
itself is a social construct.35  Definitional quandaries are compounded by the fact that different 
interested actors define terrorism in accordance with their biased objectives.36  Demonstrative 
of this fact is the following: “After the attacks of 9/11, the United Nations Security Council 
approved motions condemning terrorism and delimiting the fight against it, and also created a 
list of organizations and individuals related to terrorism without establishing any definition.  
(…) made it possible for a state to legitimize their list of organizations to be targeted.”37  
Terrorist organisations in a geopolitical context dominated by Westphalian states, therefore, 
are understood primarily by contemplating their aims relative to interests of the state.38    
 The above notwithstanding, certain distinguishing elements of terrorism have been 
generally agreed upon to facilitate academic study and counterterrorism policy.  Terrorism, 
according to Louise Richardson, “simply means deliberately and violently targeting civilians 
for political purposes”39, and she established that it has seven crucial characteristics that 
distinguish it from other types of political violence.40  Paul Wilkinson built on this by arguing 
that “It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear amongst a wider target group than the 
immediate victims of the violence, and to publicise a cause as well as to coerce a target to 
 
34 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 33.   
35 Ramsay, Gilbert, “Why terrorism can, but should not be defined”, Critical Studies on Terrorism 8:2 (2015), 
211-228.   
36 Legal experts for instance will define terrorism with the objective of enabling the prosecution of acts of 
terrorism, whereas social scientists will tend to define it with the objective of understanding it as a complex 
phenomenon.  See Petta, De Leon, “Why there is no real difference between a Terrorist Organization and an 
Organized Crime faction, just a matter of interaction towards the state”, Contemporary Voices: St. Andrews 
Journal of International Relations 1:1 (2008), 26-35.   
37 Petta, 27.  
38 Khan, Ali, “A Theory of International Terrorism”, Connecticut Law Review 19 (1987), 945.   
39 Richardson, Louise, What Terrorists Want; Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, (New York: 
Random House Publishing Group, 2006), 4.   
40 According to Richardson, terrorism must be politically inspired and involve the use or threat of violence.  Its 
point is not to defeat but send a message to the enemy through an act that has symbolic significance.  It is 
solely the act of non-state actors, the victims are not the same as the target audience, and as a tactic it 
deliberately targets civilians.    
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acceding to the terrorists’ aims”.41  In the context of understanding terrorism in contrast to the 
state, as well as its emotional appeal, Charles Townshend defined it as “a distinctive form of 
modern political agency, intended to threaten the ability of the state to ensure the security of 
its members-and thus its claim to legitimacy” and that it “resolves the discrepancy between 
actual destructive power and desired political effect by an almost mystical belief in the 
transformative power of violence”.42  For political purposes, in 2006 the US State Department 
applied the label of ‘terrorist organisation’ to any group that engages in “premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets”.43   
 These definitions can be useful in that they provide ways of conceptualising terrorism 
as a unique strain of political violence.  They present terrorism as a method used by aggrieved 
actors to contest the legitimacy and relative roles of governing institutions in society, but this 
framing assumes a socio-political status quo in which legitimate governance is the domain of 
secular entities.  They reflect a heritage in which violence performed by groups that do not 
belong to the apparatus of the state developed as a way to assert individual and community 
agency in the quest for representation, and the recognition of deeply held values.  The 
assumptions inherent in Western definitions of terrorism do not render them useless, but they 
are important to consider when applying them to groups or organisations that may not share 
the same cultural and political heritage. 
 Terrorism is fundamentally a group phenomenon that evolves because groups within 
society and power dynamics are constantly in flux, so it is necessary to complement the above 
definitions with that of Roger Griffin, who argued that terrorism is “the deliberate use by a 
movement, group, or individual of extreme violence against either human or symbolically 
significant material targets associated by the perpetrators with a demonised ‘Other’”.44  This 
definition suggests that terrorism is both a vehicle for radical change carried out against 
dominant political power structures,  and the meaningful performance of violence linked to the 
maintenance of a culturally constructed communal identity.  In this regard, “we should resist 
an approach which isolates terrorism from the rest of the political and social world: ‘terrorism 
studies’, properly conceived, should involve a rooting of explanation within the wider, 
 
41 Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism Versus Democracy; The Liberal State Response (New York: Routledge, 2011), 17. 
42 Townshend, Charles, Terrorism; A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3 & 15.   
43 Abrahms, Max, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work”, International Security 31:2 (2006), 42-78, 55.   
44 Griffin, Roger, Terrorist’s Creed; Fanatical Violence and the Human Need for Meaning (New York: Pallgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 11.   
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interconnected realities of political and social life.”45  Closely related to this, it is worth 
observing that terrorism in Islam can be defined as any violent act which contravenes the 
shari׳a.46  Islamism conceives of the shari׳a as the means by which to implement and regulate 
divine prescriptions for worldly governance, and thus both the Western and Islamic definitions 
of terrorism conceive of it as violence which challenges legitimate political authority.  The 
differences are entirely due to the different cultural heritages that produced them, and concern 
the sources of said political legitimacy; civilians as a body politic in the Western tradition and 
Allah in the Islamic tradition, as well as the form that ideal governance should take.  These 
similarities and differences are important because it is crucial to recognize that different 
engaged actors will rationalise their actions and aims differently.  While these may seem 
potentially contradictory, they must be understood as equally valid to those articulating them.  
 Due to the lack of definitional consensus, as well as the necessary overlap between 
academics and policy makers in the realm of terrorism studies,47 while since 9/11 an increased 
effort has been placed on uncovering the motivations of terrorism, the conditions which 
facilitate its emergence, its relative effectiveness, and the factors contributing to its cessation, 
a similar lack of agreement has been reached in these ventures.48  Nevertheless, the persistence 
of terrorism has resulted in the formation of distinct frameworks for understanding and 
generalising the phenomenon.  One of the most prominent of these, as well as its alternatives, 
will be surveyed.      
 
 1.2 Rapoport’s Four Waves 
 Terrorism is not a new phenomenon.  In fact, it has been used as a deliberate tactic to 
alter political realities since antiquity.49  Notwithstanding, the events of 9/11 altered the scope, 
 
45 English, Richard, Terrorism; How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 53.   
46 Venkatraman, Amritha, “Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and its Interpretations”, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 30:3 (2007), 229-248, 235.   
47 Sageman.  
48 For a holistic evaluation of psychology, politics, economics, religion, and culture as independent motivators of 
terrorism, see Addressing the Causes of Terrorism 1, International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and 
Security, Club de Madrid, 8-11 March 2005.  Articles were provided by preeminent scholars of terrorism Jorrold 
M. Post, Martha Crenshaw, Ted Robert Gurr, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jessica Stein.  
http://www.clubmadrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Volume-I.pdf (Accessed 23 June 2020)  
49 For two examples see: Horsley, R. A., “The Sicarii: Ancient Jewish ‘Terrorists’, The Journal of Religion 59:4 
(October 1979), 435-458. 
Lewis, Bernard, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Basic Books, 1967).   
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visibility, and potential for terrorism in novel ways, and in light of this efforts were undertaken 
to attempt to explicate and hopefully predict terrorism patterns.  One of the most notable of 
these is the theory postulated by political scientist David C. Rapoport, who argued that modern 
terrorism has occurred in four waves, and the world is currently experiencing the fourth wave 
which is characterised by religious terrorism.50  The intricacies and extended commentaries 
concerning this theory are beyond the scope of this thesis, but for the present purposes, the 
theory will be summarised. 
 Rapoport argued that terrorism in the modern era can be divided into four waves, each 
lasting approximately 40 years and corresponding with the human life cycle, suggesting that 
aspirations of one generation do not translate to the next due to changing political and cultural 
circumstances.  He did not attempt to uncover root causes of terrorism, but instead posited that 
each individual wave was precipitated by very specific and monumental events which altered 
social perceptions and enabled terrorism to develop internationally beyond specific cultural 
confines.  He further identified four common components that defined each wave: time (the 
abovementioned 40 year generational span, which is comprised of a beginning, high point, and 
end), space (while the geographic epicentre of each wave is unique, the geographies of various 
waves overlap), participating units (multiple small groups who’s individual lifecycles are 
shorter than the wave as a whole), and purpose or hope (the idea that a wave is generated by 
hope which is encapsulated in a specific event).  Finally, Rapoport asserted that revolution was 
the overriding aim in every wave, but that it was understood differently in each.   
 The first wave according to Rapoport was the anarchist wave, which began in Russia 
in the 1880s.  It was characterised by targeted assassinations, and its hallmark was the use of 
newly invented dynamite.  Anarchist doctrine was comprised of 4 major points: That modern 
society is full of ambivalence and hostility, it devises artificial moral conventions to generate 
social guilt and humiliation, tactics utilised in the present that may be viewed as immoral will 
be perceived as noble and liberating in retrospect by future generations, and that terror is the 
quickest and most effective way to destroy restrictive social conventions.  The use of dynamite 
and assassinations was perceived as the only way to effectively communicate a message of 
social revolution, and the first wave can be described as embodying the notion of ‘propaganda 
 
50 Rapoport, David C., “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11”, Anthropoetics VIII 1 (Spring / 
Summer 2002).  http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror/ (Accessed 20 September 2019). 
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by the deed’.51  This idea was first articulated in 1877, in an article by the same name written 
by Paul Brousse with the support of Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, and argued that 
conventional forms of propaganda were unable to adequately reach and rally the masses to 
effect necessary radical social change, and should thus be supplemented by violent action.52  
This violent propaganda, in turn, was facilitated by the advent of mass international 
communication which was able to rapidly and effectively disseminate news of both anarchist 
ideology and actions.  The first group to embody propaganda by the deed was the Narodnaya 
Volya (People’s Will), and it “created a doctrine of strategy for terror, and inheritance for 
successors to use, improve, and transmit.”53  Crucial to cementing this doctrine was Nechaev’s 
Revolutionary Catechism, which outlined not only the purpose of violence conducted outside 
of the scope of moral conventions regulating its use, but also framed the actions of 
revolutionaries as duties carried out in accordance with relations to the self, fellow 
revolutionaries, and society at large; both the corrupt society which was the object of struggle 
and the ideal one which would be realised in revolution.54  A final important note on the first 
wave is the fact that those who were empowered by propaganda by the deed considered 
themselves proud to be terrorists.  In one famous instance, Russian anarchist Vera Zasulich 
wounded a police officer who had abused political prisoners.  She threw her weapon to the 
ground and declared that she was not a killer; she was a terrorist.55  Her trial quickly became 
an indictment of the Czarist regime and its abuses, and when she was freed, Zasulich was 
heralded as a popular hero.   
 The second wave was precipitated by the treaty of Versailles, which ignited the hope 
for self-determination in the form of anti-colonial terrorism.56  Mandate status was applied to 
territories in which independence was not seen as being immediately feasible, and this was 
perceived as an abuse of colonial power and incongruent with principles of self-determination.  
The legitimacy of empire was questioned, and according to Rapoport terrorist groups emerged 
in all imperial domains to contest subjugation.  Tactically, the second wave differed from the 
 
51 Fleming, Marie, “Propaganda by the deed: Terrorism and anarchist theory in late nineteenth-century 
Europe”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 4 (1980), 1-23. 
52 Fleming, 4.   
53 See Rapoport.   
54 See Nechayev, Sergey Genadievich.  The Revolutionary Catechism.  
https://www.marxists.org/subject/anarchism/nechayev/catechism.htm (Accessed 23 June 2020). 
55 Ulam, Adam B., In The Name of the People (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 269. 
56 See Rapoport.   
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first and it reoriented away from high profile assassinations towards the systematic targeting 
of police and enforcement personnel who were the eyes and ears of imperial entities abroad, as 
well as their institutions.  Through the debilitation of colonial infrastructure, this was intended 
to simultaneously weaken the morale of imperial populations while fortifying the resolve of 
subject peoples by forcing imperial forces to commit atrocities in response to acts of 
terrorism.57  Guerrilla tactics became a mainstay of second wave terrorism, and two important 
changes took place.  First, the causes of terrorists became more legitimate in the eyes of 
international observers in that they were framed as struggles for the same rights of self-
determination as those afforded to other peoples in former imperial territories.58  Second, 
terrorists began referring to themselves as freedom fighters as opposed to first wave terrorists, 
and as such, “governments (…) began to describe all violent rebels as terrorists.”59  This 
terminological reconfiguration symbolically attempted to legitimise the state’s defence of its 
interests, inside or beyond its sovereign borders, and established the ability to classify any 
organisation that pursued aims in conflict with those of the state as illegitimate and criminal, 
regardless of their individual motivations or aspirations.  
 The third wave, terrorism of the new-left, began after the catalyst of the Vietnam War.  
The idea that a Western superpower could be defeated by guerrilla insurgencies resonated 
worldwide, and this was combined with the fact that the legitimacy of national Western 
political agendas were being increasingly questioned by domestic, especially younger, 
populations.60  In the third wave, radicalism was combined with nationalism that was the 
natural evolution of the drive for self-determination that had characterised the previous wave, 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation became emblematic of the new left.  In its terrorist 
assaults on Israeli interests, which were framed as proxies of American hegemony, the PLO 
succeeded in public perception where Arab armies had failed in the 1960s and 1970s, and thus 
“its very existence was a statement that terror offered more hope than conventional military 
forces.”61  This point is important because it conceptually built on the framing that had 
occurred in the second wave that pitted states against any opposing actor branded a terrorist.  
 
57 See Rapoport.   
58 For a discussion on the debate regarding framing between terrorists and freedom fighters, see Ganor, Boaz, 
“Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”, Police Practice and Research 3:4 
(2002), 287-304.   
59 See Rapoport. 
60 Ibid.   
61 Ibid.   
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The third wave provided the ability for terrorist organisations to intellectually claim to pursue 
notions of self-perceived legitimate statehood and self-determination without adhering to 
conventional Westphalian models that dictated what a state should look like and how it should 
behave.  In this wave, international terrorism as a term was revived and terrorist organisations 
increasingly relied on international diasporas of supporters.  Hijacking became the weapon of 
choice, demonstrating a penchant for spectacular acts which, due to increased broadcasting of 
international news, could be replayed on screens around the globe.62  Finally, the third wave 
saw an increase in international counterterror cooperation as states began to recognise the 
transnational capabilities and aspirations of terrorist organisations.   
 The fourth wave, characterised by religious violence, was catapulted and enabled by 
two key events, both of which took place in 1979.  These were the Iranian Revolution, and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Importantly, 1979 was the beginning of a new Islamic 
century, a time at which in Islamic tradition a redeemer would arrive to revitalise the faith and 
restore Islamic prosperity.63  According to Rapoport, the Iranian Revolution “provided proof 
that religion now had more political appeal than the prevailing revolutionary ethos”, and 
despite the fact that the battlefield impact of Islamic Mujahidin was negligible in the ultimate 
defeat of the USSR, the totality of the Afghan war experience conveyed the idea that “religion 
now manifested the ability to eliminate a secular superpower.”64  For Rapoport, the fourth 
wave, defined by the hope of uniting the global Muslim umma in a Caliphate, is based on its 
drive to “strengthen Islamic rebel groups in various states of the Sunni world, an effort 
Americans help frustrate by supporting existing states organised on national lines, which many 
see as residues of collapsed colonial empires.”65  Fourth wave groups incorporated systematic 
use of suicide terrorism into their modus operandi, and ongoing technological improvements 
in social media and global broadcasting have enabled groups to reach a vast audience of both 
potential recruits and third party viewers.66  Rapoport stated that the fourth wave, while being 
 
62 Biernatzki, W.E., “Mass Media: Collaborators with Terrorists”, Communication Research Trends 21:2 (2002), 3-
42. 
63 This belief is attributed to a saying of the Prophet Muhammad: “The Messenger of God said, “At the 
beginning of every century God will send to this community one who will renew its religion.” (Abu Da’ud)” See 
Eaton, Charles Le Gai, The Book of Hadith; Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, from the Mishkat al-Masibah 
(California: The Book Foundation, 2008), 12.   
64 See Rapoport.   
65 See Rapoport.   
66 For more on the relationship between terrorist groups, its audiences, and the media, see Conway, M. and 
McInerney, L. (eds), “Terrorism in ‘old’ and ‘new’ media”, Media, War & Conflict 5:3 (Special Edition 2012), 3-5.   
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the most dangerous of the waves, will terminate in 2025.67  Commensurate with his 
assessment that individual groups exhibit lifespans shorter than those of the waves, Rapoport 
wrote in 2002 that “at this writing, Al-Qaeda seems destroyed.”68           
 
 1.3 Alternatives to the Waves 
 Rapoport’s four wave theory remains seminal in terrorism studies, and is emblematic 
of the sociological method which attempts to generalise and categorise social phenomena 
based on similarities which transcend time and space.69  Notwithstanding, Rapoport 
acknowledged that he did not intend for his work to be conclusive in the field; rather he 
envisioned it as a blueprint for future research.70  One of the criticisms of the wave theory is 
that it does not account for the importance of local dynamics in catalysing terrorism.71  Jeffrey 
Kaplan argued that when taken into consideration, local dynamics can produce terrorist groups 
which do not respond to unifying catalysts that would enable grouping them together, but 
rather these groups themselves become triggers for ongoing political violence.  He posited 
considering these groups as unique and constituting a fifth wave of terrorism, and he 
enumerated 17 characteristics that they would share.72  For the present discussion, the two 
most pertinent points of Kaplan’s fifth wave theory are that they possess intrinsic self-
awareness and knowledge of their own cultural history, and that their “guiding dream is to 
create a new world – a utopian society to be realised in this lifetime.”73  Kaplan’s theory 
utilized the case studies of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army and the Sudanese Janjaweed and 
predates the advent of ISIS, but his argument that a combination of localism and nationalism 
couched in culturally specific rhetoric can add dynamism to the wave theory and enable 
further paradigmatic studies of terrorism is valuable moving forward.   
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 Similarly, in 2019 Honing and Yahel argued that the advent of Terrorist Semi-States 
(TSSs) in MENA and Pakistan could potentially constitute a distinct fifth wave of terrorism.74  
These authors stipulated that as opposed to regular terrorist organisations, TSSs displayed both 
conventional military and terrorist capabilities, provided state functions in areas of territorial 
administration, and while they governed in power vacuums created by weak or failed states, 
they continued to launch terrorist attacks against 3rd party countries.75  The enabling condition 
for this wave was “the sense of Islamists especially in the Arab world that the political avenue 
for gaining power was effectively blocked.”76  While the authors stated that there can be no 
definite answer as to whether the behaviour of TSSs such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Jabhat al-
Nusra, among others, are due to religious doctrine, they posited that they are primarily guided 
by the real-politik goal of expanding political power.  Furthermore, they argued that it was 
unclear whether TSSs should be considered a distinct wave, or part of Rapoport’s fourth, and 
that the territorial defeats of ISIS could be considered indicative of TSSs self-defeating 
proclivity to maintain commitment to a revisionist ideology despite changing circumstances.77  
Perhaps the most important detail of this speculative theory is that the authors predicted that 
TSSs would play a dominant role in the future of terrorism by “changing the nature of 
interactions between different terrorist groups.”78  This point is crucial, and as of this writing 
remains an understudied aspect in the field of terrorism studies. 
 The final alternative to Rapoport’s wave theory, and the most comprehensive, is that 
provided by Parker and Sitter in 2016 which argued that terrorism should not be conceived of 
as occurring in temporal waves, rather that it should be viewed as a phenomenon which can 
occur within distinct strains, all of which exist conterminously.79  The authors proposed four 
distinct strains: nationalism, socialism, religious extremism, and social exclusion.  They 
argued that terms such as freedom fighter had been used well before the second and third 
waves, as evidenced by an 1853 pamphlet in which German revolutionary Karl Heinzen 
coined the term and became the first in the modern period to publicly “articulate the use of 
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violence, even mass murder, by individuals to effect political change.”80  Furthermore, they 
offered the idea that when terrorism is viewed as strains it becomes apparent that Al-Qaeda’s 
ideological writings have more in common with core texts of communist insurgencies than 
with Islam itself.81  The most important observation of this theory is that it rejected 
generalisations as dangerous, and instead relied on the perspective adopted by Jessica Stern, 
who used the term ‘protean enemy’ to refer to terrorism due to its constantly changing 
nature.82       
        
 1.4 Locating The Islamic State (ISIS) 
 ISIS proclaimed the formation of its Caliphate in June 2014,83 and in the years since, 
the group has conducted and inspired atrocities worldwide that have captured global attention 
to the extent that enumerating them here is not necessary.  The violent actions of the group 
towards fellow Muslims, and its rhetoric encouraging the slaughter of those who stand in the 
way of the Caliphate would tend to conform to the above definitions of terrorism in regards to 
both their political objectives and symbolic intention to harm a ‘demonised other’.  In the 
nearly two decades since 9/11, numerous studies have undertaken examinations of religious 
terrorism, Islamic terrorism in particular, and ISIS in detail; yet questions about the group, its 
underlying motives, and resilience endure.84  Part of this may arise from the fact that ISIS does 
not seem to fit neatly into either Rapoport’s fourth wave, or any of the delineated alternatives.  
The debates surrounding ISIS revolve around its status in comparison to Al-Qaeda, and 
attempt to discern what the group ultimately wants, and the degree to which it is, or isn’t, 
‘Islamic’.85  These debates build on each other and more often than not result in more 
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questions than answers, and this is compounded by the shifting nature of the subject of inquiry 
as encapsulated above in the idea of a protean enemy.  Fundamental questions endure which 
reflect the sociological method of inquiry which seeks to discern the relationship between 
human agency and structure insofar as there exists friction between those who stipulate that 
political violence leads to violent readings of the Qur׳an in ISIS ideology, and those who 
assert that fundamental belief drives violent action.86  Furthermore, creating a unified 
framework for understanding ISIS which must underlie any informed program for countering 
it is hindered in that “religion as a topic makes most Western scholars extremely 
uncomfortable: not only do they not understand the Islamic faith well, but also dwelling too 
much on religious ideology surely risks accusations of bigotry.  So they negate religious 
ideology as a causal mechanism.”87 
 ISIS is not a state in the Westphalian sense, and since its territorial demise at the hands 
of a military coalition can no longer claim to be a Caliphate in the strictest Islamic terms.  It is 
not, however, a terrorist organisation as far as the term itself has been described and applied to 
categorical studies of organisations.  Stating this is not a denial of its brutality, nor is it to say 
that the group has not conducted terrorist activities; it is, however, an assertion that ISIS is 
ideologically and physically unique in ways that have not been fully examined and evaluated.  
As was mentioned above, Honing and Yahel argued that the legacy of TSSs will be that they 
will shape the future of terrorism in their interactions with other organisations, and while ISIS 
has been studied in its relationship to Al-Qaeda, sufficient attention has not been devoted to 
uncovering the true meaning and implications behind the friction between the two groups in 
their struggle to claim vanguard status in a resurgent victorious umma.   
In order to conceptualise ISIS, it is necessary to cautiously remove the label of terrorist 
organisation, and this has not yet fully taken place.  The group must be removed from any 
categorisation which seeks to apply generalisations, and must be examined from its own 
cultural reference points.  ISIS shares characteristics with groups from all four of the waves 
yet it seems to exist outside of them.  It is the product of the convergence of numerous 
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historical and intellectual trajectories and an analysis of its rhetoric, methodology, aspirations, 
and subsequent appeal against a backdrop of all of these has never been undertaken.  While 
numerous works have explored the details of certain aspects of ISIS ideology, and juxtaposed 
them with similar instances in Islamic history, it is necessary to combine these with a 
consideration of the manner in which ISIS very fundamentally has acted and been shaped by 
intellectual mechanisms which informed the birth and endurance of the secular nation state.  
ISIS is a product of its environment insofar as it responded to local cultural dynamics, internal 
quarrels within Islamism, but also to the political reality dominated by Westphalian states.  
Upon evaluation, it will be seen that ISIS can potentially be better understood by removing the 
constrictive label of ‘terrorist organisation’ and by rationalising its aspirations and intellectual 
mechanisms against metrics in both Islamic history and, paradoxically, the very relationship 
between authority, sovereignty and violence which was crystallised in the modern state by the 
use of deliberate and systematic terror.  As was noted above, definitions of terrorism and 
Rapoport’s theory, as well as its alternatives, presuppose the sole legitimacy of violence as 
purview of the nation state.  Locating ISIS as an actor both in the international geopolitical 
realm as well as within the jihadisphere of contemporary Islamic terrorism requires a scrutiny 
of it as an actor which does not simply seek to alter political realities through the application 
of violence, but as an entity which seeks to replace global hegemonic systems by both 
challenging and recreating the very means by which they came into existence.  Beyond 
understanding it in this way, it will be useful to consider the salience of ISIS ideology and the 
implications it has for the future of terrorism and Islamic state building by viewing it from the 
perspective of social group dynamics, and the ways in which ideas like power, violence and 
transcendence evolve to shape group perceptions.  By adopting this novel approach, perhaps a 
deeper understanding can contribute to more unified approaches to confronting such a 
dangerous phenomenon.  This does not intend to dismiss the validity of Rapoport’s theory, or 
any of its alternatives, or deny the tremendous contributions of scholars who have produced 
works on ISIS, Al-Qaeda, religious terrorism, and Islamism.  It does, however, intend to 
broaden the discussion by considering aspects of the human social condition and accumulated 
intellectual and political heritage, and how these are capitalised on by ISIS, in ways that have 
not yet been explored, and which will hopefully contribute to existing frameworks.      





The Human Quest for Transcendence: Social Groups Dynamics 
 
The term ‘social group’ does not necessarily invoke images of power, righteousness, or 
transcendence.  However, if one were to ask randomly chosen individuals across different 
social, linguistic, and cultural settings what their highest aspirations were; or what they felt 
would constitute the noblest of purposes in life, chances are that a significant number of 
answers would include elements such as the desire to be a part of something larger than 
themselves.  Answers like “doing something significant” or “contributing to a worthy cause” 
lack specific details as to what precise actions or causes the respondent considers ‘significant’ 
or ‘worthy’.  Precisely because they do, they demonstrate the underlying issue that 
conceptions of the highest ideals to which humans aspire revolve around concertedly linking 
the individual self to an entity or idea which has the ability to carry out actions subjectively 
considered to be of the highest moral standard, and which transcend the physical limitations of 
the individual.  
 To illuminate this subject, this section will first describe the processes by which social 
groups form, and continue to discuss their traits and characteristics.  Next this section will 
explore the mechanisms social groups rely on for survival, and will conclude with an analysis 
of the relationship between the individual, the group, and subjective identity.  The ISIS case 
study which is the subject of future chapters, and the effective answering of the research 
question based on Foucault’s genealogical method relies on successfully problematising social 
phenomena.  For this reason, the underlying fundamental dynamics of the human social 
condition must be explored, to then overlay them onto a scrutiny of the abovementioned case 
study, and contemporary frameworks for approaching terrorism.       
 
 2.1 Social Group Formation 
A social group is a collective of people that are joined around a sense of sameness for a 
shared purpose.88  Humans are by nature social beings, and social group dynamics have been 
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driving forces behind some of the most momentous transformations in world history.  While 
the role of agency is important, it is the mutually reinforcing dynamic between individuals and 
their constructed groups which is critical to understand in the study of socio-political 
evolution. 
Social groups form around the common acceptance of certain beliefs which inform 
patterns of behaviour and this occurs because as competitive social animals, human beings 
require both allies and enemies.  In any arena there will never exist a homogeneity of beliefs, 
and so choosing to affiliate with one specific set of beliefs in contrast to another helps to 
alleviate the anxiety of social isolation, and establishes a degree of certainty within an 
otherwise uncertain social landscape.  Cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker described social 
groups as marketplaces of cooperation between actors of varying degrees of trustworthiness, 
which form as the result of the fact that a natural preference for one’s own kind develops early 
in life and is something which must be unlearned, rather than learned.89  Jeffrey Murer posited 
that the practices that result from shared beliefs act as magnets to unaffiliated individuals that 
come within their range.90  In this regard, if individuals are prone to gravitate towards others 
they perceive as being similar to themselves, then they will also gravitate towards the 
participation in practices that are representative of the characteristics that demarcate said 
similarities.   
Social groups also form as the result of the intrinsic awareness of death.  The 
realization that life is finite and existence therefore potentially insignificant leads to the need 
of individuals to associate their lives and actions with transcendent purpose.  By doing so, 
humans are able to avoid what Roger Griffin called the “terror of an absurd death”.91  By 
voluntarily participating in acts of association with a set of shared beliefs, individuals can feel 
that they have contributed to the endurance of a set of principles which will outlive them and 
have thus assisted in maintaining a significant reality.  Furthermore, by doing this, individuals 
reap both the tangible physical benefits of group protection in a competitive social space as 
well as the aforementioned spiritual ones.  The power of a commonly held set of beliefs to 
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provide both this worldly and spiritual set of benefits was identified by Peter Berger in what 
he called the “Sacred Canopy”.92  Different groups in different cultural contexts may stress the 
importance of certain aspects of the sacred canopy over others.  For some groups the promise 
of an eternal afterlife in paradise is central, while others may stress the physical benefits of 
membership.  This dualistic benefit and the power of framing to encourage affiliation in ways 
that satisfy both fundamental human needs and contextually specific cultural problems is the 
primary reason that social groups form in response to specific social conditions or problems.  
The physical sheltering from social injustice offered by group membership and the 
transcendent promise that group beliefs will ultimately triumph over injustice makes a sacred 
canopy alluring.     
 
2.2 Traits and Characteristics of Social Groups  
Perhaps the most important characteristic of social groups is their ability to imbue 
reality with meaning.  Meaning is not inferred by professing to hold certain beliefs, but is 
cultivated over time and woven into the very ways in which individuals view the world 
through socially produced and shared patterns of behaviour.  Meaning is derivative of the 
function of an action in relation to the contemporary needs of the group in question, the 
relevance of that action to the historical trajectory of that group, and the degree to which it is 
reflective of methods portrayed as being legitimate tools for achieving certain goals deemed to 
be of critical importance to the group.  One of the primary ways in which this is achieved is 
that groups deliberately create distinctions of ‘us vs them’.93  This can be understood as a 
necessary evolutionary paradigm in a competitive social space, so in this regard social groups 
are not only fundamentally interest groups in competition for resources, but ones which are 
highly self-aware of both their existence and their difference from others.94  By default, these 
self-aware groups emerge out of contact with groups deemed ‘other’ and therefore constitute a 
mobilized collective identity.   
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Once the distinction between ‘us and them’ has been made, social groups have the 
ability and proclivity to not only dissociate from those deemed ‘other’ but also dehumanize 
them.  This can be understood as a necessary step in affirming the superiority of the belief 
system around which the group had formed in the first place.  Individuals will not willingly 
engage in acts of association that represent values systems that are at the core of a social group 
if they consider these to be questionable.  Therefore, they must be framed as not only 
affirmative and relevant, but also as absolute.  The belief and values system around which a 
group forms then becomes the foundation for a Manichean paradigm within which the values 
held by group members come to represent absolute truths and standards for belief and 
behaviour that transcend human barriers to observance.  In this framing, individuals within the 
group are deemed to be enlightened and righteous while those outside of it are equated with 
the opposite of absolute truth: absolute evil and decadence.  The reasoning behind this is that 
individuals within a society in which information is readily accessible, must have been aware 
of the presence of a group choosing to engage in communal activities that represent the 
observance of beliefs, which in turn are informed by absolute truths and values.  Willingly 
choosing to not affiliate with these absolute truths and values, therefore, must be taken as an 
indication that the individual in question does not possess either the intellectual faculties or 
moral awareness to recognize universal values and choose to embrace them.  In a mutually 
reinforcing cycle, the dehumanization of those deemed ‘other’ also serves to continuously 
elevate the perceived righteousness of the group itself.  By consistently affirming the evil of 
‘the other’ and conscientiously engaging in activity of differentiation, this activity is 
increasingly strengthened as morally superior due to both its representation of universal values 
and its ability to demonstrate the endurance of said values despite obstacles presented by the 
presence of evil. 
Closely associated with the distinction that is created between ‘us and them’ is the 
characteristic of social groups to incorporate into their belief systems the memories of past 
victories and traumas.  Social groups as upholders of a dualistic sacred canopy must 
necessarily straddle the divide between the tangible world and a transcendent reality, as 
evident in the need to associate worldly actions with a set of values portrayed as being 
universal and not bounded by time and space.  The pioneer in psychoanalysis Carl Jung 
distinguished between “reality thinking” and “fantasy thinking”;95 and while he considered 
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this distinction to be evolutionarily non-productive and primitive, the need to reconcile that 
gap between the two lies at the foundation of the attempts of social groups to establish 
meaning and a desired social order.  By incorporating memories of past victories and traumas, 
social groups link individuals with a series of values, and the lived experiences of past 
members.  This creates a framework and timeline for causation, justification, and response 
which spans generations, and allows for individual group members in the present to carry out 
actions against members of the dehumanized ‘other’ as they may consider them to be 
representatives of their predecessors in a similar paradigm, even if those individual ‘others’ do 
not.  Ultimately, the intellectual construction of an action as having direct bearing on events of 
the distant past, and therefore also occupying a place in a series of events to be called on by 
future generations, is what imbues that action with subjective transcendent meaning.  By thus 
giving meaning to individual actions, the social reality in which those actions are carried out is 
transformed into a representative plane of existence in which larger battles are fought over the 
relative supremacy of a universal set of values at that given moment in time.   
While these traits and characteristics will be observed and manifest differently by 
different groups, in different socio-cultural contexts, they become ingrained frames of 
reference for the conduct of everyday activities and subsequent political relationships.  For 
instance, many Western democracies routinely conduct election monitoring in developing 
nations, make the distribution of economic aid conditional upon the observance of certain 
patterns of political conduct, or make public declarations imploring other states to adopt their 
own formulas for success.  While Steven Pinker noted that the observance of democratic 
government itself did correlate with declines in cultural violence and the suffering of a 
population96, it is important to note that in the scope of analysing the behaviour and interaction 
of social groups, one group’s values are stipulated as being absolutely true.  Despite the fact 
that models for social governance must develop organically, certain values of democratic 
governance and their accompanying social actions in this discussion are considered 
universally righteous and applicable across socio-cultural divides, and stand in stark contrast 
to those deemed ‘other’, therefore inferior.  This example is intended to illustrate that even 
models of behaviour which are considered normal, mundane, and even benevolent or 
humanitarian in our nation-centric model of international geopolitics, demonstrate the 
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applicability of basic social group characteristics that elevate one set of beliefs and practices 
over another.                      
 
2.3 How Social Groups Survive and are Maintained 
Social spaces are dynamic, fluid environments in which actors compete for relative 
influence.  At any given time, certain actors may be more successful at asserting relative 
dominance, so social groups must recognize the need for malleability to face uncertain social 
realities.  One of the core characteristics of groups is the need to distinguish between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and in this regard then a group is more readily defined by its boundary than by what 
that boundary encloses.97  Groups must constantly be remade and reimagined to adjust to an 
evolving social space, and to do this it is the boundary that fluctuates in both its measure of 
inclusivity and rigidity of enforcement.  This is not due to drastic changes in group values, but 
because the boundary demarcates those eligible to receive the benefits of membership and 
upholds pillars of differentiation.  These two markers of group identity must be observed 
according to contemporary social needs to ensure the persistence of universal values into a 
cosmological future of perpetual applicability.   
In order to achieve this, social groups must incorporate survival mechanisms both 
internally within the group, and vis-à-vis ‘the other’.  According to Sigmund Freud, there exist 
different types of social groups; those that are homogeneous or diverse, those that are 
primitive or structured, and those which are natural or artificial.98  All social groups are 
artificial in the way Freud defined them, in that they require an external force to keep them 
together, and in Freud’s paradigm, libidinal ties with both the external force and fellow 
members are the two cognitive mechanisms which ensure group survival.99  He argued that the 
external force is an illusion of the presence of some higher power that cares about its 
community of followers, to which individuals must pledge absolute devotion.  The recognition 
of the same pledge of obedience and adherence being upheld by others is what generates 
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libidinal ties with fellow group members.  In this regard, libidinal ties between members of 
social groups as framed by Freud are self-reinforcing group regulatory mechanisms.  
Freud called them libidinal ties, but what is crucial is that the mutual understandings of 
both the relationships with sources of ultimate authority, framed as the fulfillment of values 
deemed true and universal, as well as those between individuals that recognize said authority, 
lie at the intellectual foundation of the survival of social groups.  Finally, because the illusory 
external force is benevolent equally and only towards those who recognize its authority, social 
group members perceive themselves as instrumental in the performance of a plan which is 
understood as the fulfillment of universal and transcendent values, by upholding socio-
political structures that govern norms of behaviour.   
Social groups ensure their longevity by establishing institutions that have the ability to 
represent the transcendent values of their sacred canopies and guarantee tangible benefits to 
their members.  In the approach adopted in this thesis, an institution is more than simply a 
governing body or identifiable organisation.  It is instead a “Long lasting or permanent 
standardized set of beliefs, behaviors, and values, usually expressed in sets of roles and the 
relationships between these roles.”100  This can be thought of as a multi-tiered developmental 
process in which ideas are first theorized, then linked to values in a historical trajectory, and 
then used as the foundations for rules.  This process can be repeated in the presence of 
changing external circumstances.  As the first step in this process, social groups create 
ideologies.  An ideology is best described as a “formal and articulated system of meanings, 
values, and beliefs, of a kind that can be abstracted as a “world-view””.101  This definition, 
given by Raymond Williams in 1976 is emblematic of his attack on the structuralist approach 
to studying cultural interactions.  He offered the idea instead of a “structure of feeling”, and 
framed it as the foundation of social structure that is manifest in the lived experiences and 
interactions of members of a community.102  An ideology, therefore, provides the intellectual 
groundwork for the establishment of rules that reflect an understanding of a group’s perceived 
place in history, and the appropriate methods of expressing this through actions.  This 
expression, in turn, is carried out in a symbolic system of communications which, according to 
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Rene Girard, enables societal differentiation.103  Furthermore, the expression of culture in its 
inception is itself a mechanism for differentiation from ‘the other’ which lies at the heart of 
social groups.  It is valuable to understand here the role that creation myths have in informing 
this culture, as according to Girard, they reinterpret ongoing crises in light of the social order 
that has resulted from them.104  This in turn is reflective of the social group characteristic that 
internalises past experiences in a cosmological narrative, and links them to the present and 
future in a series of communications unique to the social groups that produced the myths in 
question.   
This process yields a cultural hegemony which constitutes a particular set of practices 
and expectations, regarding the appropriate roles and interactions both within and without the 
group.  These practices and expectations are then articulated in a creed, and this is framed as 
the codification of the beliefs that inform, and justify, patterns of behaviour as the expressions 
of universally applicable values that result from access to undisputed truth.  Creeds 
demonstrate the belief that the group articulating a set of values in text are doing so in 
recognition of, and to claim the observance of, universal truths.  Following this, they express 
the solidarity that is to be achieved in perpetuity through the common recognition of, and 
respect for, an external force which generates universal values and bestows physical as well as 
transcendent benefits on its adherents.  Finally, they outline patterns of behaviour to express 
this recognition in ways that can then be governed by overseeing organisations.  They do this 
with the understanding that while the individuals that comprise the organisations may be 
transient, the organisations themselves will endure by virtue of the fact that they represent 
universally applicable truths and are therefore immune to the ravages of humanity.105 
These creeds can be upheld in the structures of a nation state, a religious organization, 
a charity foundation, or a non-governmental organization.  Furthermore, additional texts can 
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be produced by members of a social group to further establish rules of governance and 
interaction.  By doing this over time, social groups may fracture over issues regarding disputes 
as to how the original group creed should be understood and implemented in behavioral 
practices.  The poignant issue is the accusation that certain factions within the group failed to 
correctly observe the practices prescribed as the manifestation of a wholly righteous ideology.  
The crucial consideration here is the fact that social groups use ideology to establish a creed 
and follow on texts that both govern behaviour, and serve as the basis for future rules 
governing interactions within and without the group.  Because this occurs due to 
understanding the original source of the ideology as access to universal truths, principles, and 
values, the institutions created in this progression are considered legitimate beyond worldly 
reproach.  This progression is precisely how individuals and social groups put their actions 
into an active dialogue with the past, present, and future.  By thinking of this multi-directional 
interaction of cause and effect as the way in which humans imbue any practice, or 
interpretation of reality with meaning, a comprehensive picture is formed of the discourse 
produced by any social group.  
One final critical issue is that as it relates to a group’s survival, a creed will be all 
encompassing and provide for an array of contingencies.  If a group’s survival depends on the 
recognition of its system of values and practices as supreme, then by default all other belief 
systems constitute an existential threat.  When a group’s worldview is presented as being 
under threat, specific aspects and mechanisms of a creed will be favoured and turned to in 
order to justify eliminating opposing worldviews.  Ideological focus will shift from credal 
aspects that emphasize group benefits in a passive environment to those that serve to define 
and reinforce the group boundary to survive in a dangerous one.  For groups to be able to 
survive in a dynamic and fluid social space in the present, the ideology, creed and institutions 
they create must incorporate mechanisms both of passivity and assertiveness. 
 
2.4 The Relationship between Individuals, Groups, and Identity 
The relationship between the group and individual identity is not a causal one, rather it 
is a mutually reinforcing cycle that shapes individual and collective identities to result in 
individual empowerment and group resilience.  The theory of personal identity, exemplified 
by the works of Sheldon Stryker, focuses on what it is that makes each person unique as 
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defined by their personal experiences.  The collective of these individuals in a demographic 
then produces a consensus of socio-cultural factors which affects social interaction and group 
dynamics.  Role identity theory as elaborated by George J. McCall defines an individual’s 
identity as the role played when holding certain social positions.  Therefore, identity is 
relational because people in a group will interact based on their relative hierarchical positions 
both within and without the group.  The theory of social identity, given primarily by Henri 
Tajfel, argues that a person’s concept of self will be formed through the knowledge of his or 
her membership in a meaningful collective; and that through this identity individuals will 
simplify and understand the world by differentiating the meaningful group from ‘the other’.  
Finally, the collective identity theory as pioneered by Alberto Melucci focuses on individuals 
in action.  This is to say, that this theory holds that collective group consciousness and identity 
will be created through individual actions in the pursuit of a common agenda or goal.106   
Given the above, theories of identity creation in a social sphere can be grouped into 
those focusing primarily on the individual as the prime mover in identity creation and social 
action, and those which give primacy to the group.  These two schools of thought are now 
linked to the social scientists who first elaborated on them definitively.  Sociologist Max 
Weber studied society through the modes of action of individuals and their accompanying 
behaviour.  He believed that individuals were rational and that over time, they would devise 
means to accomplish certain ends and join together to do so in a logical course of action.  
Emile Durkheim, by contrast, studied social groups by emphasizing structure.  He argued that 
humans draw their actions from the surroundings of their social groups and those of others, 
and that these groups are entities separate from the individual, which compel individuals to act 
in certain ways within their given parameters.107  For Weber, therefore, society as the 
institutionalisation of social group beliefs exists solely as a function of human behaviour, 
whereas for Durkeim the opposite holds true.  This discussion demonstrates that in the field of 
sociology there is no consensus as to the appropriate method with which to attempt to 
determine causality in the creation of identity and the social action subsequently produced.  It 
also indicates that each of these theories exists because they have proven to have validity in 
 
106 Androit, Angie and Timothy J. Owens, “Identity”, Oxford Bibliographies, September 5 2014.  
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756384/obo-9780199756384-0025.xml  
(Accessed 4 January 2018).   
107 Durkheim, Emile, (Cladis, Mark S. (ed), Cosman, Carol (trans)), The Elementary forms of Religious Life (1912)  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).     
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certain cases.  This in turn means that each of these theories is useful insofar as they can be 
used not exclusively, but in conjunction with one another as appropriate in any case study to 
explore the roots of individual and group identity, and their relationship in creating social 
action in specific historical and cultural contexts.  
Given this background it is possible to consider how it relates to the creation of 
meaning that lies at the core of human yearning.  Peter Berger argued that individuals will 
make concerted efforts to create a sense of self that aligns with the core tenets of the group.  
Therefore, “The subjectively chosen identity becomes a fantasy identity, objectified within the 
individual’s consciousness as his “real self””.108  This results in a group absorbing subjectively 
created identities, and evolving over time as a whole constituted by the parts.  While Roy 
Bhaskar countered this by arguing that humans and society are not related dialectically by 
constituting two moments of the same process,109 it is precisely the symbiotic relationship 
between members and their social groups that provides both individual empowerment and 
group resilience.  While social structures may have the power to shape human actions, free 
will dictates that these structures of group ideology may do so without dictating them.  This in 
turn confirms the notion that both the theories of Weber and Durkheim must be considered in 
relation to one another.  Finally, the link between individuals, the group, and their 
cosmological narrative was perhaps best summarized by Karl Mannheim when he stated that 
on a theoretical level, man never purely exists outside of the social context and his or her 
individual imagination.  Furthermore, they can only exist by their actions and how these are 
perceived by others in the social group.110  In this assertion we can see a fusion of all four of 
the theories of identity outlined above, while combining them with the power of human 
imagination in creating meaning through self-construction and interpretation.  
When these actions are both carried out and interpreted through the lens of the 
ideology and creed of a social group; and mediated by both the textual narratives and 
institutions these produce, individuals will naturally gravitate towards those they feel a sense 
of ‘sameness’ with.  The word identity itself is derived from Latin and refers to the recognition 
 
108 Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 171.   
109 Bhaskar, Roy, The Possibility of Naturalism (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).   
110 Mannheim, Karl (Louis Wirth, trans), Ideology and Utopia; an Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge 
(Connecticut: Martino Fine Books, 2015).  
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of ‘same and same’.111  In this regard, to possess an identity is in fact the discovery of one’s 
intellectual, physical, emotional, or spiritual counterpart in some other individual or entity.  
Identity, therefore, is the result of a creed, ideology, and its structures being recognized by an 
individual as ‘same and same’ with the personal self.  To defend or uphold an ideology, then, 
becomes in a very real sense, indistinguishable from defending or upholding the self and all 
that entails.   
This process illustrates how the creation and mingling of identities yields both personal 
empowerment and group resilience.  To expand on this point, the concepts of emergence and 
entativity are crucial to consider.  Emergence is the “possibility that, when certain elements or 
parts stand in particular relation to one another, the whole that is formed has properties (…) 
that are not possessed by its constituent elements taken in isolation.”112  Similarly, entativity 
can be framed as an expansion of this, in that it is the consideration of something as original 
entity; abstracted from its attendant individuals.  In the sense of social identity theory, it refers 
to the perception that a set of people form a meaningful entity.113  When taken in conjunction, 
there exists then the paradigm that, when social groups form, they will possess traits and 
abilities that no single individual member is able to claim.  Furthermore, this group can then 
be perceived by its members as a pure entity.  When coupled with the recognition of ‘same 
and same’, a powerful bond emerges between the identity of the self and the collective.  As 
was discussed previously in this chapter, social groups are by necessity dynamic which means 
that they cannot demand absolute compliance and rigidity of their individual members in 
perpetuity.  Instead, groups must rely on contributions from individuals and by doing so, 
recognise the importance of the individual actor in question.  When an individual feels that his 
or her actions contribute to a group’s cause, said individual will increasingly associate with 
both the cause and the identity of the group.114  When this is carried out on a large level, it 
empowers individuals and provides protection for the group.  Individuals will be attracted to a 
creed, ideology, and its institutions, and be encouraged to demonstrate their commitment and 
act with agency in support of a cause greater than themselves.  This simultaneously promotes 
the group interests and protects the sacred canopy because not only does it expand its 
 
111 Murer, 290.   
112 Lewis, 210.   
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membership base, but it also has had action taken on its behalf, demonstrating the legitimacy 
of its message in contrast to others insofar as it is able to mobilise active support.  Whether the 
group stands or falls then depends on the resonance of the creed, and the relationship between 
the collective and individual identities.   
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has illustrated the processes through which social groups form, their traits 
and characteristics, and their strengths and vulnerabilities.  It has also drawn on different 
aspects of social theory to shed light on the dynamic between individuals and the groups they 
choose to associate with to better grasp the allure group identity has, and the way this affects 
both notions of human empowerment and group resilience.  Perhaps the most salient point is 
that paradoxically by associating with a group ideology and creed, individuals believe that 
they are able to choose their own fate and forge their own identity through action.  This can be 
especially alluring in cultural contexts in which identity may be socially prescribed, binding, 
or even culturally humiliating.  This newly forged identity may represent strength and 
certainty in an otherwise confusing social space, and will become a source of meaning to 
provide an explanatory framework for viewing the past, present, and idealised future.  
Furthermore, by aligning with a group and engaging in the meshing of purpose with other 
members and the group cause itself, individuals may be granting themselves immortality.  By 
conceptually rationalising the premise that if the self were to perish in the defense or 
promotion of a creed or ideology, then the values promoted by that creed and ideology would 
be allowed to survive in perpetuity, an individual may feel a sense of transcendence otherwise 
unachievable in daily life.  Ultimately groups depend on the actions of individuals to uphold a 
worldview against all others, and this depends in great measure on their ability to present a 
worldview as absolutely true and in contrast to any threat deemed ‘other’.   
By conceptually operating in a cosmological timeframe, social groups are able to 
engage actively with the past and present to envision a future in which their institutionalised 
belief system stands unopposed as recognised truth.  By utilising these types of narratives and 
linking them to an unfolding reality, groups may operate on a utopian premise.  Mannheim 
famously described a utopia as a state of mind which is incongruous with immediate reality, 
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which when manifest as action has the tendency to shatter the existing cultural order.115  
Furthermore, utopias usually make reference to times bygone so are by nature unfulfillable.  
By creating institutions based on a utopian premise and grounding these in rules called 
justified law; which prominent American jurist Robert M. Cover defined as the projection of a 
desired future on the immediate reality;116 groups presume to operate in a fashion which 
transcends temporal reality and norms governing traditional social interaction, and thus 
attempt to claim transcendent legitimacy.  In an interesting twist, therefore, if Mannheim’s 
assertion about utopias are correct, then perhaps the characteristic that provides most 
resilience to groups is their ability to effectively project utopias as within reach, but never 
fully achieve them.  By framing the narrative and applicability of a creed and ideology in this 
fashion, groups may ensure the resonance of their values system and continue to engage in the 
process of empowering individuals to actively uphold it.  Finally, this chapter has provided an 
explanatory framework that argues there this is no single applicable paradigm to social groups 
across a socio-cultural spectrum, but that there are an array of tools available which, when 
combined with an in depth knowledge of a particular historical context, may be drawn on to 
understand the meaning which individuals ascribe to themselves, their surroundings, and their 
actions.     
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Fundamentals of Religion 
 
 Religion is arguably one of the most fundamental yet controversial topics in the history 
of the evolution of mankind as a species.  As an idea, religion inherently embodies a plethora 
of paradoxes which can simultaneously be the cornerstones of collective inclusive identities 
and also serve as the basis on which to subjectively exclude selected individuals or 
demographics, or deny them rights and benefits belonging to a self-ascribed elect.  Even 
individuals in modern societies that disavow religion and claim the sole validity of atheism 
recognise the fact that religion in all its manifestations, and due to its utterly unique capacities 
as a mobilising force that drives and galvanises human thought and action, has been partially 
responsible, as cause or secondary effect, for many of the socio-political and cultural 
transformations that have defined the modern world as it exists today in both its physical 
structural manifestations and intellectual paradigmatic formulations.   
The relationship between religion as a humanly created construct, the individual 
intellect, and the immediate social reality is a dynamic and ever evolving force which has the 
ability to shape the present and the future; both in tangible ways and in the minds of vested 
individuals.  It is even more powerful when understood as the foundation of a social group.  
This section will first define religion and its role in human society in its ability to shape 
morality, behaviour, and identity.  Second, it will discuss the early evolution of monotheism 
and the associated changes this brought to existing social dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.  
Finally this section will progress to the conceptual ordering exhibited by Judeo-Christian 
worldviews in order to demonstrate the fundamental paradigms associated with these types of 
belief structures.         
 
3.1 What is Religion? 
The Oxford Dictionary defines religion as “The belief in and worship of a superhuman 
controlling power, especially a personal God or gods”.117  While this definition fits the way in 
 




which the vast majority of individuals conceive of religion in the 21st century, it does not do 
justice to the complexity and power of religion as a driving force in shaping world events.  
Roger Griffin defined it as “A totalizing cosmology, generally formulated within an extended, 
and constantly evolving, scriptural and ritual tradition and admitting many variant sectarian 
interpretations, postulating a suprahuman, metahistorical order which is manifest in atemporal 
laws or metaphysical patterns, and which endows human life with a narrative shape, ethical 
values, and ultimate meaning conceived as independent of human agency or will.”118  A 
crucial starting point in understanding the potency of religion is in recognising it as the 
product of human intellectual creativity beyond rational logic that seeks to ascribe meaning 
and purpose to everything it confronts, and establish connections to make sense of otherwise 
confusing or frustrating realities.  As a human construct, religions across time and space have 
displayed certain common features.  They posit the existence of supernatural beings, 
distinguish between the sacred and profane (or holy and worldly), contain ritual acts and a 
code of appropriate behaviour, provide a worldview to include the place of individuals within 
it, and establish a means of accessing this worldview.119  This last point is critical, as the 
ability to access this worldview in often framed as the means by which the divide between the 
ethereal and worldly can be bridged, thus linking the two in symbiotic purpose and harmony.   
According to Rene Girard, religion and human civilisational culture, consisting of 
symbols enabling cooperation and interaction, developed simultaneously and symbiotically.120  
In the earliest human settlements following the advent of agriculture, places of communal 
worship existed in the same structures as those which housed public and political officials and 
offices.121  To maintain the levels of cooperation necessary to ensure the functionality and 
endurance of novel systems of production and governance, mechanisms were needed to 
rationalise both the utility of said systems and the place of the individual within them.  
Religion, therefore, developed as the creation and propagation of myths which served three 
crucial functions in the blossoming of early human society in order to preserve the tenuous 
 
118 Griffin, 160.   
119 See Eller, Chapter 1.   
120 This construct underlies and serves as the foundational assumption for the following work: Girard, Rene, 
Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  Baltimore, 1979).     
121 The intricacies of the symbiotic development of early systems of religion, economics and politics are beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but is important to consider as a foundation for later developments that would seek to 
separate these elements that inform worldviews of a community of followers.  See Bentley, Jerry and Herbert 
Ziegler, Traditions & Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 30-45.   
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progress that had evolutionarily been accomplished: explanation, control, and legitimation.122  
The legitimation factor was twofold in that it needed to legitimise both novel systems of social 
organisation by framing them as ‘preferential’ and thus subjectively enlightened due to the 
access to and applicability of a power exceeding that of mere humanity; and it also needed to 
legitimise the human individuals and structures necessary to administer new social systems.  
In order to do this, a common set of foundational beliefs regarding issues such as origin, 
nature, language, and death, would be adopted as the paradigmatic basis for interpreting and 
experiencing reality, and these would be framed as beyond reproach due to their super-human 
source.  Subsequently, from these would flow norms for social interaction that would be 
viewed as the sole manifestation of appropriate behaviour insofar as they reflected a set of 
beliefs regarding de facto reality that existed sui generis.  Jack David Eller succinctly 
described the mechanisms relied on by early religion to achieve this, and it did so via models, 
mandates, and metaphysics.123  Religion provided models of behaviour to which humans 
should aspire, produced discourse and formulated knowledge which proscribed this behaviour 
to all individuals under its domain, and linked this behaviour to a reality unseen by the naked 
eye.   
In this framing, society is presented as a model that reflects standards beyond human 
nature to be discovered and upheld through sanctioned practices, reflective of explanatory 
beliefs which can only be maintained and enforced by legitimate representatives of 
otherworldly knowledge.  In this regard, Durkheim described religion as a symbolic 
representation of social relations which provides integration to establish a moral community 
based on shared values.  This in turn binds individuals and transforms them into a collective, 
making religion simultaneously representational, transformative, and constitutive.124  This is 
accomplished by the cognitive mechanism discussed in the previous chapter in which humans 
recognise “same and same” both in the beliefs and behaviour of others and therefore construct 
a sense of individual and collective identity.  Furthermore, this type of social religious activity 
is one which existed as part and parcel of communal survival and therefore was very much 
something that was lived, practiced, and ‘done’ rather than something which existed solely on 
a speculative level as theoretical belief.   
 
122 Eller, 70.   
123 Eller, 74.   
124 See Durkheim.     
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If religion developed as a structural mechanism by which to dictate the place and 
conduct of individuals within a social domain, then its objective will ultimately be the same as 
that of a social group within that same domain, namely self-sufficiency and survival.  To 
ensure this survival, awareness of a super-natural plane of existence and its reflection in social 
reality must be guided by a created framework of morality.  Beyond the framework 
popularised in Western religious traditions which postulates absolute morality as originating in 
a Divine aura, morality in a developmental social context should instead be conceived of as 
the natural outcome of premiums placed on specific behaviour to uphold particular modes of 
social interaction.  Morality, therefore, is subjectively defined by the beliefs underpinning 
social structural organisations, the behaviour that enables them, and the hierarchical authority 
which enforces them to ensure the survival of the collectively formed identity.  This dynamic 
balance is maintained via the concerted adoption of what Armando Salvatore called patterns of 
civility.  These, as behavioral norms, mediate the relationship between structures of power 
vested with the maintenance of a shared identity based on commonly held beliefs about the 
nature of worldly and ethereal existence, and the self-aware knowledge of that reality as the 
lived experience of those who share that belief.125   
Religion should be seen not as an eternal crystalised ideal, but rather as an ongoing 
psycho-sociological process that informs a worldview126 which can change as do the 
circumstances which either inhibit or enable the observance of that worldview.  Linking this 
idea of religion’s flexibility to the distinction between seen and unseen planes of existence, the 
idea of a god should not be viewed as an external reality as much as a fluid symbol of an 
ethical idea governing the interaction between those who share common beliefs, as well as 
with those who do not.  This type of distinguishing externalisation to dictate individual and 
societal ethics falls into the category of Jung’s fantasy thinking127, nevertheless it is crucial to 
understand that to those who employ patterns of civility reflective of culturally constructed 
idioms of shared beliefs, this fantasy thinking is intellectually understood as reality.   
 
125 This is the premise for the work which seeks to reconfigure the way we study Islam as both a society and 
religion, while critiquing the traditional Western methodology for social analysis and questioning its applicability 
to Islamic civilisation.  Salvatore, Armando, The Sociology of Islam.  Knowledge, Power and Civility (London: 
Wiley Blackwell, 2016).   
126 Ellens, 3.   
127 Jung in Eller, 48.   
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A common assumption is that faith and knowledge are diametrically opposed.   If 
knowledge itself is understood as everything which is assumed to exist, however, and in this 
capacity can structure beliefs, actions and identities, then religion does create and sustain its 
own kind of knowledge.  Perhaps not knowledge as empirical data; but knowledge 
nonetheless.  Crucially, it can be framed as knowledge which is absolutely certain, valid, and 
true, precisely because it is not empirically demonstrable.  In providing this certainty, this type 
of knowledge serves the psychological function of allaying anxiety experienced at the 
individual and social levels when confronted with the prospect of a tenuous and uncertain 
future.      
At its most basic, religion as a paradigm that is both socially constructed and 
individually felt may be summarised as a sense of awe, or an emotional overwhelming when 
faced with unexplainable realities or the prospect of insignificance.128  As an explanatory 
framework for the world, it seeks to do the same thing as modern science; but it does not do so 
from a rationally grounded perspective.  Instead, because it may originate from the prospect of 
insignificance, it may be born from a condition of utter despair whereas science often portrays 
itself as stemming from a position of rational optimism.  Fundamentally, religion is an all-
encompassing feeling, and a motivating driving force with the potential to structure power 
relations, forge collective identities, and inform the place of an individual in a reality which 
transcends the visible present.  Its purpose to the human condition was perhaps best captured 
by Friedrich Schleiermacher when he stated that as a feeling, manifest in the actions of those 
who feel it, it seeks to intuit the universe; to discern its nature and visible manifestation in 
human life.129  It is, therefore the attempt to attribute meaning to experiences and 
relationships, as well as find and solidify a cognitive relationship between the self, the social 
collective, and the universal whole to ensure synchronicity and the resultant harmonious 
existence while occupying a temporary seen plane of existence.  
 
3.2 Early Evolution of Monotheism 
 
128 Tylor, Edward Burnett, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, 
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Early religious beliefs developed symbiotically within distinct and unique cultures, and 
were characterised by monolatry; a system wherein a god, gods, spirits, or forces, could be 
worshipped by a group of people without denying the validity of other supernatural beings.  
Furthermore, these gods and forces were often viewed as co-inhabiting the physical location 
occupied by their worshippers, so norms of social interaction deemed moral were applicable 
only to the people and location in observance of given supernatural forces.130  The advent of 
writing and gradual growth of state-like entities and trade networks, led to geographic 
displacement of individuals who could take knowledge of their beliefs with them, against a 
backdrop of trade relations which formed the basis of competitive relations for resources 
against other previously unknown collective identities.  In this context of displacement and 
exchange of goods, personnel, and more importantly, knowledge, an individual’s belief system 
could become the means of maintaining an identity when confronted with alternative power 
structures and displays of normalised ethical behaviour which may have undermined his or her 
notion of morality.  One of the results of this type of clash is that religious belief was 
transformed from something which was locally grounded in a place and people to something 
which was portable, and that could be clung to as a badge of identity.  Another key 
development is that if an individual or group of individuals were displaced into the larger 
collective of a competing civilisation, they may have found themselves as a numerical 
minority; and faced critical treatment by local power structures due to the fact that their sense 
of moral behaviour clashed with codes of normalcy adopted by the host collective.    
Another result of this type of exchange was twofold.  As it became portable in that it 
represented a place, people, and normative idioms reflected in moral behaviour, religious 
belief began to form the basis for stark distinction with foreign power and social structures 
insofar as they represented the institionalisation of alternative belief systems.  As early states 
and peoples vied for influence and resources, situations resulted wherein competition between 
the relative validity and supremacy of belief systems themselves became a front in struggles to 
claim cultural relevance and ensure group prosperity despite adversity.  Another mechanism 
that evolved as a result of religion’s new found portability was an evangelical turn, which 
transformed it from something one was born into in a given place to something an individual 
could choose to affiliate with.  Morality and belief became more subjectively determined by 
the shifting desires and needs of a translocal and mobile community in relation to “the other”, 
 
130 Eller, P. 66.   
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as opposed to idioms which normalised existing intra-group relationships.  In order for this 
evangelism to achieve its purpose of bolstering the relative strength in numbers of a 
community of those self-ascribed ‘same and same’, belief systems themselves had to be 
transformed.  They had to evolve from being simply explanatory frameworks into revelations 
of absolute truth; universal precisely because they needed to appeal to an unforeseen and 
limitless demographic to ensure their own continuity and the wellbeing of their adherents.   
If belief systems were revamped to claim universal validity and truth in their systems 
of explanation, control, and legitimation via narratives of models, mandates, and metaphysics, 
then all other paradigms for interpreting the world by default became completely defined by 
error and untruth.  The gradual perceptual construction of this Manichean worldview further 
provided the basis for aligning individual adherents of competing, and therefore untrue, 
worldviews, with representations of perverted morality because they were based on faulty 
knowledge of the unseen plane of existence and its applicability in the here and now.  A 
singular deity, which assumed the roles and responsibilities of a plethora of previously 
venerated spiritual forces, could be conceived of as a projection of human ambition and ideal; 
a god which does all that humans do, but in benevolent, paternalistic perfection.  Furthermore, 
a singular deity became the ordering force in the universe; linking the seen and unseen and 
creating a cosmology of time which transcended human notions of temporal continuity.  This 
reformulation laid the foundations for notions of fate and predestination as ultimate divine 
objectives, and sui generis social conditions to be achieved by man as the physical link 
between the corporeal and ethereal realms of existence. This reflects the change in religious 
conceptualisation which saw it transformed from primarily explanatory to visionary and 
ambitious.  Furthermore, by positing a singular notion of fate and unitary existence, 
monotheism eliminated the possibility of ascribing negative effects in the world to lesser 
supernatural forces.  This meant that any act or consequence in the world which contravened 
unitary ambitions framed as fate and divine purpose in the world became necessarily an act of 
absolute evil.  Additionally, because they could be framed as inhibiting the revealed and 
desired purpose for humanity as a whole, those individuals who aligned with this inhibition 
could easily be regarded as less than human because they did not share, understand, or desire 
the unitary purpose for humanity, benevolently provided by a singular deity.  One of the 
crucial ways that monotheism reconfigured the human social space and intellect, therefore, is 
that individuals, collectives, and structures deemed ‘other’, assumed the perceived burden and 
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role of evil in the world, more different in their clashing morality than similar in their shared 
humanity.  This illustrates an interesting paradox in monotheism in that the existence of an 
omnipotent benevolent deity creates multiple simultaneously existing hierarchies between 
divine and human.  This distinction promotes an egalitarian ideal in that all those who believe 
in a god will be human and thus equal in relation to the divinity.  Simultaneously, however, 
that equality is predicated on the intellectual acknowledgement of that deity, so egalitarianism 
only extends so far as the boundaries of the group united in common belief.  Monotheism as a 
construct created the intellectual conditions for Freud’s social libidinal ties to be established 
simultaneously as mechanisms for unity and markers of differentiation.      
Monotheism enabled the cementing of existing power structures and hierarchical 
relations within a collective, and also proscribed modes of conduct through which the 
achievement of the divine purpose for social harmony could be realised.  These in turn could 
be encapsulated in a creed which simultaneously presented an idealised future, established 
correct belief, and dictated appropriate divinely ordained behaviour.  This creed therefore 
could be presented as the holistic device by which humanity and the chosen elect could be 
brought out of the darkness of ignorance into the light of divine grace; which in turn would be 
reflected in worldly harmonious existence and prosperity.  Thus, monotheism became a potent 
vehicle for effecting change in the world rather than solely a series of beliefs-grounded 
practices which explained and legitimated the conduct of a particular group of people; it 
became a civilisational promise in an institutional space.131  It obliterated the primacy of the 
present in favour of a distant utopia to be achieved both in the world and the hereafter in a 
unitary cosmology.   
3.3 Judeo-Christian Conceptual Ordering 
Perhaps the most accurate way to conceptualise the birth of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition is to recognise that, as religious scholar and Egyptologist Jan Assmann has pointedly 
observed, it was thoroughly anti-religious in that it defined itself primarily by its vehement 
opposition to all other religions and cultures.132/133  By revolutionising ideological and 
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133 Prior to this, monotheism was not a foreign concept.  Zoroastrianism had flourished, and Yahweh began his 
conceptual “existence” as one of many gods, perhaps as ‘El’ of the Canaanites.  His transition from “one of the 
more powerful gods” to “the only god” occurred over numerous centuries, and even the first commandment 
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physical mechanisms to ensure its own survival, early Judaism created the foundations for 
many of the intellectual formulations relied on by proponents of Islamist violence today.        
In Judeo-Christian narratives, God promised Abraham that He would elevate the 
Hebrews to supremacy: He would take their side in cursing their enemies, and would make 
them a great nation.  In the context of existing religious traditions, the supremacy of the 
Hebrew tribe would represent the physical manifestation of the Hebrew God’s supremacy 
amongst the host of existing gods.134  This utopian promise embodies many of the 
characteristics described in the previous chapter in that it identifies a certain ‘chosen’ people 
that will rise to supremacy not by virtue necessarily of endeavors undertaken but because an 
omnipotent deity favours them over others.  It also identifies a key foundation of monotheism 
in that the rise to supremacy is contingent upon the recognition of God as a singular 
omnipotent deity, and this recognition must be continuously demonstrated.  When applied to a 
potentially expanding demographic in a dynamic social space governed by humans capable of 
rational independent thought, this becomes a potentially toxic and dangerous prescription.  
The utopian promise of supremacy also underlies the paradoxical understanding inherent in 
Judeo-Christianity insofar as it illustrates the reciprocal and mutually reliant relationship 
between a deity and community of believers.  The Hebrew rise to supremacy is promised by a 
deity that is framed as all powerful, and would represent the physical unity and omnipotence 
of that deity; yet for the ascendance to great nationhood to occur, consistent affirmation of 
God’s singularity and omnipotence must take place.  It is in this regard that Judaism in its 
inception altered yet maintained one of the three critical functions of religion, that of control.    
This mechanism for control, with the altered paradigm that posits belief as the vehicle 
through which to transform ‘what is’ into ‘what should be’ required structure insofar as 
religion itself requires legal formalisation in order to survive.135  This formalisation is 
encapsulated in the Ten Commandments, which forms part of a broader socio-legal framework 
 
revealed to Moses reflects the contemporary belief that other gods did indeed exist, so followers of Yahweh 
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comprised of 613 commandments in revelation that codifies social behaviour.136  The nature of 
these commandments reveals two crucial facts: first, this unique strain of monotheism sought 
to reflect the unity of God in transforming all aspects of human life into manifestations of 
worship.  Second, they set a precedent for prophets to evaluate contemporary standards and 
laws, and maintain those that fit the activist needs of a community deemed ‘chosen’.  They 
could then appropriate them in the name of religious authenticity, formalise them in discourse, 
and discard all else as unholy thus potentially subhuman.   
The Jewish declaration of faith anchors the 613 rules for holistic social interaction and 
governance: “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord”137.  It reveals in its brevity a 
number of telling transformations in the conception of religion, primarily the underlying desire 
identified by Schleiermacher to establish a link between the seen and unseen.138  It transforms 
the role of god in that it is not a force or animistic idea, rather it is a ‘lord’, and this entails a 
revolutionary form of rulership, dominion, subjugation, and hierarchy which had the potential 
to drastically alter models of socio-political governance, and their perception in the eyes of the 
faithful.  In this declaration, unity is paramount.  The authentic god belongs only to those self-
ascribed Israelites, and these, both in person and collective, must exist as microcosms of 
divine unity by bonding inner faith with outer praxis.  When each individual follows these 
commandments united in common belief, social harmony will theoretically follow and thus 
productive and cooperative society can be framed as a fait accompli presented to mankind by 
god which is based on true consensus rather than an artificially binding social contract.  In this 
regard, the activist nature of the Judeo-Christian tradition is highlighted insofar as a bond is 
forged between private virtue, authentic unitary religious practice, and social justice.  The 
importance of social unity is evident in the fact that the covenants made between God and His 
followers were not forged with individual Hebrews, but with a community of faithful believers 
as a whole.  Virtue, therefore, became possible only through collective unity in observance of 
the faith, and any behaviour that deviated from mandated directives reflected not only a legal 
transgression but also a conscious impediment to the observance of divine social justice.139  
 
136 These 613 are contained in the Torah, the first five books of the Christian Bible.  An accessible list can be 
found here: http://www.gods-word-first.org/bible-study/613commandments.html (Accessed 15 February 
2018).   
137 Deuteronomy 6:4. 
138 Schleiermacher.   
139 This concept has been elaborated on by theologians of various traditions for hundreds of years.  For a 
discussion on its theological relevance to monotheism and Christianity, see Wetzel, James, Augustine and the 
Limits of Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).   
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Morality as previously defined therefore became linked to specific social agendas and could 
be measured against the expectations and standards encapsulated in a governing creed.   
This type of holistic unity was predicated on unique reformulations of the concept of 
sovereignty.  Insofar as God became lord, He became sovereign of both the universe and 
human affairs.  If His commandments were to govern all aspects of human life meant to 
ensure social justice and harmony as His plan for mankind, then political leadership of a 
community could only be legitimate insofar as it upheld those regulations.  While regimes that 
strove towards divine social justice could be legitimate yet only representative of the ultimate 
source of law and sovereignty, any regime that did not rule by divine directives for social 
interaction could no longer be deemed legitimate, regardless of its popular support.  The 
ultimate responsibility for humanity, therefore, became both the recognition of a singular deity 
as lord of all affairs both worldly and ethereal, and the perpetual striving towards achieving a 
utopian ideal of divine justice in this existence.  This conceptualisation of sovereignty further 
reveals the political activist nature of the Judeo-Christian tradition.  The ability to legitimate a 
political regime by aligning it with the lord of all existence seen and unseen is extraordinarily 
powerful; yet this same framework of legitimation can be utilised as a potent challenger to 
authority in that alternative political agendas can be advanced by arguing that existing power 
structures do not reflect the correct implementation of divine will. This duality is perhaps 
monotheism’s deepest reservoir of latent potential political energy.           
The fact that God was framed as sovereign of both worldly and spiritual realms meant 
that rules for social governance became litmus tests for membership in a community of the 
chosen.  While social harmony could be postulated as the ultimate objective, individual 
humans and regimes could favour certain demonstrations over others at given times, thus 
making the boundary enclosing the community of the faithful a subjective and fluid one.  
Crucially, this established certain forms of loyalty.  By declaring God as lord, believers 
created what James McDougall called an “entre-soi”; or “who we are”.140  They established 
libidinal ties with each other and a form of rulership which transcended the boundaries 
between the seen and unseen planes of existence and thereby simultaneously drew a stark 
distinction with those who denied God.  Failure to uphold the standards of morality 
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encapsulated in a creed became automatic grounds for expulsion in order to preserve the 
integrity of the social whole.  One of the particularities of this development is that love and 
veneration of Yahweh became necessary but insufficient as demonstrable proof of loyalty.  
Vehement intolerance and potentially hatred of groups and individuals deemed ‘other’ is 
inherent in religion, according to Eller, and castigating those that are different is an effective 
way to protect the image of the self.   
This idea is encapsulated in the origins of the term ‘demon’ in the Christian tradition in 
how it appropriated existing ideological formulations to drastically differentiate the faithful 
from the ‘other’.  The word demon today conjures ideas of absolute evil, yet in its 
etymological and social origin it actually referred to a guiding spirit, comparable to what could 
be considered a guardian angel, and was frequently commented on in philosophical treatises of 
Greek and Roman antiquity.  Insofar as this type of spirit contravened the idea of a unitary 
Christian God, it must by default have been absolutely evil; something which had to be 
vociferously rejected in order to be a demonstrably true Christian.  Thus, the benevolent and 
protective ‘daimon’ of the Greeks and Romans; and the collective social groups and 
intellectual schools of thought regarding human and existential reality that were associated 
with this type of belief, became the embodiment of absolute evil in the Christian tradition.141  
This further demonstrates the political and social activist agenda inherent in Judeo-Christianity 
in that theological doctrines of unity and loyalty to the faith were developed by rejecting and 
recasting terms and practices associated with contemporary socio-political structures that did 
not abide by the prescriptions of morality and social justice collectively held by the followers 
of a subjectively created unitary god.  While this mechanism was theoretically meant to 
proclaim a fundamental hatred of evil that denies the love, grace, and unity of the one god, the 
reality is that it is subjective to human social desires and agendas and thus potentially a tool to 
be weaponised.    
A final element to be considered is the way that Judeo-Christian monotheism 
reoriented paradigms of human agency.  Ideas regarding the role of human agency originate in 
the understanding that the seen plane of existence must be transformed to approximate as 
closely as possible the divine model for achieving social justice.  This is only possible via the 
thorough and meticulous physical performance of the directives encapsulated in a religious 
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creed, and thus the underlying role of humanity is not one of individuality but, responsibility.  
If the unitary God is also sovereign lord in this existence, only He can endow humans with 
intrinsic freedoms and liberties, and with these He expects His subjects to affirm His 
legitimacy and protect His rule.  This in turn is reflective of the strength yet fragility of social 
groups in that they are strong as ideological unifying forces but vulnerable insofar as they rely 
on the continuous actions of their members to ensure their perpetuity.  Another underlying 
paradigmatic cornerstone on which ideas of agency are built in the Judeo-Christian tradition is 
the understanding that existence, and every aspect of reality, is a manifestation of what Mark 
Juergensmeyer called a cosmic struggle between good and evil.142  This struggle is the result 
of the cosmological Manichean ordering of the world that monotheism relies on, and dictates 
that actions in this world can have a direct impact on the ongoing struggle between a 
community of the faithful and all that exists in opposition to it.  Social groups perceive 
conflicting worldviews as existential threats, and therefore individual action in defense of the 
faith becomes an urgent imperative for believers.  This framing was captured succinctly by 
Juergensmeyer when he stated that “The idea of cosmic war is compelling to religious activists 
because it ennobles and exalts those who consider themselves a part of it (…) It provides 
escape from humiliation and impossible predicaments”.143  Participating in a cosmological 
struggle means that immediate results may not always be visible, or even achieved in this 
lifetime.  Precisely because they are not, individuals may be led to believe that their actions 
have served a higher purpose. 
Another way in which religion endows its followers with agency is that it transforms 
them into active carriers of universal knowledge of the cosmic struggle in which they play a 
role.  By affirming their belief through word and action, which can be understood as a type of 
oath, they can form a bond of schwurgemeinschaftliche, brotherhood, which forms the basis of 
collective agency which in turn can be institutionalised as a mechanism for social action.144  
These, as embodiments of universal knowledge with the potential to widely disseminate it, 
have the ability to further encourage and determine the direction and type of social action 
required by the agenda encapsulated in the pursuit of a religious utopia.  In this regard, 
institutionalised knowledge becomes both a facilitator of individual agency and a mechanism 
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for social control insofar as it prescribes and authorises certain types of actions to serve 
specific ends.   
Finally, Divine utopia requires another form of agency in which particular humans are 
given the ability and duty to interpret divine directives.  These underpin the blueprint for 
achieving social justice and are considered eternal, but must be made accessible to diverse 
social scenarios, so certain individuals must thoroughly comprehend their very nature in order 
to then graft them onto particular cultural landscapes and guide a people into their observance.  
For this purpose God endows individuals with critical judgement, so that some among them 
may utilize intellectual agency for the purpose of making divine social justice and its 
institutions of governance applicable to any time and place.  Actions undertaken in this respect 
are not always, but may be, framed as operating outside conventional socio-political norms 
governing legal conduct if the parameters of legality have been established by institutions 
which do not share the religious beliefs of the actors.  This reflects the ability of religion to 
legitimate the actions of its members in stark contrast to oppositional worldviews, and 
interpret actions undertaken as simultaneous manifestations of personal agency, god’s will, 
and the individual representation of the collective identity which transcends human 
temporality.     
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has attempted to engage in a discussion of religion with a focus on its 
utility and functionality as a social group.  It has attempted to highlight the fact that the 
evolution of specific religious beliefs and paradigms that inform modes of action is intricately 
linked to parallel developments in human cultures, societies and their interactions.  As such, 
religion itself is a deliberate individual and social creation.  Religion critically performs the 
functions of explanation, control and legitimation, and it does so by crafting and presenting 
narratives of models, modes, and metaphysics.  These in turn can form the basis on which 
knowledge encapsulated in a creed can be institutionalised, and create notions of morality 
which are understood as beyond worldly reproach in their transcendent origin.  Monotheism 
and Judeo-Christianity in particular appropriated many of the mechanisms and paradigms 
inherent in pre-existing belief structures, but its most important and radical departure was its 
activist agenda which focused on transforming ‘what is’ into ‘what should be’.  This notion of 
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‘should be’ is the worldly implementation of God’s will for social justice and harmony in an 
experienced utopia. 
Religion is transformative and constitutive; it can be integrative yet serve to 
differentiate.  Any notion of God is something which is alive and dynamic, and can be 
moulded to fit the contemporary needs of a community.  Human agency and divine 
predestination interact symbiotically to pursue the socio-political objectives of a self-described 
elect, which alone possesses absolute morality.  Social justice, framed as an eternal ideal and 
the link between the seen and unseen planes of existence is central, and this in turn empowers 
individuals by leading them to believe they are acting on behalf of a righteous higher cause.  
Empowerment is further provided in that for its own survival religion requires that individuals 
with a deep understanding of its directives interpret governing creeds and apply them to 
diverse environments.  This concept in itself encapsulates religion, its form, function, and 


















Philosophies of Violence 
 
 Violence is physical damage willfully inflicted by a self-aware actor with agency upon 
another self-aware entity, without the latter’s approval, which results in immediate and often 
enduring negative repercussions for the recipient, while benefits may or may not be gained by 
the perpetrator as the result of his or her actions.  Violence, however, cannot be reduced to a 
formula of predictability, cause, and effect.  Violence is conceptually problematic in that its 
use is predicated on the ability of an individual or group to act deliberately after having 
rationally formulated ideas which frame the use of violence as being beneficial.  These 
concepts, in turn, such as what any individual entity may consider beneficial, the use of 
rationality in constructing plausible situational outcomes, or justified targets of physical harm 
are also highly subjective and thus escape definitional compartmentalisation.  As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter regarding religion, the mere mention of the word ‘violence’ 
can also trigger a cascade of powerful, conflicting, and complex emotions in different 
recipients.  To some it may mean global war, and to others it may mean personal murder.  On 
a very different level, some may conceive of entrenched structural racism as violence, and 
others may understand violence as psychological abuse or torment which does not necessarily 
leave any physical marks but still scars its victims.  Despite having opened this chapter with a 
seemingly simple definition of violence, perhaps the only thing which as a starting point can 
be confirmed is that violence in its essence is constructed, displayed, enacted, received, and 
perceived subjectively according to individual worldviews and cultural dynamics which orient 
things such as violence relative to other devices in a matrix of ongoing and fluid social 
interaction.145   
 To explore the above nuances, this chapter will first explore violence as a powerful 
social action with the ability to convey cultural meaning and shape constructs of identity, as 
well as its intrinsic relationship to human freedom and notions of morality.  Second it will 
discuss how and when violence is wielded in a social group context, and the philosophical as 
well as pragmatic justifications for its use.  Finally, this chapter will scrutinise the extent to 
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which violence can be effective in achieving social goals, shaping human behaviour, and 
altering a meaningful reality.  ISIS employs extreme and deliberate violence in the pursuit of 
its ambitions, so successfully promlematising the group’s case study according to Foucault’s 
genealogy requires a deconstruction of violence itself in relation to the human condition.  
 
 4.1 What is Violence? 
 Etymologically, the word violence stems from the Latin ‘violentia’ meaning 
vehemence, which is recognised as passionate and uncontrollable force; as opposed to force 
used in a calculated manner.  Furthermore, this construction of violence frames it as force 
which is used to pervert something from its natural expression of itself and exceed established 
norms or limits.  It also can be deconstructed as ‘vis’ and ‘ferro’ which in turn means to 
phsycially carry force, and it is grammatically linked to the concept of ‘violare’, so ingrained 
in the term violence itself is the notion of violation.146  Necessarily, force must also be defined 
as the two are inextricably linked, and it can be described as the singular ability to effect a 
significant change by the expenditure of energy, or physical effort.147  The critical 
distinguishing feature, however, is that force alone is morally neutral whereas violence is the 
deliberate shattering and violation of certain moral rules and parameters to affect change 
which favors others. 
 Due to its complexity, “violence must be understood as a form of practice mediating 
between the historical boundness of action in response to specific structural conditions and 
human creativity and the cultural quest for meaning”.148  Sociologist Georg Simmel 
revolutionised the study of violence as a deliberate social action relative to the interests of 
actors as opposed so simply an instrument of evolutionary selection149 and in this regard, it is a 
symbolic action that conveys cultural meaning, desire, and frustration.  Most importantly, the 
cultural ideas it conveys are most often linked to notions of legitimacy; either in support or 
contention.  Weber famously defined legitimacy as entailing that “a social order is accepted as 
valid either due to its historicity, to its emotional value, or to instrumental reasoning.”150  In 
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this regard, violence as a social action can be understood as an important mechanism by which 
the ideals of a social group can be advanced to lay claim to definitions and implementations of 
desirable forms of legitimate social structuring.  Understanding it in this way, violence is no 
longer a senseless or rash action, rather it is a realm of social interaction which is carried out 
for concrete reasons, and which both shapes and is shaped by inter and intra group relations in 
a dynamic social space.151   
Given the relationship between violence and legitimacy, which is the ordering of a 
social landscape, violence can be manifest in three different ways.  It can be structural, insofar 
as institutions of power can be devised and implemented to benefit certain social 
demographics while oppressing others, it can by physical, represented by issues ranging from 
police brutality to sectarian conflict, and finally it can be symbolic wherein one social group 
expresses its dominance and superiority over another by means which can be overt or subtle, 
and often entail the unknowing or unwilling compliance of the subjugated.152  Steven Pinker 
identified distinct stages of human social evolution, and asserted that civilisational progress 
positively correlated with a decline in all types of violence.153  In fact, one of the key 
suppositions which underpins the postulated need for strong centralized government, framed 
as political and civilisational progress, in the birth of the modern Western tradition is the fact 
that humans are inherently violent by nature; an impulse which can only be tempered by 
strong governing social contracts.154  The deliberately articulated use of violence as a preferred 
means by which to cleanse society of impurities, and enforce the observance of sanctioned 
codes of moral behaviour dates to the earliest Greek civilisations, and is representative of 
man’s unique ability to rationalise the use of force with the purpose of controlling the 
behaviour of others.155   
 Given the above understanding, violence is a potent tool for social construction by 
groups and individuals in power or those contesting said power.  It is inextricably linked to 
perceptions of morality and legitimacy, which in turn are subjectively created by groups with 
specific vested interests.  One of the most crucial intellectual foundations on which violence as 
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a tool for social creation can be built is the ability that it has to create a common and united 
conscience.156  In this regard violence can be understood as the final link in the chain of 
emergence which produces social entativity as described in the previous chapter on social 
groups.  Violence therefore is theoretically capable of spawning new dimensions of culture as 
elaborated by Girard in that it can result in new ways of communicating and receiving ideas 
and interests in a social dimension.  When practically applied to a modern Western nation 
centric political model, this emergence of culture through a united conscience can result in the 
formulation of specific national identities, based on the recognition of same and same as 
mediated through violence as the normative mode of communication, representative of the 
pursuit of commonly accepted ideas of legitimacy and parameters of morality.  One of the 
most influential figures to elaborate on this notion was Frantz Fanon, who argued in the 
context of the struggle for independence from colonialism that violence itself is capable of 
providing unity insofar as it gives individuals both a common cause and a means by which to 
physically strive for it.  It is the social language of dominance used by oppressive political 
entities, and therefore is the only realm of interaction which can be understood by said entities 
and defeat them.  Furthermore, the transcendent nature of violence is highlighted in that 
through this act of striving, individuals are given a sense of both history and destiny thus 
linking past, present, and future in a singular manifestation of the common will through force.  
This force, furthermore, is linked to moral righteousness in that it is intended for the specific 
function of achieving freedom.  Freedom, as a right inherent to the human condition, is 
considered morally beyond reproach.  This formulation requires understanding rights 
themselves not as existing sui generis, but instead as the moral language of modern Western 
politics.  As Alexis de Tocqueville commented, the notion of an inherent right is nothing more 
than constructions of virtue and morality inserted into the modern political world.157  Even if 
acts of violence do not immediately result in freedom from the structural violence in the 
colonial context which informed Fanon’s writings, by simply performing an act of violence, 
representative of a group identity, history, and destiny, individuals may find personal freedom 
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from the boundedness of cultural subjugation by symbolically claiming the right to enact their 
social will through violence which had previously been the purview of colonial oppressors.158 
 Some of the most radically influential thinkers, such as Marx, Engels, Hegel, and 
Fanon, have held that violence as structure is a fundamental framework in the ordinary 
processes of daily life in the world.  This being said, “there is no general theory of violence 
apart from its practices (…) Theories of violence must be as varied as the practices within 
which they occur.”159  Foucault held that violence begins in the human consciousness and as 
such, it is important to consider whether violence itself is a product, or a process.160 As a 
process it is cumulative in that it “creates and recreates new norms of collective self-
understanding”161 and therefore as a product it becomes ingrained in expectations and 
identities of social groups.  Violence is just as fluid as the dynamic environment in which it 
exists.  As a subjective perception, it is a cultural construct, and it constructs culture.   
 
 4.2 How and When is Violence Justified and Used? 
 In Western thought, violence is the domain of the secular state.  Weber’s definition, 
which frames the state as any human community which successfully monopolizes the use of 
force in a given territory has become so developed and ingrained in geopolitics, as well as 
individual orientation to it, that it may seem difficult to consider that this has not always been 
the case nor the default approach to conceiving of violence.  
As it pertains to dynamic interaction between competing social groups, the Italian 
Marxist Antonio Gramsci defined the state as the representation of attempts to symbolically 
and physically permanently crystallise a particular state of development into a status quo.162  
By combining these two conceptualisations, links begin to emerge which forge connections 
between violence, power, authority, and legitimacy which are more profound than labelling 
given to a particular regime.  The Western canonisation of the state and its monopoly on 
violence is simply the recognition of the need to harness the socially destructive capacity of 
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violence by tying its approved use to subjectively constructed notions of legitimate authority.  
Authority, in turn, can be thought of in this context not as a de-facto ability to wield violence, 
but as a recognised right to utilise tools for constructing and reshaping the social world to 
enforce the collective will, granted by the self-defined collective itself.  In this paradigm, in 
the absence of recognised authority; in whatever form is subjectively conceived of as 
legitimate and moral, no violence can theoretically, philosophically, or tangibly be justified.   
Perhaps one of the most oft-cited rationales for the use of violence is that the ends 
justify the means, yet this is overly simplistic.  According to John Dewey who theorised on 
methodologies of social reform, this justification is a way in which immediate social desires 
can be masked and pursued in violent practice.163  Fundamentally, violence relies on human 
reasoning for its justification; that is to say that to justify it is to demonstrate that it is 
rational.164  Problems in attempting to find a universal paradigm for justification arise, 
however, when accepted constructs of human morality and rationality; as well as the necessity 
or ability to apply said rationality in particular instances, clash with those which have been 
socially constructed in different fashions.  For this reason, the theoretical legitimacy of any act 
of violence lies somewhere in the triangle of relationships between the perpetrator of said act, 
the victim, and an observer.165  Thinking of it this way is useful because in a social context, 
violence without an audience is meaningless insofar as the reception of the intended meaning 
behind the act will be limited.166  This paradigm of seeking social significance through 
violence as deliberate performative action is an important foundation in the ongoing study of 
terrorism itself, yet one that is often neglected in the attempts to scrutinise acts of terror in 
favour of resorting to forceful retaliatory measures or degrees of securitisation.167  
Interestingly, these responses may also be understood as performative acts requiring an 
audience for their social agenda to have impact.   
One of the most enduring philosophical justifications for violence stipulates that it can 
be used when all other avenues of addressing areas of conflict have been exhausted or are 
unavailable, in order to reduce the presence of evil in society and alleviate general suffering.  
To reach this conclusion, the public will and reason must balance the expected ultimate 
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outcome of violence with both existing circumstances and the effects that violence will have 
on areas which are not immediately affected by the act itself.168  The counterpoint to this 
argument, however, holds that violence may in fact be morally justified despite not having 
exhausted or attempted all other avenues if the violence rectifies egregious wrongs and is used 
to advance an agenda of social reform which benefits the social group in question.169   
Given that violence is socially linked to legitimacy, morality, freedom and authority in 
a social context, regimes of authority may use it physically, structurally, or symbolically to 
maintain dominance, and this perspective relies on recognising all spheres of human socio-
political interactions as relationships of subjugation and domination.170  Violence can also be 
used to protest dominance, and so it can reasonably be expected to be used and justified if 
“human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below 
their potential”.171  The crux of this paradigm is that in this aspect, violence is socially 
equivalent to religion.  Just as religion, violence can be used and justified to establish and 
maintain authoritative dominion while also being employed as a means by which to challenge 
that authority.  In a social context, both religion and violence can be framed and used as 
potential tools for changing ‘what is’ into ‘what should be’.  Furthermore, this ‘what should 
be’ is based on a fantastical ideology as a way to view and exist in the world, subjectively 
created by a social group which deliberately distinguishes itself from others in beliefs and 
practices as reflectors of absolute morality.  As the distance between ‘what is’ and ‘what 
should be’ increases, so too does the likelihood of violence being used to narrow the gap.  
Insofar as this gap must be bridged by specific actions, individuals can justify violence as the 
way to demonstrate allegiance to an ideology and thus reap the social benefits which 
membership affords.  This in turn is most likely to occur in a social landscape in which 
multiple social group identities hold narratives of violence as central, placing a much greater 
sense of urgency on the individual.  This also demonstrates a parallel with religion insofar as 
both it and violence are something which individuals fundamentally can feel a need to resort 
to in order to assuage social anxiety in favor of certainty and security.   
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While violence is not predictable, concluding that it is rash or meaningless would be to 
negate its function as a powerful tool for social transformation.  In doing so, the underlying 
psychological, philosophical, and social platforms on which narratives of violence are built are 
dismissed for fear of giving the appearance of ‘justifying the unjustifiable’, and thus the ability 
to truly understand the sources and rationales of deliberate violence in order to curtail it is 
squandered.   
 
4.3 Effectiveness of Violence 
The purpose of violence as a tool for social manipulation is the achievement of a 
particular goal held by some group, so it will be used if it is believed that it will be successful 
in achieving said goal.  The efficiency of violence therefore is relative insofar as it is 
determined by the subjective goals of the group and those with the power to dictate the 
necessary social benchmarks that the group must reach.  This issue has been crucial to 
terrorism studies in that much effort has been devoted to the study of whether violence 
actually is effective at achieving the goals of terrorist organisations.172  For instance, a singular 
act of violence may be successful in helping a group achieve short term and immediate goals 
such as notoriety or causing fear in others, while falling short of effecting the totality of the 
social change the group ultimately aspires to.  This makes quantifying violence’s effectiveness 
as a social tool immeasurably difficult, yet it is an issue which must be considered to in 
problematising violent social groups within the context of their aspirations.  
One of violence’s most effective uses has been in its monopolisation by the modern 
state, and true power of domination lies in the harnessing of total violence by some entity to 
the extent that it does not have to exercise that violence for its authority to be recognised.  This 
demonstrates one of the most significant effective uses of latent and symbolic violence in that 
it has the ability to control the behaviour of others.  Again, in this dimension a parallel with 
religion emerges in that religion and violence are both highly effective at controlling the social 
conduct of individuals and groups.  They do this by establishing parameters for moral conduct 
and ensuring their observance by holding a monopoly on the infliction of consequences for 
their breach.  The modern state, for instance, is legitimated in conducting actions of violent 
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self-defense that would be considered morally reprehensible were they to be carried out by 
private groups not vested with legitimate governing authority.173  Additionally, from a 
philosophical perspective, this type of violence is so thoroughly entrenched that in order to 
challenge it, even greater violence is theoretically necessary.  This dynamic of entrenched 
legitimate authority grounded in justified latent violence is a reflection of a paradigm that 
stipulates that the quelling of all forms of competing violence by a hegemon is not necessarily 
always in the defense of the common good.  Rather, it is a deliberate inhibition of social 
exchange, and a denial of the mechanisms used in human evolution to mold an ever-changing 
social landscape.174  In this regard, the modern state exists both as defined by Weber, and by 
Gramsci insofar as it promotes its own interests through effective use of violence to dictate 
and control behaviour and perceptions. 
Another way in which violence is highly effective is that it possesses an inherent 
lawmaking character in that when it is used to promote the social agenda of a specific group, 
the group’s parameters of morality take the form of desired new laws, and violence is framed 
as the way to enforce their observance from a position of power.  In this context, law is the 
projection of an imagined, idealised future upon reality, and of power as the union between 
violence and the establishment of law.175  Here again the potency of violence as a tool to unite 
‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ is evident, and renowned jurist and legal scholar Robert M. 
Cover argued that institutions that lose their grasp on foundational violence as essential to the 
maintenance of law and order in society will ultimately decay.   
To return briefly to the paradigm developed by Fanon, violence is a highly effective 
weapon of cultural emasculation insofar as those who control violence control historical 
narratives for posterity.  In Fanon’s view, violence carried out by a hegemon is able to render 
colonised populations passive and inorganic, whereas violence carried out by the colonised is 
able to raise a population out of historical oblivion and immobility its rightful place of 
equality.176 Perhaps the most significant way in which violence is effective is its ability to 
shape a meaningful reality.177  Most human relationships are to some extent relationships of 
relative power; and in a sociopolitical context, power is linked to the successful harnessing of 
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physical, structural, or symbolic violence.  Individuals and social groups on both sides of the 
power equation therefore live in a reality which is effectively shaped by the real or potential 
violence enacted upon them, and the degree of violence at their disposal to use in pursuit of 
common goals.  It is effective in establishing, maintaining, and simultaneously challenging 
authority and thereby is also effective at shaping perceptions regarding parameters of 
normalcy in social interaction.   
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated that violence is a powerful social tool which should not 
be dismissed as rash or senseless.  As a human social construct, it is intimately intertwined 
with notions of legitimacy, authority, the establishment of law and order, and the demarcation 
of moral parameters.  Because these in turn are also human social constructs shaped by 
cultural and historical narratives, the relationship between them and violence will never be 
universal.  Fundamentally, however, despite the fact that the relationships cannot be 
predictable, it can be argued that the prime nexus uniting them is one of social control.  
Regardless of the particular manifestations in a given social context between legitimacy and 
degrees of multi-directional violence, the underlying struggle will not be for the sole 
possession of tangible resources necessarily; but it will be for those as a representation and 
mechanism of the possessing group’s control over the behaviours of groups which do not 
share similar visions of constructs of legitimacy, morality, law and authority.   
Philosophically violence can be justified in numerous ways, but these in turn are 
subjective, so the justification most likely to be chosen is one which will most effectively 
forge social bonds and enable the creation of identity through action.  Furthermore, this 
chapter has attempted to illustrate the fact that violence endows these actions and identities 
with meaning.  Insofar as violence is about control, it can be used both to maintain control and 
also challenge it.   Through the deliberate shattering of imposed control, violence possesses a 
unique empowering potential capable of endowing its practitioners with ultimate freedom.  In 
this duality also lies violence’s most sinister nature in that when observed continuously by 
social groups clinging to distinct constructs of ‘what should be’, a reinforcing cycle emerges 
and with every iteration violence itself becomes increasingly integral to groups’ core.  As this 
occurs, violence becomes not a mechanism for attaining goals, but the sole reason for the 
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group’s existence, without which it would lose its identity, reputation, recruitment potential 
and ability to pursue its agenda.     
Whether it pertains to social control, the ability to dictate the realm of the appropriate 
by reflecting moral standards, or its place as integral to personal and group identity, violence’s 
effectiveness and utility as a social tool mirrors that of religion.  As religion, violence is 
effective in being both transformative and constitutive concerning the physical and ideological 
orientation of groups and individuals.  The parallels between the two means that there is an 
inherent dangerous potential for religions to utilise and justify violence, or for groups with 





















The Interplay Between Religion and Violence as Social Group Function 
 
Religion is not unique in enabling violence but it is uniquely effective at it.  This 
assessment runs slightly counter to the assertion that “religion is the most prolific source of 
violence in our history”.178  This statement offered by Sam Harris, and reflective of views 
shared by other prominent political scientists and authors such as Christopher Hitchens, is not 
an outlier in the field of religious critique, rather it is emblematic of the ‘Secularisation Thesis’ 
which dominated the rationale of Western intellectuals until only recently.179  Broadly 
speaking, this framework stipulates that as societies progress through mechanisms of 
modernisation and rationalisation, religion will lose its authority both in personal and social 
life as well as governance.  It is predicated on the claims that religion is absolutist, divisive, 
and insufficiently rational; therefore incompatible with ever emerging new social dynamics 
which accompany modernisation in a state-centric global environment.  While this chapter 
will demonstrate that these claims may hold a certain degree of validity, the secularisation 
thesis as such has not materialised in that as opposed to fading away in the face of encroaching 
modernisation, individuals have clung even more vehemently to religious beliefs in attempts 
to maintain a sense of identity in an environment of uncertainty and uprootedness.  In the 
context of the aims of this thesis, when coupled with the fact that the sheer quantity of acts of 
religious terrorism has far surpassed equivalent actions with secular motivations since 2001,180 
yet simultaneously religious programs have sponsored global outreach, poverty alleviation and 
democratisation, the inquiry from a political science perspective has become reoriented 
towards discovering under what conditions religion will become violent.   
The rise and global prominence of Islamic terrorism in recent decades has led to 
intellectual attempts to uncover underlying co-enabling links between religion and violence.181  
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To further this inquiry and complete the theoretical introduction to this thesis according to the 
genealogical method for problematisation, first this chapter will present the relationships 
between Judeo-Christian paradigms and violence in a social context.  Second it will introduce 
useful analytic frameworks for understanding the contexts in which religious narratives may 
most likely be used to justify violence.  
 
5.1 Violence and Judeo-Christian World Ordering 
Previous chapters discussed the fact that in the earliest human societies, seats of 
religious and political power were often collocated in the same physical structures, and this 
was not accidental.  As humans established agrarian societies and later empires, warfare 
evolved as a means to acquire necessary revenue, and coercive force was required to ensure 
individuals played their roles in supporting the necessary functions of these emerging polities.  
Political establishments therefore relied on their social control of structural violence for 
survival.  Simultaneously, systems of religious belief evolved in which the past was presented 
as chaos, and the existing order as the pinnacle of human existence.  In this evolutionary 
context, the favour of the gods was essential for the survival of civilisation, so myths and 
rituals developed in which rightful rule, established socio-political order, religious legitimacy 
and notions of past and present intermingled without clear boundaries in the visible 
manifestation of social reality which was underpinned by entrenched structural violence.   
The structural violence underpinning early agrarian societies and legitimating religious 
beliefs as well as supporting rituals was predicated on the notion that enduring violence and 
ritual was a continuation of the first violence used in myth to conquer chaos; and its enduring 
practice was thus essential to ensure society did not slip back into that same chaos.  
Furthermore, by associating practice with foundational origins, legitimacy, violence, and 
transcendence, these actions were endowed with meaning and cemented with every repetition, 
transforming a world into a unique lifeworld of a people.182  Perhaps it is to this conceptual 
starting point that the sociologically oriented argument could be traced that religious violence 
is simply a unique manifestation of the inherent dynamic between violence and order as one of 
the intellectual bedrocks of human society.      
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It is against this type of socio-political backdrop that early Judaism developed.  The 
first Israelite settlements were established as social alternatives to the stratified city state 
which was upheld by institutionalised and structural violence183 and in their inception departed 
from the social norm in which deities were reflections of social order and relations, and their 
prophetic polemic against idolatry necessitated the unprecedented physical militaristic victory 
of the Israelite God over all others.184  This type of supreme victory of a god, people, and 
worldview over all others draped in language of violent moral righteousness was new to 
human social evolution, and is potentially a foundational link which conceives of  Judeo-
Christian reality as reliant on violent resolution for its fulfillment.  It also demonstrates a 
swing in the pendulum as systems of religious belief evolved to not sanctify the status quo of a 
social order, but to challenge it.     
In the Book of Exodus, God was portrayed as a man of war; not a distant god prayed 
to, but a very real god who physically took violent action in defense of His chosen people.  
Congruent with contemporary paradigmatic orientations, this god was responsible for 
imposing order, but order on behalf of a distinctly defined people.  Furthermore, this defined 
people, that would become the Israelites, was not responsible for maintaining a status quo 
achieved in a mythical victory of order over chaos.  Rather in his novel role as a very national 
deity, God took up arms to bridge the gap between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ according to 
the nationalistic ambitions of the early Israelites.  Later, this nationalistic identity was 
solidified in that in the context of sieging foreign cities, “when the Lord thy God hath 
delivered it unto thine hands, though shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword 
(…) thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not the 
cities of these nations”.185  The ideological orientation to violence was novel in that 
contextually it was framed as serving to prevent Israelites from associating with or engaging in 
idolatry.  The violent destruction of ‘the other’, therefore, became in a very real sense a 
necessary profession of faith and the belief in the one true god.  In the context of the 
relationship between Israelites and the Egyptian apparatus, violence further evolved in that 
diplomatic tactics would have had minimal effect when confronted with the overwhelming 
power of the latter, and so God necessarily gravitated towards ruthlessness.  In the Book of 
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Psalms, “When he grows angry he shatters kings, he gives the nations their deserts; smashing 
their skulls, he heaps the world with corpses.”186   
What is important to note in the development of divine violence in this case is that God 
was framed as violently engaging in the world not to conquer cosmic chaos, but to institute the 
rightful rule of a distinctly defined people.  Acts of violence equated to the eradication of 
perverse moral belief systems, and would afford the Israelites the opportunity to create socio-
political structures which would enable the observance of the one true god.  These social 
structures therefore were not framed as simply divinely sanctioned, but their attainment and 
observance was portrayed as an act of worship in and of itself.  Against the backdrop of 
entrenched structural violence therefore, violence carried out on behalf of a god promoted as 
being supreme among all gods in existence, and later as the only god in existence, became a 
necessary tool to advance the political agenda of a uniquely defined ‘people’ who perceived a 
discrepancy between their potential and somatic reality.  Furthermore, while this novel 
conceptualisation of violence evolved, it was neither solely religiously of politically inspired 
as such distinctions were foreign concepts in contemporary societies.   
 
5.2 Analytic Paradigms     
Two critical variables in a dynamic socio-political context which can be observed to 
understand the processes by, and conditions under, which religions may espouse violence are 
institutional independence, which measures the degree of autonomy and tolerability in relation 
to governing institutions; and political theology, which puts forth ideas that religious 
communities hold regarding the legitimacy of those governing institutions.187  Political 
theology, reflective of the characteristics of social groups broadly speaking, evolves as the 
result of external circumstances dictated in part by degrees of institutional independence, and 
through intellectual discourse suited to the needs of its constituency.  The scholar of religion 
and global politics, Daniel Philpott argued that religious communities will be more inclined to 
utilise violence in a socio-political context in specific situations dictated by the interplay 
between these variables.  For instance, a religious community may be more likely to embrace 
 
186 Psalms 110:5-6.   
187 Philpott, in Juergensmeyer et al, 398.   
78 
 
violence in a situation in which its political theology advocates the creation of an integrated 
state, giving it both political and religious authority over a broader citizenry.   
A religious community may also be more likely to engage in violent resistance in an 
environment which it feels strips it of its ability to fully observe the demands placed on it by 
its faith.188  In this regard, religious violence in a modern political context can serve the role of 
maintaining its authority and for this reason religious scholar Bruce Lincoln has described 
integrationist ruling groups as “religions of the status quo”.189  Perhaps paradoxically this 
places them in the same company as the secular modern state as defined by Gramsci insofar as 
they both attempt to leverage their ideological capital to maintain a state of affairs in which 
their legitimacy and hegemony is uncontestable.  Alternatively, religion’s potential in a 21st 
century political science paradigm also serves to inspire violence to challenge that same status 
quo to enable the observance of its political theology.  Given this paradigmatic approach to 
analysing religious violence in a political context, the claim made here is in line with that 
which predicts violence on a sociological level, insofar as social groups can most likely be 
expected to engage in violence when there is a perceived discrepancy between their rightful 
potential and actual experienced reality. 
One innovative tool for comprehending religion’s unique effectiveness at inspiring 
violence in a political context is the use of social theories as vectors of analysis.  Thomas 
Malthus’s work in political economy led to the development of the scarce resource theory, 
which stipulates that as populations grow, resources such as food and land will become 
increasingly scarce, and the inability to satisfy demand could serve as a catalyst for conflict.190  
According to secular biblical scholar Hector Avalos, “The creation of a scarce resource by 
religion occurs when belief in supernatural forces and/or beings generates the belief that a 
resource is scarce in some manner.  These are really perceived scarcities rather than ones we 
can verify exist when we do not share the religious presuppositions of believers”.191  
Understood in this way, when members of a religious group feel they are unable to dutifully 
observe the full complement of their belief system due to perceived oppression, the reward for 
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this full observance, such as eternal salvation, becomes in effect a scarce resource.  The 
gravity and enormity of the reward in question precipitates a heightened sense of urgency 
which, when coupled with textual discourse that provides justification for actions taken to 
reclaim this precious resource, creates a situation which is conducive to the emergence of 
conflict as outlined in the scarce resource theory.  While salvation, spiritual liberation, or the 
preservation of a particular sacred site might not readily appear to be scarce resources in the 
traditional sense, they are to those who act on their behalf and towards their attainment.  
Additionally, their ethereal nature makes their attainment all that more crucial in the 
worldview of the faithful, one which is mandated not only by a need for survival but also by a 
moral imperative.192   
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has discussed the symbiotic relationship between religion and violence as 
a function of social groups engaged in cultural world ordering that can be understood as 
foundational and transformative in the ongoing evolution of humanity.  This relationship and 
the degree to which it must be emphasised in practice is in large measure commensurate with 
the immediate needs of a particular demographic, and flexible enough to accommodate the 
needs of both the social group as a whole and its individual members.  Both religion and 
violence are terms and theoretical concepts which are subjective to human interpretation and 
applicability, and for the reasons discussed, the unification between the two provides for a 
powerful reservoir of powerful latent socio-political energy.    
The relationship between religion and violence is extraordinarily complex, and so a 
singular approach can and will not suffice.  Utilising a combination of the abovementioned 
paradigms may prove useful in the attempts of scholars or historians to place themselves in 
closer proximity to their subjects of inquiry.  Adopting paradigms in this innovative way may 
be a valuable avenue towards utilizing familiar conceptual language to comprehend frames of 
reference which might be foreign to our own.      
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The Inception of the Umma and its Social Defence Mechanisms 
 
When ISIS declared a caliphate, it claimed the authority to define and preside over a 
religious group comprised of nearly two billion followers.  By doing so, it dismissed the 
validity of alternative positions regarding what the umma is and how its members should 
behave, and therefore it is imperative to understand ISIS’s reliance on fundamental intellectual 
mechanisms for defining and defending a constituency that is not solely a religious group.  
Examining the roots of these mechanisms and their implications is critical in understanding 
them as more than simply tools in the terrorists’ arsenal.  This chapter will present the birth of 
Islam as a social group whose boundaries and sense of self were determined by internal and 
external factors.  It will then present the conditions and rationale which laid the foundations 
for the development of key ideological tools in Islam that are central in the ISIS worldview: 
takfir, al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, and jihad.  This chapter will then illustrate how these mechanisms 
evolved to achieve and maintain statehood.  The focus throughout this chapter will be on 
understanding the early umma, its perceptions, and communal and individual behaviour 
against frameworks of social group dynamics. 
 
6.1 Birth of the Umma as a Social Group 
 In 610 CE while on a retreat outside of Mecca, the prophet Muhammad was 
commanded by the angel Gabriel to “Recite in the name of thy Lord who created, created man 
from a clot of blood, that thy Lord is the most munificent, who teaches by the word, teaches 
man what he knew not (…) Recite! Thy Lord is most noble”.193  Upon his return to Mecca, he 
began preaching a unified system of worship that was simultaneously revivalist and 
revolutionary, and would come to clash with entrenched socio-economic and religious power 
structures, and most notably the Quraysh tribe that was vested with authority in their 
maintenance.194  Muhammad advocated a return to the unadulterated monotheism of Abraham, 
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to be achieved first by the belief in Allah’s ultimate unity, singularity, and uniqueness.  
Tawhid as divine unity represented in inception the belief that Allah was the ultimate 
singularity, and provided the basis for unity between humanity and the divine through the 
acknowledgement of said singularity and specific directives for human action meant to respect 
it.  By bridging the worldly and ethereal, tawhid also dictated that Allah was sovereign in all 
matters both worldly and spiritual, and thus the greatest sin was shirk, the denial of God’s 
oneness by placing any being equal to Him, in any position to receive human veneration of 
any sort.195   
 Early Qur’anic revelations centred on belief in tawhid196, and this became the 
foundation for the delimitation of a distinct community.197  As a nascent social group, 
Muhammad’s community required the means by which to identify itself, and in 613 CE what 
would become the foundational creed and first pillar of Islam was introduced in the form of 
the shahada, or proclamation of faith.  Although not encapsulated in direct revelation, it 
declares “I bear witness that there is no other god than (except) Allah, and I bear witness that 
Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.”198  By uttering these words, an individual accepted 
Muhammad’s revelations as undisputed, universal and divine truth and submitted to the 
sovereignty of Allah.  The proclamation of faith provided the initial mechanism by which the 
demarcation of a distinct community bound by belief could be demonstrated, and because 
social groups are partly defined by their relationships with ‘the other’, it also laid the 
foundations for the rejection of contemporary polytheistic religious beliefs and the hierarchical 
social structures which depended on and supported them.  Similarly, by joining others in this 
belief, it provided the means by which an individual could elect to associate with a distinct 
group, and this ability was a radical departure from traditional tribal affiliation in pre-Islamic 
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Arabia.199  The shahada also encapsulated the ability of religious creeds to demonise those 
deemed ‘other’ insofar as those who chose not to embrace tawhid and declare shahada could 
be perceived as personifications of the antithesis of Allah’s ultimate goodness; namely, 
absolute evil.  The Manichean tendencies of religious belief systems in this regard that enjoin 
the physical and metaphysical are evident in that Muhammad preached there were only two 
paths for humanity: that of righteousness in this life and reward in the hereafter, and absolute 
evil in the world followed by eternal damnation.200          
 The ideological demarcation provided by the declaration of belief in tawhid and 
Muhammad as divine messenger was manifest socially in that revelations included 
prescriptions for social conduct for those who had professed the shahada.201  By anchoring 
conduct in belief in tawhid, Muhammad transformed quotidian behaviour into overt acts of 
worship and infused them with notions of absolute applicability and morality.  The objective 
of this holistic approach was to create a social order defined by harmony and justice, portrayed 
as only being achievable by predicating all actions on belief in tawhid.  The social 
implications of this morality extended insofar as Muhammad recited that those who had 
refused to acknowledge tawhid could not claim to judge the actions of any who had.202  
 As opposed to the messages of previous prophets, Muhammad’s revelations appealed 
to all humanity, as the unity of mankind would represent divine tawhid.203  Notwithstanding, 
his message met with resistance from the dominant Quraysh who viewed it as an affront to 
ancestral beliefs, and the socio-political status quo which rested on longstanding systems of 
belief which informed economic and political practices in Arabian power structures.204  Given 
that Muhammad’s community was defined both internally and externally by its belief, it was 
contrasted by those in Mecca who refused to acknowledge tawhid and Muhammad’s role as 
Allah’s messenger.  These disbelieving Meccans were described as kafir, a term conjured to 
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describe one who covered over the truth.205  By covering over truth and obfuscating tawhid, 
disbelievers had plunged Arabia into an age of ignorance, jahiliyyah, and continued unabated 
to live this way.  Further, they actively continued to cover over truth by persecuting believers 
and attempting to seduce them away from their newfound convictions.  As persecution 
increased, the nature of Muhammad’s revelations adapted to reflect the needs of a social group 
under threat.206  A cycle of escalating tensions ensued, and ultimately Muhammad was 
divinely instructed to “proclaim what you have been ordered and turn away from the 
polytheists.  (…)  In the end they will know.”207  This development is highly significant in that 
it set the precedent for the disassociation from those deemed “other” on grounds of correct 
internal belief and public proclamation of it,  gave believers the ability to quantify what 
actions constituted disbelief, and encouraged further solidarity between those who believed 
themselves to possess the correct worldview when contrasted with opposing and threatening 
worldviews.  While revelations did not provide firm doctrinal mechanisms for pronouncing 
fellow humans disbelievers, the nature of escalating social tension between believers and 
disbelievers culminated in ideological ideations that laid the foundations for takfir and al-
wala’ wa-l-bara’ (WB) in Islam.208 
 While social and ideological lines of demarcation had been drawn in revelation, 
Muhammad’s community continued to exist in Mecca as a persecuted minority.  Just as the 
ideological tools to defend group integrity had emerged parallel to evolving social 
circumstances, shifting political realities gradually afforded Muhammad the opportunity to 
provide his community with the physical means to defend itself.209  After receiving pledges of 
military alliance from tribal representatives from Yathrib, divine revelations changed, and 
Allah granted Muhammad permission to engage in violence, but equally provided 
justifications for said violence and the conditions which allowed it.  “The first verse which 
 
205 Quran, 74:43-46. 
206 For details on specific instances of Quraysh harassment of the early community and the way in which 
revelations addressed this issue, see Ishaq in Guillaume, 161. 
207 Ishaq in Guillaum, 184-187.   
208 Doctrinal developments pertaining to both declarations of apostasy and the concept of loyalty and disavowal 
as relevant to ISIS and Islamic terrorism will be covered in future sections, this section demonstrates only the 
sociological development of the foundation for the concepts. 
209In 621 and 622CE, Muhammad met with representatives from Yathrib and concluded the first and second 
treaties of al-Aqabah.  The details of the meetings are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to 
note that at the second treaty, it was agreed that the tribes of Yathrib would grant Muhammad and his 
community protection, and would ally with him in matters of war.  For an account of these treaties, see Ishaq in 
Guillaume, 204.  
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was sent down on this subject (…) was: ‘Permission is given to those who fight because they 
have been wronged.  God is well able to help them,- those who have been driven out of their 
houses without right only because they said God is our Lord.  (…)  Fight them so that there be 
no more seduction, i.e. until no believer is seduced from his religion.  ‘And the religion is 
God’s.”210  Encapsulated in this revelation is the foundational notion that violence engaged in 
by a believer is justified in the case that he or she has been wronged on the grounds of belief in 
God.  It is more profound for practical and philosophical purposes when considering the way 
that Muhammad’s revelations had framed morality by equating quotidian social practices to 
acts of worship in recognition of tawhid.  While the initial command granting permission to 
fight can be seen in purely theological terms that allows violence to permit freedom of 
worship, the way Muhammad had drawn lines of demarcation between believers and non-
believers set the precedent for this command to be expansively applied because it provided the 
platform which could be used to equate any action not predicated on belief in tawhid as an act 
of persecution.  
 The earliest foundations for takfir, WB, and jihad as legitimate violence conducted in 
the name of God can thus be seen as thoroughly intertwined, and as the progression of 
psychological and physical mechanisms by which a community could define itself relative to 
‘the other’.  Furthermore, these foundations were not laid independently due to underlying 
theological positions, rather they evolved under the guise of divine infallibility in direct 
response to concrete social realities.  The framing of ‘the other’ as both an identifiable entity, 
and later one which directly threatened the physical integrity of Muhammad’s community, 
necessitated the ability of the group to defend itself.  Commensurate with the behaviour of 
social groups which will see opposing worldviews as incompatible with their own when under 
perceived threat of annihilation, in the face of increased persecution, revelations described 
jahiliyyah and its adherents as irreconcilable with tawhid.  Once that fear was alleviated by 
promises of military protection, physical mechanisms of force were introduced into the 
framework of identity and disassociation which had already been revealed. 
 
 6.2 Early Consolidation of Defence Mechanisms in Statehood    
 
210 Ishaq in Guillaume, 212-213.   
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 In 622 CE Muhammad and his community emigrated to Yathrib, (hereafter Medina) 
and this momentous event, the hijrah, marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. 211    At 
Medina, the umma settled among Arab Jewish tribes which became known as the ansar, 
helpers.  In this exile, which can be interpreted as a physical act of WB insofar as the 
community physically disassociated structural disbelief, the umma gained the opportunity to 
implement it vision for social governance which relied on revelation.212  Muhammad 
combined all positions of pre-Islamic authority into his person, serving as tribal adjudicator, 
military commander, and religious leader, and his revelations increasingly emphasised the 
creation of a distinct group identity which departed from norms of previous Judeo-Christian 
prophets.213  Indicative of this development is the Constitution of Medina which was likely 
produced shortly after the arrival of the believers at Medina.  This document identified the 
inhabitants of Medina as a distinct and independent political unit, but also delineated the 
appropriate relationship in social, religious, economic, and political interactions between 
believers and those who did not believe, but with whom believers coexisted.  This document, 
and further rules for governance which followed, incorporated previous institutions such as 
that of lex talionis, but did so by inserting notions of morality in that they were intended not to 
maintain the status of one group relative to another, but to establish God’s justice through the 
promotion of umma integrity.214  The distinct identity that began to form at Medina was based 
on the belief in an absolute divine authority, and the centralisation of worldly authority to 
mediate it.  Furthermore, religious ties among co-believers were reinforced by 
uncompromising rejection of all paganism and denial of tawhid.  Due to the intertwined 
religious and political nature of revelations and Muhammad’s position, the act of 
disassociating from jahiliyyah became simultaneously social and moral; thus any future 
 
211 For fuller historical narratives of the early umma, see Cook, David B., Muhammad (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1983).     
Rubin, Uri, “Muhammad and the Islamic Self-Image”, in Motzki, Harald (ed), The Biography of Muhammad: The 
Issue of the Source (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 3-17.  
Watt, William Montgomery, Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956).   
212 See Ramadan, Tariq, The Messenger; The Meanings of the Life of Muhammad (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
213 For more on the evolution of Muhammad’s revelations to the creation of a distinct identity, see Rodinson, 
Maxime, Muhammad (New York: Pantheon, 1971).   
214 The most comprehensive study of the Constitution of Medina is Lecker, Michael, The ‘Constitution of 
Medina’: Muhammad’s First Legal Document (Princeton: Darwin Press, 2004). 
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severing of ties with the umma through belief or action could be considered both crime and 
sin.215 
 After the hijrah, the umma as a distinct social group and political unit that had been 
persecuted required the means to ensure its survival in a competitive social space, and the 
permission Allah had given it to engage in violence was expanded on in revelations, and the 
idea of jihad which was developed to convey a necessary defensive posture.216  Although 
Muhammad and his community engaged in proactive raiding that was vital to the group’s 
survival, this was construed as defensive in that was conducted against individuals and groups 
that threatened the umma’s survival.217  “They did not wait for the enemy to attack them in 
their own country.  This is in accordance with a natural sociological law: “only contemptible 
people are fought in their own house”.”218  While raiding had been customary in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, what was socially revolutionary was that revelations not only condoned these raids, 
but that in their conduct as the means of ensuring group survival, notions of morality gave 
violence a higher meaning and purpose.  Revelations forbade the killing of innocents, while 
they also described violence as a way to disgrace and humiliate those who perpetuated evil 
and denial of tawhid.219  Most importantly, all violence was linked to the defence of God, 
territory, freedom, and human rights.  “Jihad in the sense of fighting, however, is restricted by 
the phrase fi sabil Allah, in the way of God.  This implies that jihad is not just plain, ordinary 
war, but must somehow be connected with religion and the interest of believers.”220   
 Muhammad’s community also engaged in three major battles with Meccan forces, and 
these were portrayed in revelation as having been necessary to the survival of the community, 
and virtuous endeavours in the eyes of God in that they provided the opportunity for believers 
 
215 Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, 56.   
216 Jihad in Islam means to strive, and involves both inner striving for spiritual purity and external striving for the 
observance of God’s will.  For the present purposes, however, the use of the term jihad will be confined to 
describe acts and mechanisms of violence and warfare.  For a comprehensive study of the evolution of jihad 
related to specific socio-cultural contexts in early Islamic history, see Heck, Paul L, “Jihad Revisited”, The Journal 
of Religious Ethics 32:1 (Spring 2004), 95-128.   
217 For issues related to early raids of the umma, and the difficulties defining violent jihad relative to the 
community, see Faizer, Rizwi, “Expeditions and Battles”, in McAuliffe, Jane (ed), Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an Vol 
2 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 143-152. 
218 Shaltut, Mahmud, “The Koran and Fighting”, in Peters, Rudolph, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam 
(Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 100.    
219 Peters, 12-13. 
220 Rida, Rashid, in Peters, 118.   
87 
 
to physically strive to fight those who would deny tawhid.221  Due to the way violence had 
been revealed and justified, it’s conduct as a communal expression of belief in tawhid and 
rejection of paganism could further enhance bonds of loyalty and cohesion between believers 
through the shared cathartic experience of righteous violence.222 
 While violence in the form of raids and battles took place against external enemies in 
the years immediately following the hijrah, structural and physical violence also manifest 
itself internally which reinforced underlying premises of nascent takfir and WB.  Following 
the battle of Badr, a Jewish tribe of Medina was accused of treachery by Muhammad and 
subsequently expelled from the town.  This occurred again after the battle of Uhud with 
another tribe.  After the Battle of the Trench this again occurred, yet this time Muhammad 
ordered the massacre of all the tribe’s men.223  These instances have been explored extensively 
in research, but for the present purposes what is important to note is that they are indicative of 
a period in which the authority and longevity of the umma as a social group was not a 
certainty.224  They demonstrate the fact that any act contrary to the political interests of the 
group could be simultaneously construed as an act of disbelief in that questioning 
Muhammad’s political role as leader also undermined the fundamental premise that he acted 
on behalf of divine interest.  These acts, therefore, removed their perpetrators from the fold of 
group inclusion and cast them outside community protection and divine favour.  In a 
dangerous social space in which umma survival was not guaranteed, violent mechanisms were 
necessary to ensure umma unity, the most important social quality observed in the constitution 
of Medina in that human unity meant to represent divine tawhid.  This type of enforcement 
and violently casting out those deemed ‘other’ could strengthen bonds of solidarity in correct 
belief and practice in that individuals would be hesitant to place themselves in a position of 
 
221 For a contextual placing of the battles of Badr, Uhud, and the Trench, see Bonner, Michael, Jihad in Islamic 
History; Doctrines and Practice (Princeton University Press, 2006), 40. 
222 This is commensurate with the formativist sociological approach which understands nationalist sentiments in 
the creation of identity as an inevitable result of warfare.  See Malesevic, Sinisa, “Nationalism, War and Social 
Cohesion”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 34:1 (2011), 142-161. 
223 For details see Reynolds, Gabriel Said, The Emergence of Islam: Classical Traditions in Contemporary 
Perspective (Minneapolis: Augsberg Fortress Publishers, 2012), 44-47. 
224 For more on the specifics of each expulsion and the massacre, as well as an analysis of how these events 
were chronicled by contemporaries, see Faizer, Rizwi, “Muhammad and the Medinan Jews: A Comparison of the 
Texts of Ibn Ishaq’s Kitab Sirat Rasul Allah with al-Waqidi’s Kitab al-Maghazi”, International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 28:4 (November 2006), 463-489. 
88 
 
precarity and risk facing a similar fate.  In these instances, the power of one of religion’s three 
primary social functions, that of control, is evident. 
 In 630 CE, Muhammad marched from Medina to Mecca with an army of 10,000 men, 
and Meccan forces under Abu Sufyan surrendered the city without bloodshed.  Muhammad in 
turn granted amnesty to those who had persecuted believers, and many of these went on to 
become influential leaders and warriors under the prophet and his successors.225  The fact that 
Muhammad and his followers achieved victory over Mecca is highly significant, as one of the 
hallmark features of religion is its ability to provide a narrative that future generations can 
incorporate as their own in a shared transcendent experience.  The victory over Mecca 
provided the foundation for the narrative that correct belief in tawhid, practices reflective of it, 
identity formation and demarcation resultant from it, and calculated violence in enforcement 
of it, could produce a self-sufficient socio-political group which could not only survive but 
which could also be victorious over contemporary relative hegemons.   
 
 6.3 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has discussed the deliberate creation of a unique identity based on 
fundamental belief, and intellectual mechanisms that were introduced into a transcendent 
framework to safeguard the integrity of that identity.  Because the foundational developments 
of ideas that would inform takfir, WB, and jihad were the result of contemporary contexts, and 
because the call to tawhid was meant to appeal to all of humanity, these ideas were flexible to 
enable their application relative to future and unforeseen needs of the community.  
Muhammad’s messages revealed a vision for a sacred canopy that encompassed spiritual, 
social, economic, and political spheres of life and whose inner cohesion would reflect divine 
unity. Another crucial point for restatement is the fact that all violence conducted to safeguard 
group identity and integrity was framed as both justified and necessary to achieve God’s will.  
God’s will as described in revelation, however, did not limit itself to abstract principles, rather 
it was the construction and maintenance of a revolutionary sovereign entity. Due to the 
cultural context in which these ideas developed, violence in the way of God manifest itself as 
one of the mechanisms through which one social group could pursue independence and a 
 
225 For details on the events leading to Muhammad’s victory over Mecca, see Watt, Montgomery, Muhammad; 
Prophet and Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 203-206. 
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model for governance which contradicted contemporary institutions of power as well as 
existing rules for achieving and exercising statehood.   
      


























 ISIS is one of the world’s best-known entities, yet the nuances and characteristics that 
make it unique and potentially able to provide an enduring ideological framework despite 
territorial demise remain underappreciated in Western frameworks.226  The Wilson Center, an 
internationally respected think tank based in Washington DC summarised the early years of 
ISIS by stating the following: “The Islamic State – also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh – 
emerged from the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a local offshoot of al Qaeda founded by 
Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2004. It faded into obscurity for several years after the surge of U.S. 
troops to Iraq in 2007. But it began to re-emerge in 2011. Over the next few years, it took 
advantage of growing instability in Iraq and Syria to carry out attacks and bolster its ranks.”227  
This description, while not entirely inaccurate, is misleading in that it portrays ISIS as having 
grown organically as an Al-Qaeda splinter organisation, and as part of a single jihadist 
movement whose members share violent anti-American ambitions.  Furthermore, this 
assessment frames ISIS and its relative level of prevalence and success as being inversely 
related to the presence and influence of the US military, and can thus facilitate blanket 
labelling of “Islamic terrorism” and encourage support for countermeasures which rely heavily 
on military intervention at the exclusion of all others.228   
 ISIS is the product of the juncture between longstanding ambitions of Islamic self-rule 
in the jihadist program and the contextual circumstance provided by the US led war in Iraq.  In 
the case of social groups pursuing ambitions, and especially in the case of those which would 
 
226 The group has undergone numerous name changes since its appearance, and has been known as The Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), The Islamic State (IS), and Daesh (the 
transliteration of the Arabic acronym formed of the same words that comprise ISIS in English).  All of these 
names have different meanings to both proponents and opponents of the organisation, but for sake of ease, 
this thesis will utilise ISIS to refer to the group at all stages of its existence until later noted. 
227 Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, Wilson Center, October 28 2019.  
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state (Accessed 5 December 
2019). 
228 For more widely circulated brief assessments of the origins of ISIS, see ISIS, History.com, June 7 2019.  
https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/isis (Accessed 5 December 2019).   
Kirdar, M.J., Al Qaeda in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 15 2011.  
https://www.csis.org/analysis/al-qaeda-iraq (Accessed 5 December 2019). 
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do so violently, ideology alone is insufficient to trigger action.229  For this to occur, 
opportunity is needed as well, and the Iraqi conflict was not the catalyst for ISIS emergence; 
rather it was an opportunity required for competing visions within the jihadisphere to take 
root, and which exacerbated them.  The extreme and seemingly indiscriminate violence 
conducted in the name of jihad, which characterised the early conflict in Iraq, was widely 
noticed by international audiences.  The underpinning meaning of the longstanding program 
that said violence supported, and the ways in which it had evolved leading up to its 
manifestation in Iraq, was not.   
 This chapter will first explore Salafism and its emergence as a distinct identity within 
the umma, designed to reinvigorate Islam’s prosperity by emulating the standards provided by 
Muhammad and his community.  Second it will discuss the development of Salafi-Jihadism as 
a unique substructure to achieve Salafi objectives through purity and governance by means of 
violent ideological reconfigurations.  Third this chapter will discuss the impacts of the Soviet-
Afghan war on Salafi-jihadism and the birth of al-Qaeda.  Fourth this chapter will introduce 
one of the most influential Salafi-jihadist ideologues of this period, Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi, in order to survey his intellectual reconstructions of key concepts that remain points 
of contention within the jihadisphere.  Finally, it will chronicle the state of Salafi-jihadism in 
the period between the Soviet-Afghan war and 9/11.   
 
 7.1 Exploring Salafism 
ISIS is, at its core, a Salafi-takfiri organisation, and thus no examination of the group’s 
framing and wielding of the concepts would be useful without understanding the origins and 
significance of the same.  “Salafism derives from the term the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-
salih), the first three generations of Muslims who had first-hand experience of the rise of Islam 
and are regarded as exemplary for the correct way to live for future Muslims.”230  In order to 
follow the example set by the first generations of Muslims and emulate their behaviour despite 
centuries of separation, Salafis adhere to a strict methodology which relies on the principles of 
 
229 Baldet, William, Preventing radical right extremism requires honesty, empathy and a whole society approach. 
Are we doomed to fail?  OpenDemocracy, June 5 2019.  https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/preventing-
radical-right-extremism-requires-honesty-empathy-and-whole-society-approach-are-we-doomed-fail/ 
(Accessed 5 December 2019).   
230 Meijer, Roel, “Introduction”, in Meijer, Roel (ed), Global Salafism; Islam’s New Religious Movement (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1-32, 3.   
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the Qur׳an and hadith to correctly observe tawhid in the world.231  Salafis are therefore 
distinguished from other Muslims by their self-asserted proximity to the pious predecessors, 
gained through the correct emulation of emotivity and behaviour, and the refusal to adopt non-
scriptural sources of shari׳a.232  Salafism traces its roots to the scholar Ibn Hanbal (780-855 
CE) and the movement ahl al-hadith which rejected contemporary sources of Islamic law such 
as analogical reasoning (qiyas) and personal scholarly legal opinion (ra’y).233  Later 
proponents of this methodology included the 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyya who argued 
that the Mongol rulers that had displaced the Abbasid Caliphate had converted to Islam by 
proclaiming the shahada, but that they governed by manmade laws that contradicted the 
shari׳a.  This, he asserted, had rendered their conversions null and void, making them 
apostates and thus legitimate targets of jihad in which every Muslim was legally required to 
participate.234   Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya declared that sin and communal deviance from the 
path outlined in the Quran constituted disbelief so grave that in return the Muslim community 
had been thrust into chaos and subservience.235  The only way to rectify the situation, he 
argued, was to return to the basic fundamentals of worship and governance embodied by the 
first three generations of Muslims.  In the 18th century, ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) built on 
this framework and argued that those who did not adhere to his vision of tawhid could be 
declared kuffar, apostate, and thus excommunicated by takfir, making them legitimate targets 
of lawful jihad.236  The desire to emulate the standards of Muhammad’s community proved to 
be a powerful intellectual mechanism for mobilisation, and as it was presented by Ibn 
Taymiyya and ‘Abd al-Wahhab centuries apart, proved to later generations that it could be 
applicable across time, space, and serve specific cultural needs.   
Despite the fact that Salafism appeals to the desire to purify Islam and return to the 
most unadulterated sources of law, governance, and social conduct, the way that this is 
 
231 Hadith is the “group of reports”; accounts of what Muhammad or a member of his early community said or 
did.  They are second in authority only to the Qur׳an, and were collected in written form in the 9th century CE.  
In collecting an authoritative collection, hadiths were evaluated on their constituent parts: isnad (chain of 
transmission, to verify authenticity), and matn (the text of the report containing guiding principles, measured 
for utility and applicability).  The hadith, therefore, are viewed as “the practices and patterns of behaviour that 
brought such phenomenal success to Muhammad and the Medinese community”.  See Shah, Mustafa, The 
Hadith: Articulating the Beliefs and Constructs of Classical Islam (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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achieved differentiates Salafis both from the broader umma and amongst themselves, and 
there is no single definition of what it means to be ‘Salafi’.237  Quietist Salafis “focus on the 
propagation of their message (da׳wa) through lessons, sermons, and other missionary activities 
and stay away from politics and violence, which they leave to the ruler.”238  These individuals 
emphasise purification and education, and do not recognise modern political systems as 
legitimate due to lack of foundation in scriptural principles.  Furthermore, they consider 
political activity as a dangerous diversion which detracts from an individual’s ability to 
achieve spiritual purity, and foments unlawful divisions within the umma.239  Salafi-jihadism, 
a term used to describe those who seek a return to the models exemplified by the first three 
generations of Muslims by means of violence has gained notoriety in the West after 9/11, but 
can best be described as a theological doctrine of millenarian change which focuses on issues 
of rightful authority, legitimacy, obedience and justified rebellion.240  In linking its theology to 
violence, Salafi-jihadists emphasise the Quranic injunctions for warfare which dictate that it 
must be conducted fi sabil Allah (in the path of God) as was outlined in the previous section, 
and maintain that the path of God entails the premises for tawhid in governance which were 
embodied by Muhammad and his companions.  This undermines visions of jihad which 
describe it as a holistic struggle for purity, and thus Salafi-jihadists view physical struggle as 
the pinnacle of Islam, and themselves as an elite group within the umma responsible for its 
salvation.241  
 The rigidity of the worldview embraced by Salafis, and the self-appointed role of 
Salafi-jihadists in ensuring Islam’s survival and enforcement of tawhid, necessitates the 
practical application of takfir to delineate what the Muslim community should be.  For Salafi-
jihadists, takfir is the means by which to embody one of religion’s core social functions, that 
of control.  Just as Muhammad linked worldly conduct to the living demonstration of tawhid, 
so Salafi-jihadists consider what they interpret as unlawful or un-Islamic behaviour as 
 
237 Primary points of divergence among Salafis revolve around the concepts of ‘aqida and manhaj; creed and 
method.  Defining the creed is particularly important to Salafis as it entails correct belief and the elimination of 
religious innovations as well as un-Islamic influences.  See Meijer, 5.     
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comprising a sin grave enough to remove its adherent from the fold of Islam.242  When 
coupled with a militant ideology which stipulates to those outside the fold of Islam as 
legitimate targets of violence, takfir becomes a mechanism to ensure homogeneity through 
fear and coercion.  While takfir as a construct is meant to protect the purity of the umma by 
casting out those who engage in major acts of disbelief, it becomes problematic when 
attempting to discern the inner motivations and intentions of those individuals who may 
outwardly engage in questionable behaviour.243  Salafi-jihadists, however, circumvent this 
difficulty by citing examples of the Prophet Muhammad’s life in which he judged individuals 
based on their apparent actions.244  Given human subjectivity and the social ambitions of a 
group, however, it is evident how the application of takfir can be moulded and modified to 
serve a desired outcome.   
Salafism advocates the realisation of tawhid through credal purity, and its adherents 
believe themselves to be of the saved sect which will lead the umma to prosperity.  Further, 
they believe that socio-political developments which occurred after the time of the Prophet are 
corrupted and deviant, and must be avoided to maintain purity.  While quietists do not overtly 
engage in political structures, Salafi-jihadists maintain that justified jihad conducted to 
eliminate these structures is a necessary step in progress through idealised regression in order 
to emulate the standards of Muhammad’s community and the mechanisms by which it 
achieved sovereignty.  In terms of social group analysis, Salafism provides a worldview which 
offers revival and communal dignity, and Salafi-jihadism offers a specific type of agency, 
justified through sacred historical narrative, through which this may be achieved.245  As a 
construct, it is abstract and subject to the needs and desires of a constituency which when 
combined with the abovementioned irreproachable religious justification, makes it a powerful 
paradigm for forging specific visions of an ideal community.   
 
 
242 Maher, 72. 
243 For more on the subjective use of takfir, and the six types of sin that comprise kufr akbar (great sin), see Lav, 
Daniel, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 69. 
244 In one example, Muhammad told his paternal uncle who was captured during the Battle of Badr that 
although he was Muslim, it was only ‘apparent’ that he had been against the Muslim army.  This was used by 
Anwar al-Awlaki in 2009.  See Maher, 74.  
245 For more on contextual development of Salafism, and its uses as a vehicle for change, see Lauziere, Henri, 
The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).    
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 7.2 The Dream of the Utopian Islamic State 
 The Islamist and jihadist programs in the modern era can trace their roots to the 
founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 by school teacher Hasan al-Banna.246  
The Brotherhood, according to article (2) of its bylaws, “is an international Muslim Body, 
which seeks to establish Allah’s law in the land by achieving the spiritual goals of Islam and 
the true religion”.247  It sought to Islamize society by creating and maintaining grassroots 
organizations as well as the provision of essential social services in accordance with the 
principles of tawhid.248  This would in turn ultimately result in the restoration of a worldwide 
Caliphate following the inevitable collapse of secular regimes.  Al-Banna wrote extensively on 
the topic of jihad, and described it as a tool incumbent upon all believers in establishing the 
Islamic state and this was reflected in the organizational motto: “Allah is our objective.  The 
Prophet is our exemplar.  The Quran is our law.  Jihad is our way.  Dying in the way of Allah 
is our highest hope.”249  The Muslim Brotherhood in its inception therefore began the process 
of intellectually reorienting the grounds on which a state could and should be formed in the 
modern era.  The Western construct of a modern state took root in Europe following the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.  The Treaty, which outlined rudimentary notions of citizenship 
based on locality and loyalty, sought to guarantee enduring peace through the recognition of 
the validity of new laws and agreements which were the result of distinct communal 
identities.250  Al-Banna, however, argued that these fundamental ideas of identity and 
citizenship were artificial, and therefore any state that arose from them would be similarly 
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flawed.  This would especially be the case when states derived from this artificial construct 
were superimposed onto a culture which already possessed organic models for identity-based 
governance; in this case, that which was provided by the example of Muhammad’s experience 
at Medina.251   
 The Brotherhood outlined a policy of gradualism that was reflected by the 
organization’s seven stated goals: (1) inform the world about Islam and spread its teachings, 
(2) unify the world under the banner of Islam, (3) raise the standard of living and achieve 
social justice, (4) fight disease, poverty and hunger, (5) liberate the umma from foreign rule, 
(6) establish a worldwide Caliphate, and (7) build a new world order based on the Sharia.  
These goals, in turn, were to be met through the gradual conduct of four separate phases: (1) 
da׳wa I, (2) da׳wa II, (3) jihad, and (4) khalifa.252  It is important to note that despite the 
overall ambitions made explicitly clear in the Brotherhood’s charter, the organisation was 
committed to working within established frameworks and institutions of democracy to achieve 
them, did not believe itself to be in the jihadist stage of progression, and thus did not apply 
takfir to rulers or regimes.    
 After playing a vital role in the Egyptian free officer’s coup of 1952, the group was 
politically persecuted and radical offshoots began to advocate the progression towards the 
jihadist stage of operations, embodied by thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb who revolutionised the 
construct of takfir by applying it to secular rulers.253  He justified this by citing Ibn Taymiyya, 
whose theology had been reinvigorated in the modern era by ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who argued 
that any activity; social, moral, or political, that encroached on the sole authority of Allah was 
by default an act of apostasy and therefore necessitated a two-fold process: jihad waged to 
cleanse the umma of impurities and jihad waged to wrest political control from the grasp of 
infidel authorities and establish tawhid in governance.254  Furthermore, according to the Quran 
and the models of governance embodied by the earliest generations of Muslims, it would be 
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the obligation of the legitimate Islamic ruler to maintain tawhid and enforce correct forms of 
pious behavior in all aspects of life by defining and implementing strict guidelines for 
members of the umma to follow.  By drawing inspiration from Ibn Taymiyya and ‘Abd al-
Wahhab and moulding their precepts for contemporary applicability, Qutb set an important 
precedent in Islamic reformism and statecraft.  He embodied the necessity of recovering the 
‘true pristine Islam of the Quran’ by resorting to militant methods and imposing correct 
reformist ideology by force,255 and he did so by carefully crafting an ideological platform 
which built on ideas which had been a part of Islamic history for centuries, demonstrating the 
power of religious narratives to create a continuum between past, present, and idealised future.   
Qutb also began to build on the ideas developed by al-Banna in that he continued to 
redefine conventional notions of legitimacy and sovereignty in ways that reflected a melding 
of traditional Islamic constructs of divine rule and Western frameworks which relied on the 
existence of a power relationship between rulers and a constituency.256  By framing a return to 
original Islamic models for governance as the means of reviving human fulfilment, dignity, 
and social harmony, Qutb demonstrated the ability of religious beliefs to provide links 
between contemporary circumstances and an idealised past.  By elaborating on the necessity of 
violence by reinvigorating the role of ijtihad, he also appealed to underlying sentiments of 
modern national subjugation and offered individual and collective agency as a vehicle for 
effecting change in the world.257  Qutb did not utilise the term Salafi-jihadism as we 
understand it today when conceptualising terrorist models, but his reformulations of justified 
violence as a necessary means of defining the umma and restoring Islamic purity demonstrate 
the salience and endurance of the frameworks he built on.       
In 1971, Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Hudaybi rejected both violence and 
takfir on behalf of the organization, stating that while the need to maintain the struggle against 
oppression in the pursuit of the eventual Caliphate remained paramount, any individual to 
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pronounce the shahada in earnest was to be deemed a believer against all accusations.258  This 
stance is commensurate with the belief in Islam that one cannot judge what is in a person’s 
heart; this role is reserved for Allah alone.259  While this position remained institutionally firm 
within the Brotherhood, Qutb’s ideology also found resonance, and in 1981 members of the 
militant Jamaat al-Jihad assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.  The group’s 
theoretician, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, argued that extreme violent jihad was an 
individual duty necessary to cleanse the umma.  Further, he elaborated on Qutb’s position in 
that he believed the social bonds of ideological solidarity in pursuit of ideal governance 
exemplified by Muhammad’s community were stronger and more valid than any notion of 
modern citizenship.  By thus crafting his argument, ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj developed and made 
more salient the notion that concepts of statehood and nationality were invalid when 
contrasted with superior models of social harmony that would result from the observance of 
divine prescriptions for governance.260 
 
7.3 Salafi-Jihadism in the Soviet-Afghan War 
The details of the events leading to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the 
nuances of tacit and overt governmental support for the mujahidin that confronted it are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but no discussion of ISIS ideology would be complete without 
a brief narration of the jihadist experience there.261  Early in the Afghan conflict, Dr. Abdullah 
Azzam, with the financial support of Osama Bin Laden, established the Maktab al-Khidamat 
(Office of Services), whose function was to release recruitment propaganda, facilitate the 
inflow of foreign fighters into the country, and train them.262  Azzam capitalized on subjective 
individual socio-political grievances experienced by the lower classes of Muslim nations, and 
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linked them to an expanded perception of nationhood.  He urged allegiance to an Islamic 
identity over a national one by stating that “This Afghan Affair has emerged from a regional 
affair to an Islamic one.”263  Azzam argued that jihad as prescribed in scripture did not 
necessarily need to be conducted exclusively defensively, but that it could be waged 
offensively in order to establish a territorial foothold from which to expand the eventual 
caliphate.  In this regard he differed from Qutb slightly in that in his framing he shifted the 
primary focus of jihad away from apostate rulers to the Soviets; foreigners that had physically 
invaded Muslim lands.  He also echoed Faraj’s conceptualization in positing that jihad should 
not be a collective duty declared by a recognized ruler but an individual obligation incumbent 
upon every single believer, thus further undercutting the authority of apostate states to declare 
jihad, and establishing the transnational umma as an independent stakeholder engaged in just 
warfare within a global conflict.  By doing so, Azzam gave his vision of the umma the 
ideological ability to wield state like power in a modern context.264  
In the early 1980s Bin Laden established Al-Qaeda’s immediate forerunner in 
Afghanistan, Ma’sadat al-Ansar (The Lion’s Den of Supporters) as an Arab-only fighting unit 
that did not integrate with local mujahidin counterparts, and increasingly “treated Afghans 
living in government controlled areas as unbelievers to whom Muslims should apply the laws 
of futuhat (conquest), including execution of adult males who resisted and enslavement of 
women and children.”265  Whereas in 1979 the conflict had been framed as a pan-Islamic 
solidarity movement, by the mid-1980s members of the Office had begun to focus substantial 
energy on redefining the parameters of umma membership and these, to a large degree, were 
determined by the conceptual developments regarding the role of jihad in shaping not only a 
state but the Muslim community itself.  In Bin Laden’s view, his fighters constituted an elite 
cadre that was necessary if the jihadist program was to succeed, and this jihadist vanguard 
would be responsible for achieving what previous Islamists and revolutionaries had not.266   
This conceptual orientation gave the vanguard the imperative of establishing an Islamic state 
modeled on Medina, and established the basis on which a self-determined group of individuals 
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could claim elite status within a larger constituency and thus dictate the composition and 
identity of that same constituency.  This intellectual positioning, therefore, created an 
environment in which takfir and WB could be extensively interpreted and applied within the 
umma itself as well as beyond it to create and enforce specific parameters for membership.  
While the Office of Services and the members of the Lion’s Den were materially focused on 
defeating the Soviets as part of the larger progression towards Islamic statehood, the 
ideological creation of an elite vanguard and its theoretical self-ascribed ability to define the 
identity, composition, and goals of the larger Islamic social group was an important 
development in the doctrine of jihad.267  
 
7.4 The Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
 One of the most important individuals to have great impact on the intellectual 
repositioning of jihad, its role in identifying the umma, and achieving statehood during this 
period was Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.268  He is, to this day, one of the most important 
spiritual fathers to develop the militant ideology of Salafi-jihadism which first gained 
worldwide renown through its incarnation in Al-Qaeda.269  Furthermore, the Jordanian Salafi 
continues to be a figure of great authority within the jihadisphere, and his outspoken role in 
the ongoing debates surrounding the application of takfir and WB, as well as his contributions 
to revolutionising the very concepts, and Salafi-jihadism itself, require devoting significant 
attention to his ideology. 
 Since the 1970s al-Maqdisi has made numerous contributions to the ideology of Salafi-
jihadism, but for the present purposes, this section will focus on his treatment of WB and its 
implications.  Notions of community and loyalty which form the foundations of WB predate 
the advent of Islam, and were used to denote the process by which members of a tribe could 
expel an individual from the safety guaranteed by group membership, and simultaneously 
claim to be innocent of any fate to befall the former member.270  This concept was 
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incorporated as the early Muslim community absorbed ingrained tribal social mechanisms, and 
was repurposed to distinguish group membership between those who did and did not 
acknowledge tawhid.  The Qur׳anic passage that informs al-Maqdisi’s treatment of WB is the 
following: “Indeed there has been an excellent example for you in Abraham and those with 
him when they said to their people: “Verily we are free from you and whatever you worship 
besides Allah.  We have rejected you, and there has started between us and you enmity and 
hatred forever until you believe in Allah alone.”271  This verse, according to the Salafi 
interpretation, encompasses the obligation of the believer to disavow any form of worship that 
denies tawhid, as well as those who uphold it.  Crucially, it dictates that relationships between 
Muslims and non-Muslims must remain on the basis of hatred until tawhid is realised, and 
parties can find common ground in the acknowledgement of tawhid.272      
 Al-Maqdisi expanded on this conceptualisation in “Millat Ibrahim” (1984) by aiming 
the necessary hatred and enmity at man-made laws.273  Furthermore, al-Maqdisi argued that in 
the modern world, those who uphold man-made laws should also be treated with enmity, 
making individuals at all levels of government and secular institutions targets of hatred.  He 
did so by elaborating on the Islamic deficiencies manifest by Saudi governance, arguing that 
while Wahhabi theology was well intentioned, it relied in contemporary usage on innovations 
which were heretical due to their having originated after the time of the salaf.274  In his work, 
al-Maqdisi cited extensively from the Quran, hadith, and Wahhabi scholars to support the 
proposition that the ideal form of expressing disavowal was violent jihad.  “By thus 
connecting wala’ towards ‘un-Islamic’ laws with worship, and its alternative -bara’ – with 
jihad, while all the time stressing the necessity of disavowal for all Muslims, al-Maqdisi has 
turned al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ from a quietist tool to purify the religion into an instrument for 
revolution.”275  Not only did al-Maqdisi revolutionise WB by arguing that it entailed 
mandatory hatred and justified violence against those deemed ‘other’ by their adherence to 
man-made laws, by doing so he also made the outward conduct of jihad, as demonstrative 
bara, a necessary litmus test for inclusion in a narrowly interpreted Muslim community.276  
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Al-Maqdisi used his framework, which built on the ideas developed by Qutb and ‘Abd al-
Salam Faraj, to determine that applying or upholding any system of laws or governance other 
than those mandated in scripture constituted disbelief so grave as to warrant unequivocal 
pronouncement of takfir.  He did so in a meticulously Salafi fashion, by likening modern 
political structures to the jahiliyyah which predated Islam, and he turned an intellectual 
construct designed to strengthen bonds of Islamic solidarity into a means by which to declare 
apostate those who did not share his vision of tawhid.  Fundamentally, he created a framework 
which equated justified violence to the natural consequence of the basic beliefs of the Islamic 
faith.277       
 
 7.5 Salafi-Jihadism between the Soviet-Afghan War and 9/11 
A great deal has been written about the evolution of Al-Qaeda between the Soviet war 
and 9/11, but for the present purposes a few points are worth noting.278  Despite the cessation 
of hostilities, and the international displacement of veterans of the Soviet war, Al-Qaeda 
maintained its self-image as a transnational entity and absorbed regional affiliates by 
providing tactical and theological training to groups of local fighters, and granted them 
eventual autonomy in return for a pledge of loyalty, bayat, sworn to Bin Laden himself.279280  
Although Saudi Arabia had acknowledged the legitimacy of Azzam’s jihad against the 
Soviets, following the return of foreign fighters and the perceived threat they posed by 
embodying reformulated ideas of what constituted legitimate governance, the Saudi State 
launched a wave of repression against the moderate Islamist group Sahwa in an effort to 
contain any affront to its Islamic legitimacy.  Despite these efforts, in 1995 Saudi Arabia 
experienced its first terrorist attack which killed five Americans, two Indians, and injured 
dozens more.  Of the four perpetrators, three were veterans of the Soviet war, and at trial all of 
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the accused stated that they had been heavily influenced by the teachings and ideology of al-
Maqdisi.281 
One of the most important developments during this period was the fact that when 
Saddam Hussein’s military invaded Kuwait, the Saudi state invited American troops and 
personnel to the region, despite Bin Laden’s offers to supply the regime with jihadist troops 
and personal finances.282  This had a major impact on reshaping the realpolitik and theological 
objectives of the jihadist movement.  In his initial appeals to the Saudi state, Bin Laden 
displayed hesitance in applying the theologically dangerous accusation of takfir as “at the 
time, he saw the Saudi regime as Islamic, and believed any religious irregularities in the 
country did not extend to driving the regime out of the fold of Islam.”283  Following the refusal 
of his offer, Bin Laden left Saudi Arabia, and Al-Qaeda’s core leadership relocated numerous 
times before finding safe haven in Afghanistan.284  While Bin Laden’s ultimate objectives of 
Islamic statehood, achieved through justified violence, remained constant, reorienting 
organisational benchmarks and priorities meant that takfir and WB as they had developed 
during the Soviet war could be potentially further reconfigured intellectually to correlate with 
those entities or individuals which now became enemies.   
Bin Laden’s ideology gradually developed to embrace the recognition that visions of 
an Islamic state grounded on Salafi ideals could never be realised without first driving 
powerful foreign influence from the Middle East, and thus WB and its application extended 
predominantly towards foreign hegemons.  This sentiment was manifest in Bin Laden’s 1998 
Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, 
in which he abstained from applying takfir to regimes or individuals, but reiterated the 
sentiments previously embodied by al-Banna and Qutb which presented Islamic dignity as 
oppressed, and offered jihad against the ‘Judeo-Christian’ coalition as the means by which to 
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reclaim them.285  In his declaration, Bin Laden also critically described jihad as both a 
collective and individual duty, and urged Muslims to unite despite their differences in order to 
avoid falling into the capital sin of neglecting Islamic prerogatives. 
Al-Qaeda attempted to institutionalise its vision of global jihad against America, and 
cement its narrative of a unified and transnational umma in 1998, when Bin Laden, along with 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced the creation of the al-Jabha al-Islamiya al-‘Alamiya li-Jihad 
al-Yahud wa-l-Salibiyyin (World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the 
Crusaders).286  This organisation attempted to unite various jihadist factions and did not focus 
on theological takfir or WB, but what is most remarkable about it was its lack of success in 
that only three out of the roughly twenty jihadist organisations operating in Afghanistan at the 
time endorsed it.287  The lack of unanimity, and refusal to abide by Al-Qaeda’s program which 
did not endorse declarations of takfir and focused instead on waging jihad against foreign 
powers was manifest by the presence in Afghanistan of Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.    
Zarqawi had spent little time in Afghanistan immediately following the Soviet war, 
and had later returned to Jordan where he had been imprisoned and come under the 
mentorship of al-Maqdisi.  Following his release from prison in 1999, he returned to 
Afghanistan and established independent training camps in Herat Province, where he 
repeatedly refused overtures from Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda leadership to give bayat.288  
Central to this refusal was the fact that Zarqawi advocated directing jihad at who he perceived 
as the true enemies of Islamic integrity: apostate regimes of the Islamic world, and the Shi’a.  
While Bin Laden and Zawahiri attempted to promote Islamic unity and a fundamental 
unifying Muslim identity, Zarqawi founded his visions on the stringent application of takfir 
and WB to first create a cleansed Muslim community which could then form the bedrock of 
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Salafi Caliphate.289  Zarqawi’s justification for targeting the Shi’a rested on the fact that he 
believed them to be heretics, and outside the fold of Islam due to their rejection of the first 
three Caliphs of Islam; the embodiment and institutionalisation of the salaf.290  Furthermore, 
Zarqawi’s position, unlike that of Bin Laden, had the support of renowned Salafi shaykhs, 
mobilisation infrastructure in Europe, and many individuals who relocated to training camps 
in Afghanistan from the Middle East found his strategic and theological vision appealing.  
While Al-Qaeda’s leadership maintained its position and abstained from pronouncing takfir on 
fellow Muslims, and focused on the global enemy of America, Zarqawi’s training camps 
swelled with new recruits.291  Despite numerous attempts on behalf of Al-Qaeda to achieve 
cooperation, Zarqawi’s organisation maintained its autonomy and uncompromising ideology 
regarding the necessary application of takfir and WB through jihad as the only way to pursue 
independence and sovereignty in the Middle East and Levant.     
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The above narration is not an all-inclusive account of the evolution of jihadist thought 
in the 20th century leading up to 9/11.  It is, however, important to note the major thinkers 
associated with the era that reformulated key constructs in ways that continue to affect jihadist 
thinkers and narratives to this day, because this trajectory created discourse which is central to 
genealogical problematisation.  The overview demonstrates that takfir, WB and jihad, while 
being theologically grounded in Islamic history, are fluid concepts which have been moulded 
and elaborated on at specific junctures and in response to specific events to fit the needs of a 
self-defined, and often times idealised community, which is meant to be deliberately distinct 
from those identities and communities deemed ‘other’.  They have been refashioned to suit the 
purposes and aspirations of groups contending with the difficulty of applying divine 
prescriptions for maintaining and ensuring community prosperity to the realities of modern 
geopolitics.  Furthermore, commensurate with philosophical justifications for violence, and 
the proclivity for religious narratives to endorse violence, these concepts have been utilitarian 
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in that they have tended towards violence in instances in which the ideologues dealing with 
them did so in a context which presented a community facing an existential threat.   
This chapter has also demonstrated that the concepts dealt with are not only fluid, but 
that their meaning and utility as part of informing identity and strategy are seldom agreed 
upon.  This variance in opinion transcends the decision to use violence; it indicates deep 
divides in how individuals perceive what it means to be Muslim, and what the representation 
of that collective identity should be in governance.  While this may be a difficult issue to 
explore given the more immediate nature of contending with the violent consequences 
associated with this subject, it is worthwhile to note that great violence and turmoil 
accompanied the same process of communal identity and resultant governance which led to 
the eventual formation of the secular nation state in the Western context.   For this reason, 
except for the mention of the terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia in 1995, this section has refrained 
from using the term terrorism, and has instead focused on the intellectual links between the 
constructs of takfir, WB, jihad and violence, and how these have been used as cognitive 
mechanisms to advocate individual and collective agency in pursuit of alternate models of 


















 The timing of the birth and rapid ascension of ISIS, as well as the role it continues to 
play in the aftermath of the US led war in Iraq may be sufficient to speculate a causal 
relationship between the two phenomena.292  It may further be true that had the US not 
invaded Iraq, ISIS would not have emerged and developed into its present form.  This chapter 
will demonstrate, however, that the war in Iraq and its aftermath simply provided a theatre of 
operations and a highly altered conducive environment in which competing aspirations 
towards the attainment of an Islamic state within jihadism could take root and be manifest.  
Furthermore, this chapter will argue that the failure to understand these longstanding and at 
times conflicting aspirations, the framing of the war in Iraq, and the blanket labelling of 
Islamic and Al-Qaeda terrorism by Western actors contributed to the pursuit of well-
intentioned yet at times misguided policies.  Instead of focusing on the war in Iraq as an open 
front in the Global War on Terrorism, this chapter will emphasise the role, framing, and utility 
of violence as it was advocated and used by jihadist actors with vested interests towards the 
attainment of specific goals.  This utility and purpose, aided by and framed in relation to 
specific constructs of takfir, tawhid, and WB, superimposed on events as they unfolded in real 
time, distinguished those actors and the ambitions they pursued.  Additionally, this chapter 
will consider the vastly different ways that similar events and progressions relating to the war 
in Iraq were framed and understood by US policy makers, who considered them within the 
context of a conventional war on terrorism but who failed to recognise the ways in which they 
were understood and used by those they sought to defeat.  By understanding these nuances, 
 
292 Media entities and national leaders alike have at times attributed the emergence of ISIS to the US invasion of 
Iraq and its subsequent regional policies.  See Milne, Seumas, “Now the truth emerges: how the US fuelled the 
rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq”, The Guardian, June 3 2015.  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/03/us-isis-syria-iraq  (Accessed 18 February 2020).  
O’Connor, Tom, “U.S. Created ISIS to Distract World from Israel, Iran says”, Newsweek, March 22 2018.  
https://www.newsweek.com/us-created-isis-distract-world-israel-iran-defeated-it-khamenei-says-857359 
(Accessed 18 February 2020)  
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light can be shed on “what terrorists want”293 and better understand them as they perceive 
themselves, and as enduring players in the geopolitical environment.  
 First this chapter introduce the ways in which the U.S. and its allies justified an 
invasion of Iraq in the escalating war on terror, and contrast these with the mechanisms 
introduced by Bin Laden to reframe the conflict in politicised jihadist rhetoric.  Second it will 
discuss the role of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in forging a distinct violent theology that 
distinguished him and his followers from al-Qaeda and which sought to establish the 
foundations of an Islamic polity in Iraq.  Third this section will analyse the roles of the U.S. 
troop surge and Anbar awakening of 2007 in subduing sectarian violence in Iraq, which 
ultimately led to the decision to withdraw U.S. combat forces.  Finally this section will 
introduce the repercussions of this decision both within Iraq and the jihadisphere.  
 
 8.1 Iraq: A Necessary War for the West 
 After the attacks of 9/11 and the targeting of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, 
the United States military invaded Iraq in March 2003.294  In a message to the US Congress, 
then President George W. Bush wrote that force had become the only way to ensure the 
protection of American national security, and that the invasion would constitute a vital part of 
the broadening global war on terror.295  The military actions undertaken by the president had 
been approved by the US Congress months before, in October 2002, and it had passed a 
resolution which stated: 
“Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the 
United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, are known to be in Iraq; 
 
293 This refers to the title of Louise Richardson’s seminal work which tries to explain the methodology of 
terrorist organisations, and the rationale behind their actions in pursuit of goals which are counter to both the 
goals and hegemonic positions of democratic nation states.   
294 For an opinion piece on the rationale behind the decision to militarily invade Iraq, see Albert, Michael and 
Noam Chomsky, “Noam Chomsky on Iraq War”, Peace Research 35:1 (May 2003), 51-60. 
295 Sanger, David E, “Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq; Missiles 
Apparently Miss Hussein”, The New York Times, March 20 2003.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/20/world/threats-responses-white-house-bush-orders-start-war-iraq-
missiles-apparently.html  (Accessed 20 February 2020)   
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Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including 
organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens; 
Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of 
the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist 
organizations; 
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, 
the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise 
attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists 
who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States 
and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend 
itself;”296 
 While and in-depth analysis of the US government’s rationale for invading Iraq is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the above extract is poignant for a number of reasons.297  First, 
it displays the power a nation state has at its disposal to harness the use of violence to protect 
what it considers its very foundation: its citizens.  Furthermore, it demonstrates the fact that in 
current practice, the state has both the mandate and the ability to use violence in order to wage 
war on organisations deemed as existing outside the realm of political normalcy and the status 
quo.  Beyond the political implications, the above extract exemplifies behavioural traits of 
social groups that were explored in previous chapters, in that a group will be more inclined to 
use and justify violence when faced with an imminent threat.  Whether or not the threat is 
tangible or defined is inconsequential; rather it is the framing of it as existential that underpins 
the ability to justify violence.298  This sense of existential urgency is visible in the fact that 
only 14 days passed between the time the resolution was presented to the US House of 
Representatives and the time that it became public law.299   
 
296 United States Congress, H.J.RES.114-Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.  
October 16 2002 became Public Law No. 107-243.  https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-joint-
resolution/114/text (Accessed 20 February 2020)  
297 For an analysis of the international and domestic legal justifications for the Iraq war, see Murphy, Sean D., 
“Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq”, 92 Georgetown Law Journal 4 (2004), 173-257. 
298 Volkan.   
299 The resolution was presented to the US House of Representatives on October 2 2002.  It was approved in the 
House and Senate by overwhelming majorities.  President Bush signed it into law October 16 2002.   
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 President Bush and the US did not act unilaterally in Iraq, and it is interesting to note 
one of the primary justifications for war used by its staunchest ally, the UK, which sheds 
additional light on the way in which the violence was rationalised from a modern state 
perspective.  In response to an anti-war protest on the eve of the invasion, then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair cited the ultimate morality of war in Iraq.  He publicly stated that the number of 
casualties to come, and the overall suffering endured in war would be relatively minor 
compared to the long-term human toll that would inevitably result from Saddam Hussein 
remaining in power and the secondary opportunities this would provide to those who sought to 
harm Western interests.300  This construct of sacrifice in order to attain a greater good is not 
specific to nation states, and in this usage is reflective of the quasi proselytising nature 
inherent in the modern democratic nation state that considers its socio-political model for 
governance superior and universally applicable.   
This information is not presented to deny the atrocities that the Hussein regime 
undisputedly committed in Iraq301 nor to dispute the laws of self-defence available to nation 
states under the United Nations charter302; rather it is intended to demonstrate the existential 
framing of the decision to wage war in Iraq as a moral imperative in a struggle against a multi-
dimensional and incompatible ‘other’, presented collectively as the war on terror.    
Months after the invasion, President Bush famously declared “mission accomplished” 
in the toppling of the Hussein regime303 and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld summarily 
dismissed ongoing fighting as minor skirmishing, conducted by “dead-enders”.304  Salafi-
jihadists, however, perceived the events early in the Iraq war in a different manner.  Prior to 
invading Iraq, as was noted earlier, the United States and coalition forces had targeted both 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The most pertinent point worth noting is the duality 
 
300 Gordon, David, “Iraq, War and Morality”, Economic and Political Weekly 38:12/13 (March 22 – April 3 2003), 
1117-1120, 1117.   
301 For a complete account of the atrocities committed under Saddam Hussein, based on the Ba’ath Party 
Archives at the Hoover Institution, a collection of more than 10 million digitised pages chronicling the party’s 
workings and motivations, see Sassoon, Joseph, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).     
302 Article 51, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of collective or individual self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations.”  https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml  (Accessed 20 February 2020) 
303 For the “Mission Accomplished” speech see https://www.history.com/speeches/george-w-bush-declares-
mission-accomplished (Accessed 20 February 2020) 




inherent in this strategy in that this effort did initially succeed in denying safe haven to the Al-
Qaeda command structure, and can thus be considered a strategic victory in the war on terror 
as framed by Western actors.305  A secondary effect to this course of action however was that 
the success in eliminating centralised command structures of Al-Qaeda resulted in the 
weakening of its organisational and ideological unity, and the dispersal of mid-level leadership 
and combatants contributed to the birth of what has since become known as the “global 
jihadist movement”.306   
 
8.2 Osama Bin Laden’s Framing of the Invasion of Iraq 
Just as President Bush, the US Congress, and Prime Minister Blair had addressed their 
constituents and the world at large regarding the need to wage war in Iraq and the objectives 
they hoped to accomplish by doing so, Bin Laden articulated his perception of the war and its 
significance in an ongoing history which exists independent of a finite war on terror.  In an 
October 2003 broadcast, Bin Laden addressed the Iraqi people, and he referred to the war as 
simply the most recent chapter in a continuous struggle which pitted Christian crusaders 
against a global Muslim community and identity.307  In his address, Bin Laden invoked the 
morally righteous cause of Muslims in following scriptural justifications for defensive 
violence, and echoed Hassan al-Banna by arguing against artificial national identities imposed 
on Muslims in the Middle East and Levant.  Bin Laden reiterated the ideology upon which he 
had founded Al-Qaeda in that he urged Muslims globally to unite in solidarity to confront the 
evil embodied by the United States whose demise was necessary for Islamic virtue to triumph.  
It is interesting to note that Bin Laden focused primarily on pan-Islamic unity in his rhetoric, 
only mentioning an Islamic state twice in this particular address.  Furthermore, he abstained 
from proclaiming takfir on rulers or individuals, but he linked the construct of theological 
disbelief to alliance with enemy interests.  “I am speaking to Muslims in general, and Iraqis in 
particular, when I say: beware of supporting America’s crusaders and those who have taken 
 
305 For more on the perception of the invasion of Afghanistan related to targeting responsible parties and Al-
Qaeda in the war on terror, and the portrayed success of the demise of the Taliban, see The 9/11 Commission 
Report, 337-338.   
306 For early transformations that spawned the global jihadist movement, see Gunaratna, Rohan and Aviv Oreg, 
The Global Jihad Movement (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2015).     
307 Bin Laden, Osama, “Second Letter to the Muslims of Iraq”, October 18th 2003.  Transcribed in full in Kepel, 
Giles and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds), Al-Qaeda in its Own Words (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 2008), 66-70.      
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their side, because all those who collaborate with them or belong to them, whatever their 
names or titles, are unbelievers and apostates.”308  Bin Laden also drew on the ideological 
developments of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in that he equated participation in democratic 
electoral processes and institutions to the sin of supplanting God with men, and offered that 
justified jihad was the only avenue to casting off corrupt regimes that had denied human 
dignity and social fulfilment to Muslim masses.309   
Bin Laden not only addressed the global Muslim community, but he also addressed the 
American people.  In the days immediately following 9/11, President Bush spoke to the US 
Congress and delivered perhaps one of the most remembered speeches that defined his outlook 
on the war on terror, and his rationale regarding terrorist organisations and the parameters 
under which to designate them ‘other’.  He said: “Americans are asking: “Why do they hate 
us?”  They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government.  
Their leaders are self-appointed.  They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our 
freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”310  While 
Bin Laden had indeed argued in his address to the Iraqi people that participation in democratic 
institutions constituted sinful behaviour and disbelief, he pragmatically rebutted President 
Bush’s assertions: “By way of introduction, let me say that security is an indispensable pillar 
of human life and that free men do not forfeit their security, contrary to Bush’s assertion that 
we hate freedom.  If that were true, then let him explain to us why we did not attack Sweden, 
for example.  (…)  No, we fight because we are free men who do not slumber under 
oppression.  We want to restore freedom to our nation, and just as you lay waste to our nation, 
so shall we lay waste to yours.”311  Bin Laden also emphatically stated that despite President 
Bush’s claims, all men love freedom, and neither he nor the jihadists on whose behalf he 
spoke detested Americans for the freedoms they enjoyed.  Instead, Bin Laden presented a 
concise timeline of violent grievances suffered by Muslims either at the hand of the United 
 
308 Bin Laden, in Kepel, 68.   
309 Bin Laden lists specifically princes and ulema who have been co-opted by foreign and sinful rulers.  He also 
lists legislative councils and parliaments as sinful institutions, and those who participate in them as sinful 
transgressors.  Kepel, 68.    
310 This is an extract from George W. Bush’s speech to a joint session of congress, September 20 2001.  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html  
(Accessed 20 February 2020)   
311 Bin Laden, Osama, “Message to the American People”.  This address was delivered to Al-Jazeera October 30 
2004, two days before the U.S. Presidential elections.  For the  unedited transcript, see 
https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html (Accessed 23 February 2020)   
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States, or supported by it, and by doing so effectively took the same posture as President Bush 
in presenting his violence as a justified campaign of retribution which possessed the inherent 
moral high ground due to its defensive nature.312   
In presenting his justified retribution, Bin Laden utilised the metaphor of the United 
States as a crocodile that had seized a helpless child, and argued that violence was the only 
possible way to confront the threat it posed:  “Tell me: Does the crocodile understand any 
language other than that of force?”313  This conceptualisation demonstrates the salience of 
different strains of anti-colonial violence that had been merged with Bin Laden’s ideology in 
that the idea of colonial powers which sought to subjugate native populations by violence only 
understood the language of violence, and therefore must be confronted by that very same 
violence.  This framework had been popularised by Franz Fanon as was recounted in the 
chapter of this thesis on violence, and further went on to state that by confronting the colonial 
aggressor, subjugated peoples could appropriate mechanisms of domination, and through this 
appropriation, bond together to attain cultural, political, and spiritual freedom.  By 
reinvigorating this narrative, and then recounting his calculus to engage in violence, Bin 
Laden built on this framework insofar as the anti-colonial violence he cited was imbued with 
Fanon’s interpretation that colonial and imperial aggression denied the agency of those it 
targeted.314  By thus justifying his violence, Bin Laden conveyed the desire for his actions to 
reclaim agency on behalf of a subjugated community.   
Bin Laden went on to challenge the very foundation of nation state legitimacy, and its 
claim to a monopoly on violence: “State terrorism is called freedom and democracy, while 
resistance is termed terrorism and intolerance.”315  In Bin Laden’s view, the United States had 
committed terrorism during its embargo of Iraq following the first Gulf War, which resulted in 
mass casualties among civilians and children.316  Just as President Bush and Prime Minister 
Blair had claimed the moral high ground in their decisions to invade Iraq and eradicate 
 
312 Bin Laden specifically cited the American-supported Israeli incursion into Lebanon in 1982, and the resultant 
bloodshed of civilians and innocents.   
313 Bin Laden.   
314 For more on the social group dynamics of anti-colonial violence and enactment of identity and agency, see 
Loadenthal, Michael, “Othering Terrorism: A Rhetorical Strategy of Strategic Labeling”, Genocide Studies and 
Prevention: An International Journal 13:2 (2017), 74-105.        
315 Bin Laden.   
316 For an analysis of how sanctions increased childhood mortality rates, see Ronsmans, Carine, Oona Campbell, 
Mary C. Smith Fawzi, Sarah Zaidi, David H. Spodik, Omar A. Obeid, et al., “Sanctions against Iraq”, The Lancet 
347:8995 (January 20 1996), 198-200.     
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terrorism, so Bin Laden argued that his actions were in fact morally justifiable in that they 
were carried out in order to confront what he perceived as terrorism carried out against his 
people.317/318  In this address, Bin Laden made no mention of takfir, tawhid, or the mandatory 
hatred that al-Maqdisi had codified in WB.  Rather, he positioned himself politically and 
questioned the morality and authority of nation states, and intellectually claimed for himself 
the ability to speak and conduct violence on behalf of an organisation and a people not joined 
by national identity, but by religious faith.   
 
8.3 Iraq: A ‘Golden Opportunity’ for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
Due to his role in the attacks of 9/11, Bin Laden was a focal point for the war on terror, 
but his visions for a united global umma, forged through the violent toppling of American 
hegemony via systematic attacks reminiscent of anti-colonial guerrilla warfare were not 
uncontested within the jihadisphere.  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi embodied the birth of the global 
jihadist movement in that he was among those who fled Afghanistan following the U.S. led 
invasion in 2001, and eventually arrived in Iraq.  In the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, then 
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell had named al-Zarqawi as an associate leader of Al-Qaeda 
to Bin Laden during an address to the United Nations.319  Here Bin Laden as a focal point for 
terrorism, and the blanket labelling of Al-Qaeda to justify an incursion into Iraq in the name of 
the global war on terror is evident.  Furthermore, this justification showed no signs of 
understanding, or expressing the need to understand, the various factions within jihadism that 
would prove more difficult to combat than a conventional military enemy, united in purpose, 
ideology and location. 
Once in Iraq, al-Zarqawi merged various jihadist factions that had taken up arms 
against American forces following the collapse of the Hussein regime, and those who saw in 
 
317 In terrorism research, it has been argued that “Historically the use of terror by regimes has been infinitely 
more lethal than that of non-state groups, because, by definition, regimes / governments are likely to have 
control of far greater supplies of weapons and manpower to implement their policies of terror in the course of 
internal repression or foreign conquest.”  See Wilkinson, 6.     
318 For a rethinking of terrorism labelling in relation to the state, see Jarvis, Lee and Michael Lister, “State 
Terrorism Research and Critical Terrorism Studies: An Assessment”, Critical Studies on Terrorism 7:1 (2013), 43-
61.   
319 Colin Powell’s address to the U.N. on February 6 2003 concluded its justification for war in Iraq with the 
premise that Iraq had substantive ties, and provided safe haven to Al-Qaeda members and infrastructure.  The 
full address is accessible in the CNN archives.  “Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation”, February 6 2003.  
https://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.09/index.html  (Accessed 22 February 2020) 
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Iraq an opportunity for jihad, and in June 2003 Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad was formed.320  Despite 
President Bush’s proclamation of “mission accomplished’, an insurgency emerged in Iraq out 
of disbanded Ba’athist forces and jihadi diaspora foreign fighters which U.S. war planning had 
failed to anticipate.  In fact, much of this insurgency was fuelled not by pre-existing Iraqi ties 
to Al-Qaeda as U.S. politicians had claimed, but by the very invasion of Afghanistan itself and 
the successful messaging carried out by Al-Qaeda leadership which stressed an existential 
threat to Muslim security and prosperity, as outlined above in Bin Laden’s broadcasts.  This 
messaging was reinforced by messages such as this from al-Zawahiri in October 2002, which 
were delivered with the purpose of ideologically preparing Muslim masses for the pending 
invasion and framing it as the next step in the American quest to subdue Islam: “The campaign 
against Iraq has aims that go beyond Iraq into the Arab Islamic world (…)  Its first aim is to 
destroy any effective military force in the proximity of Israel.  Its second aim is to consolidate 
the supremacy of Israel.  (…)  America and its deputies should know that their crimes will not 
go unpunished.”321  The Iraqi insurgency intensified following the initial conventional stages 
of the conflict, and violence escalated to unforeseen levels.322   
Amidst this violence in February 2004, Zarqawi composed a letter to Bin Laden and 
Ayman al-Zawahiri in which he outlined his interpretation of the conflict in Iraq, and more 
importantly, the opportunities he saw in it, which differed drastically in presentation, 
methodology, and objectives, from those advocated by Bin Laden.323  Al-Zarqawi described 
the war in Iraq as a golden opportunity, and as the manifestation of a divine blessing to 
conduct jihad in its truest purpose to finally culminate in the ultimate battle between Islam and 
disbelief.324  Central to this culmination was not only driving the U.S. and its allies out of the 
Middle East, but defining who the true enemies of Islam were, and establishing the correct 
methodology of confronting them.  Al-Zarqawi believed that the first essential step was the 
establishment of a territorial foothold within Iraq, and he blended Bin Laden’s realpolitik of 
 
320 Milelli, Jean-Pierre, “Introduction: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Jihad in Mesopotamia”, in Kepel, 245.   
321 Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, October 2002, in Hegghammer, Thomas, “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War”, Middle 
East Journal 60:1 (Winter 2006), 11-32, 18.   
322 For a concise study understanding the factors that fuelled the Iraqi insurgency that included but were not 
limited to jihadist radicalisation such as internal dislocation and personal grief over loss, see Moaddel, Mansoor, 
Mark Tessler and Ronald Inglehart, “Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys”, 
Political Science Quarterly 123:4 (Winter 2008-9), 623-644.   
323 For the full text see U.S. Department of State, “Zarqawi Letter”, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm  (Accessed 22 February 2020)   
324 Al-Zarqawi, in Kepel, 251.   
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interstate relations with narratives of Islamic history and statecraft which pitted factions of 
Islamic belief against one another in their drives for dominion.  These factions had been 
defined by either their righteous belief in Sunni Islam, or their adherence to heretical beliefs.  
For al-Zarqawi, Iraq represented “a political mosaic, an ethnic mixture made up of 
confessional and sectarian differences that only a strong central authority and a despotic ruler 
have been able to lead.”325  While here al-Zarqawi echoed the premise offered by Hassan al-
Banna that Western constructs of statehood had no applicability when transposed onto an 
Islamic landscape, he criticised the modern manifestation of the Brotherhood along similar 
lines as his mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, by arguing that the organisation had left the 
fold of the religion by its duplicitous engagement with political processes and institutions.326  
Against this backdrop of the critical importance of using the opportunity provided by 
the U.S. invasion of an artificial state to create a foothold from which to utilise jihad to restore 
Islamic purity manifest in political sovereignty, al-Zarqawi presented the true enemy to the 
jihadist project: the Shiites.327  To introduce his audience to the topic, al-Zarqawi quoted the 
Qur׳an by stating “They are the enemies; so beware of them.  The curse of God be on them!  
How are they deluded (away from the truth)”.328  He went on to say “(They are) an 
insurmountable obstacle, a lurking snake, a crafty and malicious scorpion, a spying enemy, 
and a mortal venom.”329  Al-Zarqawi began his justification for critique against the Shiites by 
citing Islamic history, arguing that the demise of righteous Muslim conquest had been caused 
by the Shiite Safavid dynasty’s incursion into Baghdad in 1624 which had also resulted in a 
massacre of the Sunni population.330/331  Further citation of history included references to Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Hanbal.  In citing Ibn Hanbal, al-Zarqawi embodied the Salafi justification 
to pronounce takfir on any who denied the supreme position held within Islamic tradition to 
the companions of the prophet Muhammad.  “Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal was asked about those 
 
325 Al-Zarqawi, in Kepel, 252.   
326 Al-Zarqawi, in Kepel, 259.   
327 The historical dispute between Shia and Sunni Islam and its manifestations worldwide are beyond the scope 
of this thesis, but for a fundamental analysis, see McHugo, John, A Concise History of Sunnis and Shi’is 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).     
328 Al-Zarqawi, in Kepel, 253.  The Qur׳anic verse cited, 63:4, refers to the hypocrites; those who have nominally 
accepted Islam but who have either perverted its beliefs or failed to adhere to the standards and guidance of 
revelation.   
329 Al-Zarkawi, in Kepel, 253.   
330 Kepel, 345.   
331 For more on the dynamic between the Ottomans and Safavids, and the conquest of Baghdad of Shah Abbas I, 
see Blow, David, Shah Abbas: The Ruthless King who became an Iranian Legend (London: I.B. Taurus & Co., 
2009), Specifically, the Chapter “Final Triumphs: the capture of Qandahar and Baghdad”.   
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who insulted Abu Bakr, Omar, and Aisha.  He replied: “I do not see them as Muslims.””332  
For al-Zarqawi, the historical grievances suffered by Sunni Muslim populations, the role of 
Shiite dynasties in thwarting legitimate Caliphates, and the denial of the true teachings of 
Islam was sufficient to proclaim takfir on Shiites.   
Al-Zarqawi did not conclude his condemnation of the Shiites with historical 
grievances, rather he utilised it to explain how and why the Shia were the true enemy in the 
fight raging in Iraq in 2004, inserting an ongoing cosmological struggle into an unfolding 
event in real time.  Al-Zarqawi reflected on the sectarian dimensions of the aftermath of the 
U.S. led invasion, and the affiliation that had begun to grow between U.S. reconstruction 
efforts and Shiite interests.333  He argued that while the United States was indeed an 
archenemy, the most pressing threat was the Shiite population because, true to its historical 
proclivities, had chosen to affiliate with foreign crusaders.  Al-Zarqawi displayed foresight in 
stating that eventually, American forces would leave Iraq.  Were this to happen without 
resistance, the Shiite led institutions they would help create would remain in place and the 
Sunni population of Iraq would yet again be left subjugated in an artificial state.   
The only recourse, and first step towards establishing a territorial foothold, therefore, 
was targeting the Shia.  “In our opinion, they are the key to change, because attacking their 
religious, political, and military aspects will reveal their rage against the Sunnis.  They will 
bare their fangs and show the secret hatred simmering in their hearts.  If we manage to drag 
them into a religious war, we will be able to awaken the slumbering Sunnis, who will sense 
the imminent danger and the cruel death that these Sabeans have in store for them.”334  Here 
al-Zarqawi conjured the imminent existential threat necessary to rally a religious social group 
to violence.  He went on to say that in this type of righteous cosmological struggle, Sunnis 
would inevitably emerge victorious.  Al-Zarqawi argued for specific targeting of Shiite and 
American leaders, because “When one of their leaders dies, the community will die with him.  
The situation is not the same among the Sunnis, because, if a leader dies or is killed, another 
arises, and the death of the first is a challenge that gives weak Sunnis heart.”335  This final 
 
332 Al-Zarqawi, in Kepel, 257.   
333 After the dismantling of the Hussein regime, state building in Iraq was primarily Shia-centric which resulted 
gradually in Sunni rejection.  Many Sunni communities with no pre-existing hostilities were targeted by Shia 
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State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post 2003 Iraq, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.   
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point is worth noting insofar as it was used to self-describe both the tactics and perceived 
resilience of the Sunni insurgency, and demonstrates the premise that Al-Zarqawi had already 
alluded to by predicting the eventual departure of the United States from Iraq, in that the 
jihadist movement considered itself engaged in a struggle which transcended the armed 
conflict in Iraq.336  Al-Zarqawi concluded his letter by stating that if his recipients, namely Bin 
Laden and al-Zawahiri were amenable to his proposals, he and his organisation would be 
ready and willing to be the vanguard in Iraq.  
 While the above broadcasts and letter are only a snapshot of the conflicting aspirations 
present within the jihadist movement in the early phases of the Iraq war, they are important to 
consider for a number of reasons.  Bin Laden presented himself much more as a statesman 
attempting to articulate grievances and justify retribution on behalf of a global Muslim 
community that was engaged in a conflict driven by state actors.337  While he certainly 
advocated the revival of the Caliphate by mandatory violence, he urged Muslims to lay aside 
their differences to fight the ultimate foe.  For this reason, he abstained from proclaiming 
takfir on regimes or groups of people, believing that the struggle to defeat the United States 
was paramount.  Al-Zarqawi, by contrast, revived the legacy of Sayyid Qutb by arguing for 
jihad as a two-fold process; first to cleanse the umma of impurities, and second achieve 
sovereignty.  He viewed the war in Iraq as an opportunity to act on the declaration of takfir 
against the Shia, and utilise the opportunity to ignite a sectarian war which would result in the 
creation of a physical foothold from which to then export the jihadist program.  Both men 
stressed the imminent and existential nature of the struggle, and they both claimed morality 
and justification for their proposed courses of action.  President Bush, the U.S. Congress, and 
Prime Minister Blair had also argued for the morality of their cause as well as its imminent 
and existential nature; yet Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi did so in a fashion which portrayed the 
Iraq war as an event within a cosmological timeframe not bound by the constrictions of the 
state-centric geopolitical process.   
 
336 Numerous mechanisms have been identified by which terrorist organisations are most likely to cease in their 
existence.  One specific mechanism is decapitation, which is the targeted killing of the group’s leader.  This 
mechanism, it has been argued, is the least likely to be successful in the long term, yet it has remained a 
cornerstone of United States counter terrorism policy.  For more on these mechanisms and the paradoxical use 
of counterterrorism by leadership decapitation, see Cronin, Audrey Kurth, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding 
the Demise and Decline of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
337 Gunaratna, Rohan, Al-Qaeda’s Ideology, Hudson Institute, May 19 2005.  




 8.4 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s War of Takfir 
 In October 2004, the U.S. State Department designated Al-Zarqawi’s group, Al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad a terrorist organisation,338 and this coincidentally occurred within days of 
Al-Zarqawi’s pledge of allegiance to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, which he had refused to do in 
the past.339  Al-Zarqawi likely realised that his aspirations of igniting a sectarian war required 
the superior resources of Al-Qaeda, and that by pledging allegiance he could utilise the 
increasingly popular brand name of that organisation to attract more recruits.  More 
importantly, by pledging allegiance al-Zarqawi became the face of Islamic violence in Iraq, 
given that Al-Qaeda’s leadership remained in hiding following the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan.  Furthermore, this physical removal from the battlefield and the claim that Al-
Qaeda had accepted his battlefield proposals meant that al-Zarqawi’s takfir driven agenda 
would not have to be compromised despite his organisation’s transition to an official 
subsidiary affiliate.340  
 Weeks after the pledge of allegiance, Iraq experienced a sharp increase in sectarian and 
anti-democratic violence, as Sunni militants used car bombs to kill and injure over 180 people 
in two separate attacks in the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.  The same day, gunmen 
executed three election officials in Baghdad.341  Responsibility for these attacks was claimed 
by minor Sunni militant groups, and it may therefore be surmised that smaller organisations 
and individuals were emboldened by both the physical presence of al-Zarqawi, and as his 
agenda which strove vehemently against both the Shia and forcibly imposed democratic 
institutions.  Furthermore, the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 saw some of the 
bloodiest battles that U.S. and coalition forces had been engaged in since the beginning of the 
war on terror.342  American strategic planners acknowledged the emergence of sectarian 
 
338 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organization: Designation of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad and 
Aliases, October 15 2004. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/37130.htm  (Accessed 1 March 2020) 
339 Mendelsohn, 118. 
340 Mendelsohn, 118. 
341 Hussein Al-Obeidi, Abdul, “Car bombs hit Najaf and Karbala, killing at least 60”, The Seattle Times, December 
19 2004.  https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/car-bombs-hit-najaf-and-karbala-killing-at-least-60/  
(Accessed 5 March 2020) 
342 140 U.S. Servicemen were killed in November 2004 alone.  Casualty rates reached the highest point they had 
been in Iraq as the U.S. Military began Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah which initiated the months long 
campaign to rid the country of the insurgency.  See 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties_nov04.htm (Accessed 6 March 2020)  
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violence, and targeted key cities in efforts to render them peaceful in order to begin state-
building.  Fallujah and Ramadi became magnets for aspiring jihadists and foreign fighters, and 
although command of them fell to a Mujahidin Shura Council which represented nearly 40 
different organisations, al-Zarqawi was the face of the resistance.343  It is poignant to note in 
this regard that U.S. politicians saw the capture of these cities as essential steps in the process 
of building a democratic Iraq and ridding the country of vaguely described ‘terrorism’.344  
Furthermore, the large-scale operations that took place in these cities were studied and 
understood by the U.S. military in a fashion which sought to locate them in the context of 
homegrown insurgencies.345  Tactical analysis placed premiums on understanding conceptual 
model-driven growth and fluctuation of insurgent movements which understood them relative 
to U.S. military presence, and based the success of an insurgency on the ongoing tacit or overt 
support of the domestic population.  While al-Zarqawi had referenced a similar need in his call 
to awaken the slumbering Sunni masses, U.S. military strategists viewed the insurgency as 
something finite in its immediate expression, which could be defeated through simultaneous 
military and psychological operations, designed to inflict casualties on the enemy and sway 
the loyalties of the populace respectively.  It is evident from the previous analysis of al-
Zarqawi’s letter, however, that these battles represented to jihadists something much more 
complex than simply confronting crusader forces, and certainly not something that was finite 
or restricted to Iraq.    
 While these military clashes that, according to U.S. forces, would end the insurgency 
and help shape the future of a democratic Iraq were taking place, another struggle was 
simultaneously occurring which would have a greater long-term impact on the shaping of the 
intellectual battle space.  In July 2005, a letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi was intercepted 
by U.S. forces, in which the former outlined the place of the Iraq war within the greater 
 
343 For more on the U.S. strategic planning against the Sunni insurgency, and the role of Al-Zarqawi, see 
Rayburn, Joel D., et. al. (eds), “Fighting to the Elections, August – December 2004”, The U.S. Army in the Iraq 
War: Volume 1, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. War College, 2019, 335-364.   
344 For an American political assessment of this stage of the war in Iraq, see the interview with then U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice on “The Big Story with John Gibson”, which aired September 22 2004.  
Partial transcript included here: “Condoleeza Rice on the War in Iraq”, FoxNews, September 23 2004.  
https://www.foxnews.com/story/condoleezza-rice-on-the-war-in-iraq (Accessed 5 March 2020) 
345 This thesis was presented for the fulfilment of the Master of Military Studies at the United States Marine 
Corps Command and Staff College, where military leadership incorporates lessons of previous campaigns in 
order to return officers to operational forces who are capable of shaping future strategy.  Harrill, J.D., Phased 
Insurgency Theory: Ramadi, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico VA, 2008.  
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a491315.pdf  (Accessed 6 March 2020)  
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jihadist project.346  Using reference points rooted in the Qur׳an and hadith, al-Zawahiri 
portrayed Iraq as  the epicentre of Islamic history, and expressed the serendipitous nature of 
the future of Islam resting on the outcome of ongoing battles there.  Against the backdrop of 
this cosmological narrative, he outlined the stages of the jihadist project, and the role of the 
violence in Iraq within it.  Al-Zawahiri argued that the expulsion of American troops and 
establishment of an Islamic Emirate in Iraq represented the short-term goals of Al-Qaeda, and 
that the eventual long-term toppling of Middle Eastern regimes and the unification of Islam in 
a worldwide Caliphate was the ultimate objective.  He stressed that the homogenisation of 
Islam was paramount in achieving the ultimate objective, but that this duty did not fall to the 
mujahidin in Iraq and that credal spiritual purity, while necessary for the establishment of the 
Caliphate, was not sufficient in its own right.347  
 Al-Zawahiri did not disagree with al-Zarqawi’s pronouncement of takfir on the Shia, 
and he stressed that they existed outside the fold of Islam due to heretical beliefs.  He also 
noted that it was undeniable that they had historically conspired against true Islamic 
governance, and that they had collaborated with American interests.  In this regard, the 
superimposition of historical grievances against a particular social group onto 
contemporaneous events is evident, and served the purpose of further framing the war in Iraq 
as an episode within a grand narrative that existed independently of U.S intervention.  “It is a 
religious school based on excess and falsehood whose function it is to accuse the companions 
of Muhammad of heresy in a campaign against Islam (…) Their prior history in cooperating 
with the enemies of Islam is consistent with their current reality of connivance with the 
Crusaders.”348  Perhaps the most critical point in al-Zawahiri’s letter that would prove to be an 
enduring point of increasing separation within the evolving jihadist movement is that he 
argued that common Shia individuals were innocent of accusations of heresy and thus immune 
from targeted violence, because they had been misguided ideologically.  For this reason, they 
could and should be forgiven and absorbed back into the fold of Islam through gradual da׳wa 
while their leaders could not.349  While al-Zawahiri did not theologically disagree with al-
 
346 A full translation of the Al-Zawahiri letter can be accessed here: Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi, Combatting 
Terrorism Center at West Point.  https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-
Translation.pdf  (Accessed 6 March 2020)  
347 Al-Zawahiri, 4-5. 
348 Al-Zawahiri, 8. 
349 Bar, Shmuel and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda”, Current Trends in Islamist 
Ideology, Hudson Institute, February 16 2006.  https://www.hudson.org/research/9901-the-zawahiri-letter-and-
the-strategy-of-al-qaeda  (Accessed 6 March 2020) 
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Zarqawi, he disapproved of the indiscriminate violence the latter exhibited towards the Shia 
because he argued it detracted from the immediate goals of the jihadist project previously 
outlined.  On this point, al-Zawahiri posited that indiscriminate violence towards the Shia 
could provoke Iranian reactions, and would alienate Sunni populations who’s support he saw 
as essential to the creation of an Islamic Emirate in Iraq.  He further found problematic the fact 
that many of those engaged in anti-Shia violence were non-Iraqis and that this undermined the 
potential for a homegrown Islamist constituency.   
 This was the first instance in which issues of violence linked to the indiscriminate 
application of takfir as a strategic component within the jihadist program with real-time 
application in a combat zone were discussed in such detail.  It is important to locate al-
Zawahiri’s letter in the context of the subject matter that was presented in the previous section 
insofar as he advocated for the need to garner the support of the Iraqi masses and the ulema, 
and discussed these issues within the context of regional and global state entities.  The need 
for popular consensus as the pillar of a future Caliphate, and the manoeuvring within a state 
driven world represented the Al-Qaeda worldview which channelled the legacy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and operated within existing institutional frameworks, and thus incorporated 
undertones of modern nationalism.350  As was noted in the previous chapter, violent offshoots 
emerged in the 1960s out of frustration with this modus operandi, and thus it is important to 
read this letter as part of the continuum of the evolution of the Islamist agenda, not solely as a 
strategic battlefield intercept. 
 Al-Zawahiri was not the only jihadist ideologue to criticise al-Zarqawi.  In July 2005, 
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was released from a Jordanian prison and gave an interview to 
Al-Jazeera in which he reiterated statements he had conveyed in a letter to al-Zarqawi in 
2004.351  Al-Maqdisi had been al-Zarqawi’s mentor while in prison in Jordan in the 1990s, and 
his personal relationship with his pupil as well as his prominent role within the ideological 
structure of Al-Qaeda gave many in the West hope that he could temper the sectarian violence 
 
350 For more on the rationale within the Al-Qaeda worldview in this regard, see Munson, Henry, “Islam, 
Nationalism and Resentment of Foreign Domination”, Middle East Policy 10:2 (Summer 2003), 40-53.   
351 Kazimi, Nibras, “A virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi”, Current Trends in Islamist 
Ideology.  Hudson Institute, September 12 2005.  https://www.hudson.org/research/9771-a-virulent-ideology-
in-mutation-zarqawi-upstages-maqdisi  (Accessed 6 March 2020) 
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in Iraq.352  Unlike al-Zawahiri, al-Maqdisi criticised al-Zarqawi both theologically and 
tactically.  Just as al-Zarqawi had justified his indiscriminate targeting of the Shia by citing 
Ibn Taymiyya, al-Maqdisi argued that the latter had not deemed Shia laypeople unbelievers, 
and “as (Ibn Taymiyya) says in his fatwa under the section of fighting the rebels that one 
should not equate (the Shia) with the Jews and the Christians as to how they are fought.”353  
He further agreed with al-Zawahiri and stated that common Shia individuals were innocent of 
heresy due to having been misled ideologically, and therefore wholesale application of takfir 
was unwarranted according to guidelines established in the Qur׳an and hadith.  Al-Maqdisi 
went on to argue that the extreme violence conducted by al-Zarqawi was detrimental to the 
overall jihadist aspiration of the establishment of the Caliphate, which was only attainable 
through the gradual education of the global Muslim population.354  While the education that 
al-Maqdisi envisioned surely rested heavily on his interpretations of mandatory jihad and WB, 
he viewed the indiscriminate application of takfir and subsequent violence as a dangerous 
precedent which would lead to extremism and cause the umma to fall into fitna, upheaval, that 
would be catastrophic for Islam. 
 Within days, al-Zarqawi responded to his former mentor, and began by stating that the 
positions taken by al-Maqdisi represented more than a simple of judgement, and that he had 
become merely a puppet of Al-Qaeda leadership.  He argued that historically, those 
individuals present on the battlefield had the clearest understanding of the situation and its 
requirements, and thus his actions should be considered beyond reproach.355  He also 
attempted to usurp the legitimacy of al-Maqdisi by citing extensively from the Qur׳an and 
hadith to justify his actions, and uncompromisingly repeated his stance toward the Shia.  In 
these arguments, al-Zarqawi was not alone, and vehement support for him and his campaigns 
appeared online on jihadist websites and forums.  One example is an eight-page document 
which adamantly stated that the conflict in Iraq, and atrocities committed by the Shia had 
created an ‘exceptional situation’ which required jihadists to conduct ‘necessary deterrence’ 
based on ‘treatment in kind’.  Further, after referencing numerous instances in the Qur׳an and 
 
352 For more on the relationship and subsequent fall out between al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi, see Brooke, 
Steven, “The Preacher and the Jihadi” in Fradkin, Hillel, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in 
Islamist Ideology 3 (2006), 52-66. 
353 Al-Maqdisi, in Kazimi.   
354 Kazimi.   
355 Haykel, Bernard, “Jihadis and the Shi’a”, in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds), Self-Inflicted Wounds: 
Debates and Divisions within Al-Qa’ida and its Periphery, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010, 
202-223, 220.   
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hadith, the author of this document concluded that although individuals like al-Maqdisi 
focused on the impermissibility of targeting the Shia, it was in fact warranted because it served 
the purpose of achieving one of God’s ultimate aims; that of deterring attacks on Muslims, and 
ensuring Muslim communal safety.356   
This final point is worth noting insofar as both al-Zarqawi’s critics and his supporters 
placed his violence in the context of its utility in serving ultimate ambitions.  While the above 
is only a portion of the discourse circulated in jihadist circles, his critics argued against 
violence and blanket excommunication in takfir due to its perceived detrimental effect on the 
goals of establishing popular consensus, expelling American forces, and establishing an 
Emirate.  While these goals may have been present for al-Zarqawi and his supporters, they 
argued that blanket takfir and subsequent violence were necessary because they served God’s 
ultimate aims, and these superseded any temporal or political ambitions.  Furthermore, the 
argument of mandatory violence, justified by scriptural prescriptions for takfir emerged not in 
the intellectual realm of jihadism, but from within the chaos of the Iraq war.  This hybrid 
creation of theology and violence is representative of social entativity that was outlined in 
Chapter 2, and is underpinned by the assertions later made that violence, when performed as 
an act of communal association, can lead to the creation of distinct and novel notions of group 
identity that despite religious, philosophical or pragmatic justifications, holds the very conduct 
of violence as central to its existence.357 
U.S. observers to the war in Iraq were not necessarily unaware of the points of friction 
within the jihadist movement, but the general policy preference for resolution through 
leadership decapitation, and the expectation that this would cause insurgent terrorist 
organisations to crumble, remained intact.358  U.S. forces succeeded in capturing Fallujah and 
Ramadi, long touted as essential steps in creating a foundation from which to build a 
democratic Iraq, but al-Zarqawi vowed to kill any individual involved in drafting Iraq’s new 
constitution.  His fighters also continued their violence against the Shia in suicide attacks in 
Shiite cities such as Karbala, and also attempted to undercut state building by carrying out 
 
356 This document was published anonymously, likely from within Iraq, Haykel, 221. 
357 See Hardie-Bick, James, “Escaping the Self: Identity, Group Identification and Violence”, Onati Socio-Legal 
Series 6:4 (December 2016), 1032-1052.     
358 For a contemporary policy opinion piece on intra-jihadist friction, see Hunt, Emily, Zarqawi’s ‘Total War’ on 
Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide among Sunni Jihadists, The Washington Institute, Policy No 1049, November 15 
2005.  https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/zarqawis-total-war-on-iraqi-shiites-exposes-a-
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attacks such as one on a police station in Baghdad which killed over 130 people in January 
2006.359  That same month, and perhaps due to increasing separation between those actively 
involved in the fighting in Iraq and the noticeably absent Al-Qaeda leadership, al-Zarqawi 
announced that his organisation would join the Iraqi Mujahidin Shura Council.360   This 
decision may have been influenced by the gradual tactical progress of U.S. forces and the need 
to consolidate jihadist resources, as well as the recognition that popular Iraqi support was 
needed for al-Zarqawi to continue his takfir driven agenda.  Perhaps in a similar effort to 
garner support, in April 2006 al-Zarqawi appeared in a video in which his face was exposed 
for the first time.  In it, the entrenchment of hatred through WB as violent disavowal of 
democracy and the continued necessity of purging the umma of the Shia in order for Islam to 
be victorious was evident.  “The charade of the rotten democracy, which you brought to the 
Land of the Two Rivers, after bestowing upon the people material and spiritual freedom, 
happiness, and stability - all this has been dispersed, never to return, by Allah's grace. (…) 
Continue your jihad, intensify your operations, and multiply your blows. By Allah, these are 
the victories of Islam. By Allah, these are the final moments before the servants of the cross 
declare their defeat in the Land of the Two Rivers. The collapse of the motivation to fight has 
become the most prominent characteristic of the armies of the Crusaders. (…) To conclude, 
we bring good tidings to the nation: The establishment of the Shura Council of Mujahideen in 
Iraq, which, Allah willing, will be the nucleus for the establishment of an Islamic state in 
which the word of Allah will reign supreme.”361  
These statements portray an unabashed righteousness, and also are interesting insofar 
as they utilise glamorous imagery and a transcendent symbolic narrative to reframe 
contemporary events in Iraq.  Whereas U.S. forces perceived the outcomes of battles such as 
Fallujah and Ramadi as key victories in their favour, al-Zarqawi restated the position he had 
taken with Bin Laden in his 2004 letter in which he argued that the Sunni jihadist movement 
 
359 For a brief timeline of the major violent events associated with al-Zarqawi, see Smith, Laura, “Timeline: Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi”, The Guardian, June 8 2006.  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/08/iraq.alqaida1  (Accessed 7 March 2020)   
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would be immune to losing a leader.  Here, he similarly argued that seeming military victories 
by the coalition were only steps in the progression towards the ultimate and ever nearing 
Islamic triumph.  The statements made in this audio release may be indicative of an insurgent 
leader becoming desperate to retain influence, but when analysed in reference to the ideas 
outlined above in which communal violence carried out both tangibly and symbolically 
against a perceived aggressor  has the ability to form new and enduring social group 
perceptions of self, purpose, and identity relative to the ‘other’, they offer insight into that 
crystallising worldview, and its potential longevity despite adversity.  
Al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike in Baquba, north of Baghdad, on June 7th 2006 as 
the result of a prolonged intelligence cooperation between U.S. and Jordanian entities to locate 
and kill him.362  This represents the culmination of the policy of organisation decapitation, the 
rationale for which was explained by a Jordanian intelligence officer: “There is no such thing 
as ‘Zarqawism’.  What Zarqawi is will die with him”.363  While it is true that perhaps al-
Zarqawi did not inspire a cult of personality that would survive his demise, the relationships 
between takfir and violence that he gave applicability in the ongoing tumultuous events of the 
Iraq war created a tangible shared experience that would inform the worldview of those 
fighters and individuals that did survive him.  This does not imply that every fighter would 
adopt al-Zarqawi’s worldview, but is commensurate with the social psychology of groups 
outlined by Pinker in Chapter 2 which stipulates that shared experiences become 
internalisations of normative behaviour, and thus form the foundation for future institutions 
and social structures.  This progressive paradigm is then reinforced by forging these shared 
experiences through violence meant to physically reshape an ideological community against a 
contemporary and transcendent narrative, and thus despite the leadership decapitation of al-
Zarqawi, the influence he had on shaping the worldview of factions within jihadism that 
would survive him would prove to present an ever increasing challenge to the war on terror.     
 
8.5 An Islamic State Built on Takfir 
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Following the death of al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda in Iraq appointed his successor.  More 
importantly on October 12th 2006, the Mujahidin Shura Council announced the unification of 
several unaffiliated Sunni jihadist groups, and three days later proclaimed the establishment of 
the Islamic State of Iraq which was to be the legitimate governing body of Baghdad, Anbar, 
Diyala as well as other provinces, and declared Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi (d. 2010) its leader 
under the title ‘Commander of the Faithful’.364365  In this original inception, the use of the 
word ‘of’ in the Islamic State of Iraq portrayed the entity as a state for Iraqi Sunnis to 
counterbalance the establishment of federal Shia governance during U.S. led reconstruction.  
Shortly after its formation, the entity began referring to itself as the Islamic State in Iraq, later 
simply the Islamic State, meant to represent the notion that it was in fact a burgeoning polity 
for the global Muslim community which happened to have taken root in Iraq.366  These 
depictions represented a claim to institutional and political legitimacy within administrative 
territories inside Iraq’s national boundaries, but the latter is particularly important because not 
only did it present the Islamic State in Iraq as a lawful stakeholder, it also signified the 
institutionalisation through narrative and self-portrayal of a worldview which refused to 
acknowledge the legacy of Westernisation that had been grappled with by scholars, jurists, 
activists, and Islamists since Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798.367  In November 2006 a 
spokesman succinctly proclaimed “We are not the sons of Sykes-Picot, we are the sons of (the 
Prophet Muhammad)”.368/369  By framing its organisation as the cultural and political heir of 
 
364 This is a direct link to the second Caliph of Islam, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, who became the first to assume the 
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128 
 
Muhammad’s original community at Medina, which had also dismissed existing tribal 
affiliations in favour of a unifying identity in the acknowledgement of tawhid and socio-
political behaviour meant to recognise the same, the leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq 
claimed salafi legitimacy, confronted the same structural problems that defensive 
modernisation had attempted to, and rejected the approach of perceived moderates which 
advocated striving within existing democratic frameworks to achieve statehood.  Furthermore, 
because the organisation was also deliberately a Sunni jihadist organisation which built on the 
foundations of violence which had occurred in Iraq up to that point, it existed not only in the 
context of Muhammad’s legacy but in the realpolitik world in which historical Shia subversion 
was manifest in Iraqi political power which relied on the maintenance of artificial borders 
imposed by Sykes-Picot and upheld by foreign powers.  For both historical and contemporary 
reasons therefore, and the applicability it had been given by al-Zarqawi, takfir as a mechanism 
that would identify group parameters and form the basis of a state-like participant on the world 
stage while rejecting the very legitimacy of states themselves provided a historically powerful 
and presently relevant socio-political tool.             
While Al-Qaeda had striven for Islamic unity and incorporated many of the paradigms 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in framing the legitimate nation state of Iraq as a front in the 
jihadist project, The Islamic State summarily rejected both the approach of its jihadist 
predecessor and the very existence of states and the identities derived from membership 
therein.  In February 2007, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi gave a public address in which he stated 
that “We are fighting not for any patriotism but rather for God’s word to be the most high.”370  
This conceptualisation echoed Muhammad’s appeal in that his community strove for social 
harmony and political prosperity through the conduct of tawhid, and by linking itself with this 
pursuit, the Islamic State also undercut the legitimacy of other competing jihadist organisation 
that could now be portrayed as operating on the basis of theological and political innovations 
 
agreement, one of which was the Kingdom of Iraq.  This partitioning led to further creation of states which did 
not represent the ethnicities or pre-existing community identities which were affected and moulded into 
different nations.  Retrospectively the Sykes-Picot agreement may be considered the height of modern 
colonialism.  For more on the history of the agreement and its continued relevance in Middle Eastern politics, 
see Rabinovich, Itamar and Robbie Sabel, A Century Since the Sykes-Picot Agreement: Current Challenges, 
Institute for National Security Studies, 2016.  
370 Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, in Bunzel, 18. 
129 
 
that were illegitimate and void due to having occurred after the time of the Prophet and 
salaf.371 
It is in this regard that the application of takfir became increasingly relevant.  While 
Al-Qaeda leadership initially supported the establishment of the Islamic State and viewed it as 
the beginning of the potential Emirate in Iraq, the latter was unable to garner the unanimous 
support of jihadist groups operating there at the time.  After releasing the theological 
justifications for the Caliphate, in April 2007 Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi declared that all 
individuals and organisations who refused to swear fealty by giving ba׳ya were sinners, and 
applied blanket takfir.372  Consistent with this position, the Islamic state enforced strict 
compliance within its territories and continued its attacks on coalition and Iraqi government 
forces as well as other Sunni militants who refused to acknowledge its legitimacy.  This 
contestation led to a drastic increase in violence in Iraq, where in early 2007 there were over a 
thousand violent attacks per week on coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians, and 
thousands of individuals and families were displaced.373   
 
8.6 The U.S. Troop Surge and Anbar Awakening 
Faced with this situation, President Bush announced that he would surge 30,000 
additional troops to the region in an effort to stem sectarian violence.374  The justification in 
international law for this type of surge can be found in part in the norm of non-combatant 
immunity, which has its roots in the ethical tradition of “just war”, and has been enshrined in 
the Law of War which was most notably codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the 
 
371 The concept of bid’ah as heretical innovation has an important place in Islamic and Salafi theology.  It has 
been interpreted in many ways according to the tradition attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that Islam is 
applicable to any time and place.  Salafis argue that any innovation in socio-political norms or conduct that 
occurred after the time of the salaf constitutes heresy due to its not having originated in scripture or 
Muhammad’s life, and not being therefore ensconced in the Qur’an and Hadith.  For more, see Ibn Mohar Ali, 
Abu Muntasir, Bid’ah: Understanding the Evil of Innovation (Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House, 
2006).   
372 In its classical connotation, this oath of fealty is a contract to render obedience.  For more on its significance 
and utility, see Khel, Muhammad Nazeer Ka Ka and Mohammed Nazeer Ka Ka Khel, “Ba׳ya and its Political Role 
in the Early Islamic State”, Islamic Studies 20:3 (1981), 227-238.   
373 “Iraq violence hit new high in early 2007: Pentagon”, Reuters, World News, March 14 2007.  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-pentagon-idUSN1426801120070314 (Accessed 8 March 2020) 
374 For a logistical analysis of the troop surge, see Shnaubelt, Christopher M., What NATO Can Learn from “The 
Surge” in Iraq, NATO Defense College, 2008. 
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Geneva Conventions of 1949.375  As a signatory to these conventions, the U.S. was obligated 
to observe the norms therein as a participant in a conflict, and therefore in order to reduce the 
violence inflicted on innocent civilians, it reinforced existing combat troops in Iraq with 
additional army brigades and Marine battalions.  Beyond the justifications which stemmed 
from codified norms of interstate relations during hostilities, members of President Bush’s 
advisory team believed that the presence of additional troops would be effective in curtailing 
sectarian violence in order to allow political reconciliation and state building in Iraq.376  While 
sectarian violence was perceived as an obstacle to U.S. led democratisation in Iraq, by framing 
the troop surge in relation to norms of inter-state conduct and as a solution to conflicts being 
waged by factions adhering to religious ideology, U.S. strategists fell into the trap of believing 
that the underlying theological debates raging regarding the Islamic legitimacy and worldview 
of jihadists organisations were minimally important compared to the need to fortify Iraq’s new 
government.377   
This paradigm was reinforced in that in 2007, a movement known as the Anbar 
Awakening began to gain traction.  Following the initial U.S. invasion, L. Paul Bremer, a 
career U.S. diplomat and expert on terrorism had been appointed chief administrator of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), responsible for transitioning Iraq from a post-Hussein 
vacuum to a democratic state.  Bremer’s key policies revolved around the ‘de-Ba’athification’ 
of Iraq, and the dismantling of the Iraqi security and intelligence services.  This led to the 
marginalisation of Iraq’s Sunni elite, which commanded large popular support. 378  This in turn 
fuelled the resonance of jihadist rhetoric which framed U.S. backed Shia dominance as an 
existential danger to Sunnis.  While the evolution of the Anbar Awakening is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, by late 2006 and early 2007, a large number of Sunni Shaykhs capitalised 
on growing popular discontent with rampant violence, and began cooperating with U.S. 
 
375 Kahl, Colin H., “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs?  Norms, Civilian Casualties, and the U.S. Conduct in Iraq”, 
International Security 32:1 (Summer 2007), 7-46.   
376 Sky, Emma, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty: Winding Down the War in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs 90:2 (March / 
April 2011), 117-127, 118. 
377 This view is consistent with policy pursued by the U.S. leading to the troop surge in 2007, and much debate 
in hindsight has focused on the idea that modernisation assumed the decreasing relevance of ideology and 
religion in public life and governance.  Following the Iraq war, much attention has been paid to the fact that this 
assumption has in not materialised uniformly in the world, and religious ideology has been more important in 
driving collective action than was recognised at the time.  See Cladis, Mark, “Religion, Secularism, and the 
Democratic Culture”, The Good Society 19:2 (2010), 22-29.  
378 See Stover, Eric, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti, “Bremer’s “Gordian Knot”: Transitional Justice and the US 
Occupation of Iraq”, Human Rights Quarterly 27:3 (August 2005), 830-857. 
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forces.379/380  While this was a sanctioned government program which was financially 
subsidised by the U.S. and supported by its troop surge, it was portrayed as a grassroots 
movement which had resulted from discontent with insurgent violence.  This portrayal 
allowed U.S. strategists to reconcile their paradigms regarding the superior validity and 
applicability of liberal democratic governance, congruent with one of the sociological pillars 
of the process of modernisation, which can be described as: “a process by which major 
clusters of old social economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken down 
and the people become available for new patterns of socialisation or behaviour.”381  By 
pursuing this strategy, therefore, U.S. interests could be served in that the troop surge was 
designed to eliminate violence and create sufficient space to engage in negotiation and 
reconciliation; namely, erode the psychological commitments to ideological constructs which 
had fuelled violence such as takfir, and begin the process of introducing new patterns of 
socialisation in the form of popular democratic participation.  This motivation is consistent 
with the overall framework of modernisation, one of the foundations of the Western nation 
state.  It states that when mobilised and given social agency, individuals and social groups will 
naturally gravitate towards the pinnacle of rational organisation, and this will organically 
result in democratic governance, its resultant institutions, and social harmony.382  By framing 
the Anbar Awakening as a native Iraqi grassroots movement which supported fledgling state 
institutions such as the police force and military, and supported government initiatives, the 
sociological trajectory and supposed applicability of democratic modernisation could be 
validated.  What this paradigm failed to account for, however, was that a construct such as 
takfir allows for no reconciliation.  The only possible reconciliation according to the Qur׳anic 
passages used by jihadists to justify takfir is in the eventual mutual recognition of tawhid and 
all that it entails.  The fact that the Awakening was portrayed as an organic Iraqi movement 
also gave it undertones of nationalism, something that jihadist rhetoric had evolved to dismiss 
as heretical through the reconfiguration of WB.  Perhaps mobilisation towards democratic 
 
379 For the trajectory of the Anbar Awakening, see Kagan, Kimberly, The Anbar Awakening: Displacing Al-Qaeda 
from its Stronghold in Western Iraq, Institute for the Study of War, 2006. 
380 For Iraqi discontent with rampant violence and motivations for fighting against insurgents, see Montgomery, 
Gary W. and Timothy S. McWilliams (eds), Al-Anbar Awakening: Iraqi Perspectives (Volume II) (Military 
Bookshop, 2009).   
381 Deutsch, Karl W., “Social Mobilization and Political Development”, The American Political Science Review 
55:3 (September 1961), 493-514, 494. 
382 Abid, Mohammad, “Political Modernisation: The Concept, Contours and Dynamics”, The Indian Journal of 
Political Science 65:4 (October – December 2004), 590-602.     
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modernisation and the formation of a state could be feasible, but it is precisely this state entity 
and its accompanying social structures that jihadists such as al-Zarqawi had vehemently 
dismissed.    
   The Islamic state and other Sunni insurgent organisations fought to maintain control 
in areas such as Ramadi, Diyala and Baghdad, but were gradually pushed out of their 
strongholds by U.S. forces as well as Iraqi brigades and police troops bolstered by the surge 
and Anbar Awakening movement.  This was aided by the fact that the Mujahidin Shura 
Council announced in late 2007 that it would cease all attacks against civilians, and would no 
longer support foreign jihadists; again inserting sentiments of Iraqi nationalism perhaps in an 
effort to retain Sunni influence in what it perceived as a turning tide.  Furthermore, while the 
Islamic State had emphasised strict enforcement of Islamic law in its territories, it had 
neglected the provision of security and essential services, and thus the Council may have been 
willing to distance itself from what it perceived as an organisation incapable of sustaining 
popular support.383  Although fighting persisted, by late 2007 violence levels had significantly 
decreased in Iraq.384  Additionally, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) officially dissolved in favour of the 
Islamic State, and al-Zawahiri acknowledged that “there is nothing in Iraq today called al-
Qaeda.  Rather the group al-Qaeda in Iraq has merged with other jihadi groups into the Islamic 
State of Iraq, may God protect it, which is a legitimate emirate”.385  
The reduction in violence in Iraq as the result of the Anbar Awakening, troop surge, 
repositioning of jihadist organisations such as the Mujahidin Shura Council, and formal 
dissolution of AQI gave U.S. commanders and strategists cause to believe that the tactics used 
had been successful.  Most importantly, as Al-Qaeda had been the focal point of the war on 
terror, its organisational demise in Iraq symbolised a significant victory both on the battlefield 
and in the political realm.386  The gradual return to urban areas of formerly displaced Iraqis, 
the improvement of the economic landscape, and the tactical improvement of Iraqi forces 
further bolstered the perception that the war against Al-Qaeda, and by association Islamic 
 
383 For the indigenous Iraqi role in the surge and Anbar Awakening, see Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed and Sterling 
Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening”, PRISM 2:1 (December 2010), 3-18.   
384 For an evaluation of the confluence of factors that led to overall violence reduction, see Biddle, Stephen, 
Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?”, 
International Security 37:1 (Summer 2012), 7-40.   
385 Al-Zawahiri, in Bunzel, 21. 
386 For the perceived success of the campaign to drive AQI from Iraq, see Smith, Neil and Sean McFarland, 
“Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point”, Military Review 88:2 (March – April 2008), 41-52.   
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terrorism, was nearing its conclusion.  The troop surge ended in late 2007, and throughout 
2008 and 2009 U.S. forces reoriented their approaches to focus on counterinsurgency 
operations (COIN), key leader engagement (KLE) and relied increasingly on Iraqi security 
forces for combat manpower.387  Despite these advances, much of the decrease in violence can 
be attributed to the fact that due to the 2007 military operations, Iraq had been further divided 
geographically along sectarian lines in that Sunni and Shia populations no longer coexisted, 
and each retained their limited spheres of influence.  The Islamic State, it appeared, had been 
reduced to an entity in name only.  Given these realities, the important point to note is that the 
war in Iraq to this point had drastically altered the landscape in which jihadist organisations 
were operating.  Many smaller Sunni jihadist organisations continued to exist, as did the 
Islamic State, and all were adamantly opposed to the presence of the U.S. as well as ongoing 
state building measures.  At this point, however, due to the strengthening of Iraq federal 
authority under U.S. auspices, these organisations did not have the physical or financial ability 
to conduct violent campaigns.388  While U.S. strategists lauded the success of organic 
movements such as the Anbar Awakening as proof positive of the applicability of democratic 
modernisation, the narrative which framed the U.S. invasion as part of an ongoing continuum 
in Islamic and jihadist history had been given relevance through the campaigns of violence 
and application of takfir, and had thus become a new chapter in that ideological continuum.  
 
8.7 U.S. Troop Withdrawal and Immediate Repercussions 
In January 2009, Barak Obama became the U.S. President.  Amid plummeting 
American support for the Iraq war, he had campaigned in part on the promise that he would 
extricate the U.S. from that conflict.389  On August 30th 2010, President Obama announced the 
end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, and that troop levels would drop to 50,000.  These 
troops would be restricted to advisory roles, and they would also be scheduled to leave Iraq by 
 
387 Hull, Jeanne F., Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement, Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, 2009. 
388 Gompert, David C., Terrence K. Kelly, and Jessica Watkins, “Political and Security Conditions of U.S. 
Withdrawal”, Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analysing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave, 5-48.  (Virginia: 
RAND, 2010).  
389 Rosentiel, Tom, “Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008”, Pew Research Center, March 19 2008.  




the end of 2011.390  The popular and political consensus in the U.S. was that there had been no 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, al-Qaeda had been defeated, and that ongoing American 
casualties were unacceptable.  The Obama administration hoped to engage with the Iraqi 
government to pursue long-term security arrangements, but even as the troop withdrawal was 
announced, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began expelling U.S. companies, and 
arresting hundreds of Sunni citizens, accusing them of either having been jihadists or former 
Hussein regime collaborators.391  Al-Maliki, a Shiite, had been one of the leading Iraqi’s 
responsible for aiding the CPA in its de-Ba’athification campaign, and his consolidation of 
sectarian power following the inevitable eventual withdrawal of the U.S. was precisely what 
al-Zarqawi had foretold in his 2004 letter to Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.   
Despite the fact that sectarian violence did not escalate to the levels previously seen in 
Iraq, the important point to consider is that the experience in Iraq between the U.S. invasion of 
2003 and the decision to end operations and withdraw all troops in 2010 was a formative one 
for jihadism in the realm of real world combat as well as that of ideology.  Just as Egyptian 
state repression had led individuals like Sayyid Qutb to refashion parameters regarding the 
necessity of violent jihad in the pursuit of sovereignty and tawhid; and just as the Soviet war 
in Afghanistan had led to the reorientation of Islamic identity through combat against an 
aggressor deemed ‘other’, so the Iraq war had a deep impact on shaping the continuum of 
jihadist thought when placed against a transcendent narrative of salafi history and 
contemporary socio-political grievances.  Notions of a morally righteous and divinely justified 
violent campaign built around takfir were given tangible applicability when leveraged against 
an existential threat whose roots were deeply culturally embedded both within Islam itself and 
the legacy of colonialism.  This is not to say that all jihadist organisations adhered to 
specifically agreed upon definitions or uses of takfir, but that its utility in justifying a violent 
campaign to ensure homogeneity of correct belief and practice which would form the 
foundation of a state which existed outside of the norms of Western statehood, was used, 
expounded upon, and debated within jihadism itself to the point that it became ingrained in the 
narratives used to develop jihadist ideology.  This reflects the approach outlined Chapter 1 
 
390 MacAskill, Ewen, “Barak Obama ends the war in Iraq.  ‘Now its time to turn the page’”, The Guardian, August 
31 2010.  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/01/obama-formally-ends-iraq-war (Accessed 9 March 
2020) 
391 Fly, Jamie M. and Robert Zarate, FPI Bulletin: Bringing the Iraq War to an Irresponsible End?  Foreign Policy 
Initiative, 2011.   
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which states that terrorist groups are learning organisations, and they incorporate lessons 
learned from other groups and formative experiences to shape an ever-changing ideological 
platform which is best suited to the achievement of its goals.  This is compounded by the 
proposition made throughout this chapter and previous ones that groups are able to form 
revolutionary ideas of communal identity when engaged in situations in which the conduct of 
violence is perceived as central and necessary.  Given this, despite the relatively low levels of 
violence in Iraq in 2010, it is crucial to consider the potential longevity of the ideological 
permutations that took place during the war there, specifically as they related to the 
interpretation and use of takfir wielded to shape an idealised community and revive the 
political legacy of the salaf in the modern period in a fashion which would result in the 
establishment of a polity that does not adhere to current Western interpretations of what a state 
should be.  The longevity, potential resonance, and danger of this ideology is what can be 
overlooked when policies and strategies that view the enemy as a physical force that can be 
defeated on the battlefield through the use of both conventional and unconventional military 
and political tactics are relied on.  While the danger of extremist ideology manifest in Al-
Qaeda had been acknowledged by U.S. forces, the progression of events leading to the troop 
withdrawal emphasised strategic victories leading to a reduction in violence, and did not take 
into full account the significance and latent extremism, or the fracturing along theological 
lines regarding takfir and the deep significance of the same, that had developed up to that 
point.   
 
8.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter began with a discussion regarding the different ways the war in Iraq was 
justified by the West as a moral imperative, as well as the counterpoints offered by Bin Laden 
which located it in a transcendent history of oppression in the jihadist struggle for sovereignty.  
It then discussed the role of al-Zarqawi in the early stages of the Iraq war, and how his near-
term objectives conflicted with those of al-Qaeda and led to the creation of a distinctively 
defined violent ideology grounded in both Islamic narrative and contemporary reality.  This 
chapter then chronicled the impact of the U.S. troop surge and Anbar awakening, and how the 
results of these ultimately led to a U.S. troop withdrawal.  Finally, it discussed that while 
violent organisations in Iraq were constrained in their abilities to carry out attacks, the 
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decrease in violence did not necessarily correspond with an eradication of the ideologies and 
objectives that had been given applicability and potential endurance through collective action.  
While this chapter stated that the relationship between ISIS and the war in Iraq is not 
unilaterally causal, it presented the pertinent socio-political and cultural perceptions of the war 
in furtherance of the thesis objective of successfully problematising ISIS by means of a 
thorough genealogical inquiry.         
     
                           






















 The U.S. decision to remove all combat troops from Iraq in 2010 represented the end 
of the war in terms related to direct state involvement, but by leaving behind thousands of 
troops as advisors, the U.S. transitioned from an active combat role to operations other than 
war (OOTW) and thus maintained a high level of intervention consistent with the ambition of 
establishing a democratic Iraq.392  By contrast, this decision did not signify the end of the war 
for jihadists, as Iraq had been portrayed as a front in an existential struggle; it simply meant 
that the ultimate battle to achieve tawhid had transitioned to a new and different phase.  The 
Manichean worldview of salafi-jihadism which pre-dated the war in Iraq, and developed there 
to incorporate new realities through the deliberate application of takfir, allowed for no political 
reconciliation and demonstrated its malleability in the context of evolving socio-political 
realities.  After 2010 therefore the physical and intellectual innovations which had taken root 
through their application in Iraq became part of the jihadist transcendent narrative, able to be 
utilised and expounded on again in the future. 
 This chapter will analyse the events and conditions which shaped the socio-political 
operating space of jihadism following the war in Iraq, specifically as they related to the rise of 
ISIS, and will emphasise the importance of the marginalisation of al-Qaeda and self-ascribed 
role of ISIS  in both Islamic tradition and future world order.  First this chapter will reflect on 
the position taken by global Islamic scholars regarding takfir.  Second, it will analyse the 
written jihadist manifesto which offers insight into the strategy and self-perception of ISIS 
which also may have contributed to the group’s ability to maintain its ideology despite 
physical losses in Iraq.  Third, this chapter will examine the Arab Spring in the context of 
popular mobilisation and the effects that this had on reshaping the realm of the possible in 
regional geopolitics.  Finally, this chapter will provide an overview of the civil war in Syria, 
 
392 Military intervention can be comprised of either combat operations or OOTW, but intervention underpins a 
longstanding belief which had been a cornerstone of U.S. military and political strategy since before 9/11, that 
articulates the position that justice and peace can be established relatively quickly by the U.S. military, in any 
global context.  Although this did not occur in Iraq, this belief endured in institutional behaviour, leading to a 
situation in which the U.S. could not extricate itself entirely from Iraq.  For more see Odom, William E., 
“Intervention for the Long Run: Rethinking the Definition of War”, Harvard International Review 22:4 (Winter 
2001), 48-52.      
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the rise of ISIS as a stakeholder entity, and the fracturing within jihadism that this engendered.  
Throughout this chapter, uses of takfir will be noted but the emphasis will be on the drastically 
altered geopolitical landscape between 2010 and the summer of 2014, and the ways in which 
jihadism evolved to capitalise on contextual realities. 
 
9.1 International Conference on Takfir 2010 
 The dangers posed by the revolutionary ways in which takfir and WB had been 
wielded to fuel violence shrouded in justificatory language that evoked prominent individuals 
in Islamic history did not go unnoticed within the broader umma.  In March 2010, a Peace 
Summit Conference was convened in Mardin, Turkey, and included religious scholars and 
authorities from different specialisations and geographic locations which intended to represent 
the global Muslim community and its diversity as well as unity.  The conference deliberated 
on issues related to the umma’s relationships with the rest of mankind by revisiting the 
classical and juridical division of the world into abodes of war, peace, and covenant, as well as 
the constructs of jihad, WB, and citizenship.393  The scholars focused on the fatwa passed by 
Ibn Taymiyya regarding the classification of the city of Mardin, due to the fact that it had been 
appropriated by jihadists in order to justify takfir.  The underlying motivation for the re-
exploration of Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa was the fact that in the 21st century, Muslims were living 
in a much altered global context, interacting with societies and political structures not 
accounted for during the time of Ibn Taymiyya, and were bound by international laws and 
treaties as well as novel formulations of citizenship and identity.  The conference sought to 
ensure the compatibility of principles of the Sharia with an evolving modern world.  It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to enumerate all of the findings of the conference, but it is 
important to note its first conclusion, which stated: 
“Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa concerning Mardin can under no circumstances be appropriated and 
used as evidence for leveling the charge of kufr against fellow Muslims, rebelling against 
rulers, deeming game their lives and property, terrorizing those who enjoy safety and security, 
acting treacherously towards those who live (in harmony) with fellow Muslims or with whom 
 
393 For an introduction to the purpose and methodology, and findings of the conference, see “The Mardin 
Declaration”, Al Habib Ali Al-Jifri, March 30 2010.  http://www.alhabibali.com/en/news/the-mardin-
declaration/  (Accessed 24 March 2020) 
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fellow Muslims live (in harmony) via the bond of citizenship and peace.”394  It furthermore 
concluded that jihad was not in fact the pinnacle of Islam as individuals like Bin Laden had 
argued, but it was one of many ways in which to defend the faith.  The legitimacy of jihad 
rested on its conduct solely as a mechanism by which to repel foreign aggression, and could 
only be valid when declared by a rightful Islamic ruler.  Finally, the conference concluded that 
WB could never be used as the basis on which to declare takfir, unless an authoritative 
governing body found there to be an actual article of disbelief.395   
 This conference and its findings attempted to prevent any ideological misuse of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s legacy by violent jihadists while arguing that doing so would lead to fitna within 
the umma, causing it to fracture.  It focused on the unity of the umma as paramount, and 
sought to maintain the cultural identity of Islam within a modern world bound by hegemonic 
systems of international laws, boundaries, and structures which had no organic precedent 
within classical Islam or the Sharia.  It is poignant to note that while the scholars at this 
conference strove to find a middle ground between Muslim identity rooted in historical 
narrative and the modern structures governing global relations, they did so in a fashion which 
stressed the importance of abiding by those same structures and therefore could be accused of 
takfir by the very jihadists whose validity they sought to undercut.  The purpose of this brief 
examination is to demonstrate that takfir has deep relevance to the construct of Muslim 
communal identity, and that elements within Islam had become aware of its resultant potential 
gravitational pull, and ability to resonate with contemporary circumstances and grievances in 
order to justify violence.  It also demonstrates the increasing competition for the rightful 
appropriation of Ibn Taymiyya’s legacy in the aftermath of a conflict which had witnessed 
such revolutionary applications of it to fuel violence. 
 
9.2 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the “Management of Savagery”  
 In April 2010, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and other top Islamic State officials were killed 
in a joint raid between U.S. and Iraqi forces in Tikrit, and the leadership decapitation appeared 
to signal the end of the jihadist organisation, as it had already lost the ability to conduct a 
 
394 “The Mardin Declaration”.   
395 For more on the specific articles which constitute disbelief, and the argument that WB cannot be used to 
justify takfir, see Hassan, Muhammad Haniff, “The Danger of Takfir (Excommunication): Exposing IS’ Takfiri 
Ideology”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 9:2 (2017), 3-12. 
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sustained violent campaign.396  Within a month, the Shura Council of the Islamic State 
appointed a successor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, naming him Commander of the Faithful, and 
emphasised his descent from Muhammad’s tribe as well as his Islamic scholarly credentials.397  
The choice of al-Baghdadi, while never overtly recognised, may have been influenced by the 
desire of the Islamic State to portray Islamic legitimacy to the masses it sought to influence by 
claiming equal juridical status to acknowledged entities such as those represented at the 
Mardin Conference.  Furthermore, while the Islamic State may have been incapacitated due to 
the U.S. troop surge, Anbar Awakening, and entrenchment of Iraqi federal authority under 
Nouri al-Maliki supported by remaining U.S. forces, al-Baghdadi demonstrated great foresight 
in that his first act as Commander of the Faithful was the appointment of former Ba’athist 
officials to prominent posts within the Islamic State.398  In this simple act we are able to glean 
a great deal about the ambitions of the Islamic State and its methodology.  More importantly, 
we can surmise the group’s visions of itself and its desired role in the world as an entity with 
stakeholder power without adhering to structural or intellectual parameters that govern state 
stakeholders.  To explore this, it is necessary to understand the work that perhaps inspired and 
justified the Islamic State’s methodology, aspirations, justifications, and longevity despite 
temporary incapacitation.      
 In 2004, an online manifesto was published anonymously in Iraq under the pseudonym 
Abu Bakr Naji, that blended an understanding of states’ behaviour with Islamic rhetoric to 
justify violence in the pursuit of sovereignty.399  In “The Management of Savagery: The Most 
Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass”400, Naji opened his work by outlining the 
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state of affairs in the Muslim world following the agreement of Sykes-Picot, and concluded 
that under such conditions, the lives of the masses were governed by “no goodness, no justice, 
no world.”401  Naji articulated the belief that this unnatural state of subjugation and 
humiliation could not be remedied institutionally, but only through the direct application of 
extreme violence and the exploitation of fear.  Still in the introduction, he blended realpolitik 
and sociological theory to argue that nation states had imposed values and structures on an 
independent society which contravened rationality, and this had caused cultural depravity and 
inequity to proliferate.402  By creating, harnessing, and wielding the savagery and chaos 
caused by this artificial imposition, of which the war on terror was only the latest iteration, the 
true Muslim community could violently define itself by true belief in praxis, and the strategic 
implementation of lessons learned in both Islamic and global history, could also achieve 
sovereignty.  “If we succeed in the management of this savagery, that stage (by the permission 
of God) will be a bridge to the Islamic State which has been awaited since the fall of the 
Caliphate.  If we fail (…) it does not mean the end of the mater; rather, this failure will lead to 
an increase in savagery!!”403     
 Throughout his manifesto, Naji conjured figures of the Islamist movement, such as 
Hassan al-Banna, and cited their utter failures and lack of both strategic vision and theological 
conviction.404  While he reiterated the position taken by Islamists that the umma could only 
regain dignity and sovereignty by returning to fundamental premises of Islam, he rejected their 
assertion that this could occur by engaging with structures of democracy.  He also criticised 
them for only preparing future generations for an abstract jihad and failing to take violent 
action.405  Naji also condemned previous jihadist movements, arguing that they had become 
weak, and had engaged in wanton terroristic violence without using it to strategically forge a 
community identity which would result in sovereignty.406  Naji wove his narrative by 
promoting the creation of a state built on Qur׳anic prescriptions as a Muslim communal 
imperative, and linked the events of the war on terror to the tribulations that were experienced 
by early generations of Muslims.  Simultaneously, he exhibited knowledge of authoritarian 
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regimes and practices in the Middle East as well as U.S. foreign policy to craft a strategic 
state-building platform heavily influenced by Marxism and guerilla warfare tactics.407  In 
keeping with salafi-Jihadist inspirations, he also drew heavily from both Sayyid Qutb and Ibn 
Taymiyya to justify violence and jihad.  Citing the former, he wrote “Verily, this Qur’an does 
not reveal its secrets save to those who rush into battles with it (on their side) and who live in 
an atmosphere like the one in which it was sent down the first time.”408  Although the 
manifesto was published anonymously under a pseudonym, it is possible to see its influence in 
the actions of al-Zarqawi that were covered in the previous chapter in that Naji argued for the 
necessity of the violent polarisation of the masses in order to both ensure a homogenous 
eventual population and the support required for governance in a modern world.  He 
recognised the need to use theological weapons such as takfir to achieve goals of statehood, 
but also emphasised the need to learn from centuries of socio-political developments.  He 
advocated harnessing technical and tactical expertise in politics and warfare while discarding 
those that contravened prescriptions of the Sharia, in order to capitalise on creating a 
sovereign entity in the modern world which adhered solely to Islamic governance.       
It is important to note this framework because it invoked the importance of sovereignty 
as linked to the masses, and thus echoed the revolutionary beliefs posited by Marat or 
Robespierre during the French Revolution which gave birth to the modern state.  By 
articulating the need for violence, however, he emphasised the later legacy of the French 
Revolution which arguably dictated that inter-communal violence was the primary vehicle for 
the achievement of the revolutionary politics of democracy because it ensured the 
homogeneity of beliefs required to support a popular base.409  By directing necessary violence 
towards an oppressive power, Naji also revived the ideas proposed by Fanon and demonstrated 
an understanding of the effects that violent conduct had on the behaviour of state actors 
protecting national interests.  Finally, by viewing the world in the context of natural and 
unnatural states of existence which naturally tended towards socio-political group formation in 
order to self-govern as a sacred canopy, Naji appropriated the same premises that Western 
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enlightenment intellectuals such as John Locke had used in his work on social contracts.410  
Naji’s manifesto was clearly born from the chaos which ensued from the onset of the war on 
terror, but just as religious ideology sought to supplant chaos with order, as was narrated in 
Chapter 3, so Naji’s work sought to use Islamic narratives blended with socio-political thought 
from diverse backgrounds in global history to propose a system of violence by which a 
divinely righteous social group could conquer chaos and usher in order under the mantle of a 
caliphate.  Ultimately, by blending social and tactical philosophies under the banner of salafi-
jihadism in a specific geopolitical context, Naji’s work provided a blueprint by which the 
umma could and should reclaim its communal dignity represented in sovereign governance.     
While Naji’s work did not appear to be referenced by Islamic State leadership, by 
scrutinising its directives and comparing them to tangible actions taken, it is possible to 
surmise in hindsight that it had a degree of influence.  By appointing former Ba’athist officials 
to prominent posts within the Islamic State, al-Baghdadi capitalised on the institutional and 
administrative expertise of individuals who had also been marginalised in the building of a 
future democratic Iraq.  By pursuing this strategy, Islamic State leadership distanced itself 
from the policy objectives of al-Qaeda, and increased the theological and tactical divergence 
that had begun during the war in Iraq.  By engaging former Ba’athist administrators and 
strategists, al-Baghdadi made it clear that his organisation intended to govern, as Naji had 
argued was necessary for legitimacy and survival, which al-Qaeda had been criticised for 
failing to do in Iraq.411  While this governance was not immediately feasible due to the 
restricted capabilities of the Islamic State, events would soon create conditions that the group 
could capitalise on, and these events similarly revolved around notions of the mobilisation of 
the masses and constructs of sovereignty in geopolitical context. 
 
9.3 Arab Spring, Reshaping the Realm of the Possible, and Jihadist Responses 
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On December 16 2010, a young street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, had his cart and 
electric scales confiscated by the police, and he was allegedly slapped and publicly humiliated 
by a female officer.  The following day, the vendor, named Mohamed Bouazizi, went to the 
governor’s office to complain.  When the governor refused to see him, he covered himself in 
gasoline and set himself ablaze in protest.412  Although Bouazizi died 18 days later from his 
injuries, his self-immolation sparked protests in Tunisia which built on an entrenched cultural 
post-colonial tradition of engaging in collective action of dissent.  Protestors originally called 
for social equality and dignity, but rapidly began vehemently demanding the ouster of 
President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali who had, since 1987, manipulated the constitution to allow 
himself to remain in power indefinitely.413  Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14th 2011, 
but the protests were captured on social media and represented the culmination of popular 
dissent with entrenched corruption, violent repression, rampant unemployment, and social 
inequity experienced by a population under an autocratic regime surviving under the guise of 
Western modernity and its institutions.414 
On January 25th 2011, millions of citizens flooded Cairo’s Tahrir Square in Egypt, 
called for fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, and demanded “bread, freedom, and social 
justice”.415  While mostly peaceful, many protests manifest themselves by violently targeting 
what were perceived as structures and symbols of regime repression and brutality such as 
police stations.416  Mubarak did step down 18 days after the protests began, and opposition 
forces to include labour unions and the Muslim Brotherhood tentatively joined together to call 
for the establishment of a ‘civil state’.  While the breadth and complexity of what has become 
known as the Arab Spring is beyond the scope of this thesis, the international audience was 
captivated by these protests because they represented something new and unheralded.  They 
demonstrated that young individuals in Muslim countries were not bound by cultural 
stereotypes inimical to democratic and civic participation, and that primarily nonviolent 
grassroots movements could erode divisions along sectarian, economic, and social lines to 
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mobilise actors in the pursuit of fundamental rights within democratically endorsed 
structures.417  
The Arab Spring spread rapidly to Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria, but as a 
revolutionary movement it was misconstrued due to the fact that it did not adhere to the 
patterns and aspirations associated with the monumental revolutions in Western heritage that 
ultimately hoped to unify the masses and revolutionise political structures to represent popular 
sovereignty.418  The first Western reactions to the uprisings portrayed them as being carried 
out by westernised and educated youths who had progressed to the secular standards embodied 
by modern political structures and thus were determined to overthrow regimes that failed to 
uphold them correctly.  In fact the Obama administration quickly distanced itself from the 
Mubarak regime, which had been a regional ally to the U.S. in terms of relationships with 
Israel, and due to this relationship took a central role in mediating future Egyptian elections 
where it saw the potential for a stronger democratic ally; all the more crucial given the 
perceived danger from Islamist organisations should they capitalise on growing discontent 
with practices associated with democratic regimes under Mubarak.419   
While a great deal of contemporaneous study was devoted to understanding the root 
causes and future potential of the Arab Spring in a traditional state centric model which views 
world relations as contests for power between rational actors, notions of affect which would 
have more profoundly enduring ramifications on the socio-political landscape, and on 
individuals as actors, were taking root through the revolutions.  These paradigms forged 
through notions of affect that empower agents to take collective action in pursuit of self-
determination were embodied in the revolutions in that they were “transparent movements that 
both exceed individual subjects and bind together collectives in ways that create conditions of 
possibility for both the crystallisation of social structures and for their contestation”.420  This 
type of social entativity is not dependent upon modernisation theory or democratic aspirations.  
It can be better understood as a dualistic cultural outburst, which on the one hand physically 
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revolted against corrupt regimes and their associated practices, and on the other which 
transcendentally grappled with the legacy of Sykes-Picot and its aftermath and sought to 
regain a sacred canopy in the sense of ontological security which, beyond physical security, 
imbues actors with a sense of self that forms the foundation for collective agency.421  The 
Arab Spring developed differently in different nation states that experienced it, but it is 
perhaps this cultural and deeply rooted human sociological yearning that was manifest through 
protest which was its most significant legacy in reshaping the realm of the possible through 
collective action in the Middle East.422   
The reshaping of the geopolitical landscape as a result of the Arab Spring would prove 
to have an enduring effect on the jihadisphere.  As protests spread to Yemen in January 2011, 
al-Qaeda’s affiliate on the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, seized large portions of territory to 
include major towns in Abyan Province.423  The most important aspect of this development is 
the fact that AQAP was instructed by al-Qaeda General Command to not declare the 
establishment of an emirate or nascent state, due to the fact that it could not hope to provide 
the foundation of a state in terms of basic services, and therefore would fail to gain necessary 
popular support.  In a letter to AQAP leadership, Osama Bin Laden wrote that Arab 
populations had become entirely dependent upon their governments for goods and services, 
and subsequently any Islamic State which failed to deliver these same public services quickly 
and efficiently would lose any hope for support.424  This position is reflective of al-Qaeda’s 
incorporation of Muslim Brotherhood precepts concerning governance and the masses, and 
also may have been a response to the fact that it had been criticised for failing to hold territory 
in Iraq.  This move by al-Qaeda may have been carried out due to knowledge of the 
prescriptions given by Naji for state building, yet with underlying recognition of the power of 
the masses demonstrated in the Arab Spring.  Instead of declaring an emirate, AQAP engaged 
with tribal leaders and began a concerted strategy designed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
the local population, and unify disparate elements of society.425  This further underpins al-
Qaeda’s long term vision for the establishment of the Caliphate in that the group abstained 
 
421 Solomon, 935.   
422 For more on the Arab Spring, see Grand, Stephen R., Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions 
Elsewhere can Teach us about the Prospects for Arab Democracy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2014).  
423 McCants, William, The ISIS Apocalypse; The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 55.   
424 McCants, 54. 
425 McCants, 56. 
147 
 
from any proclamation of takfir and instead emphasised gradual education of the population to 
ensure an ease of transition to eventual Islamic governance.  Despite holding territory and 
engaging in grassroots civil state building, AQAP remained focused on using strongholds 
from which to attack U.S. interests in the Middle East, and conducting terrorist training in 
order to carry out attacks abroad in pursuit of its primary ambition of forcing U.S. removal 
from the region.426  
On May 1st 2011, a U.S. special operations team killed Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, 
in what was heralded as a success of intelligence gathering and operational planning.427  While 
this leadership decapitation certainly eliminated one of the focal points in the war on terror 
and the mastermind behind 9/11, al-Qaeda’s leadership passed to Ayman al-Zawahiri and the 
organisation continued unabated in its global mission via regional affiliates.428    
 
9.4 The Arab Spring Triggers Civil War in Syria and Creation of Jabhat al-Nusra 
  While AQAP was capitalising on the opportunities created by the Arab Spring in 
Yemen, protests spread to Syria, where in January 2011 protestors had begun demanding 
“freedom for the people” in public arenas across the nation.429  While the regime of President 
Bashar al-Assad initially made concessions to the protestors, it increasingly responded with 
brutal repression.  In this regard it is interesting to note the relationship between the Alawite 
Syrian state and opposition movements, in that the Muslim Brotherhood had enjoyed great 
popular support in opposition to the regime in Syria beginning in the 1960s.  This relationship 
culminated in a Syrian government assault on the city of Hama in 1982, which resulted in 
massive Sunni civilian casualties.430  Following this catastrophe, political Islam declined in 
Syria as a mobilising force, but interestingly religious education aimed at the moral 
transformation of society through grassroots initiatives became the focal point for advocating 
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social reform.  For this reason, the 2011 protests used religious language and reference points 
to criticise the regime not due to political party affiliation but because Islamic social values 
had become the primary framework for reform following the 1982 massacre.431 
In April 2011, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Assad and top Syrian officials due to the 
regime’s brutal repression of protests.432  Unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, Assad refused to step 
down and various factions of resistance emerged to his increasing crackdowns as government 
loyalists and rebel groups framed the conflict in ways to maximise their respective narrative 
appeal.433  Amidst this tumult, al-Baghdadi commissioned Syrian Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani 
to spearhead an Islamic State cell in Syria, and he formed Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) as one of many 
factions combatting the Assad regime.434  Al-Zawahiri voiced his organisation’s support for 
jihad in Syria, and emphasised the prominent role that territory enclosed in Syria in the 21st 
century played in Islamic history.435  JN quickly grew in capabilities, but portrayed itself as a 
nationalist movement without ties to terrorist organisations and by doing so was able to 
capitalise on the Islamic frames of resistance that had been ingrained in Syrian political 
narratives.436  JN adopted an approach similar to that of AQAP in Yemen which had 
incorporated Muslim Brotherhood precepts, and engaged in grassroots initiatives to gain 
popular support for an eventual Sharia government following the collapse of the Assad 
regime.  During the second half of 2011, JN engaged in attacks to achieve its immediate 
objective, the defeat of the Assad regime, and crafted a military strategy that deliberately 
targeted Syrian government security and intelligence branches, divisions of the army, and 
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prominent figureheads.437  Al-Jawlani also framed the Syrian conflict as a stepping stone to 
expelling American interests and oppressive rulers from the heartland of Islam, and by doing 
so echoed the narrative popularised by al-Qaeda during the war in Iraq.  JN dealt rapid 
successive blows to Syrian government forces, characterised by brazen suicide attacks which 
resulted in high death tolls, which forced them to retreat to urban defensive positions.  In this 
situation, JN capitalised on the chaos Naji had proposed creating and successfully recruited 
from among rural populations, and organised them into effective military style brigades.438  By 
leading these efforts and mobilising the Syrian rural population, JN played a crucial role in 
transforming the conflict in Syria from one characterised by sporadic clashes between factions 
to one of civil war. 
 
9.5 Al-Maliki’s Authoritarianism and Re-emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq     
While JN expanded operations in Syria, aided in part by the political manoeuvrings of 
the Assad regime which freed insurgents from prisons in order to justify increasing brutality 
under the guise of counterterrorism, al-Baghdadi and Islamic State leadership responded to the 
results of the U.S. troop departure from Iraq and the secondary effects from the Arab 
Spring.439  As was noted above, al-Maliki intensified his consolidation of power following the 
removal of U.S. forces.  In December 2011, he dispatched troops and tanks with arrest 
warrants to the residences of Minister of Finance Rafi al-Issawi, Vice President Tariq al-
Hashemi, and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq.  Al-Hashemi fled from Baghdad to 
Iraq’s Kurdish region, but later confessions from his protection detail claimed the Vice 
President had been behind a string of terrorist bombings.440  These confessions were revealed 
to have been coerced under extensive torture, and the fact that the politicians in question in 
this instance were Sunni represented the increasing trend of the al-Maliki administration to 
implement tactics akin to those used by Saddam Hussein to quell sectarian opposition to his 
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rule.441  Furthermore, a week after deploying tanks and troops to confront opposition, al-
Maliki announced that he intended to abandon national coalition governance in favour of a 
political majority.  By doing so, he would effectively side-line the Iraqiyya party which was 
widely supported by Sunnis, and this was perceived as an effort to marginalise the Sunni 
population in favour of a Shiite majority.442  These developments were eerily predicted by al-
Zarqawi in the letter that he wrote to Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri in 2004 that was covered in 
the previous chapter, in which the former argued that the failure to wield takfir successfully to 
create conditions in which the Sunni population would mobilise to defeat the Shia and 
establish a state, would result in the Americans’ Shiite allies retaining the structures of power 
following U.S. withdrawal and the use of them to subjugate the Sunni masses.443 
 The withdrawal of U.S. combat troops removed effective barriers to re-emerging 
violence, and in December 2011 car bombs detonated in both Sunni and Shia neighbourhoods 
in Baghdad which killed 60 and injured over 200 individuals, in the deadliest attacks in Iraq in 
over a year.444  Beginning in January 2012, the Islamic State began releasing speeches 
declaring an imminent return, claiming that the group was rapidly gaining new supporters.  In 
February, it proclaimed that “The (Islamic) State will soon return, God willing, to all the areas 
that have been taken from it.”445  In July 2012, al-Baghdadi announced that the Islamic State 
“is returning anew, advancing to take control of the ground that it had and more…The Islamic 
State does not recognise synthetic borders, nor any citizenship besides Islam”.446  Subsequent 
speeches by the Islamic State argued that al-Maliki’s tactics were indicative of a Shiite 
expansionist plot at the expense of Sunnis, and emphasised the tangible grievances of Iraq’s 
Sunni population under increasing authoritarian democratic rule.  This final instance is 
poignant in both its content and timing in that it channelled developments of the Arab Spring 
to fuel discontent with corrupt and authoritarian regimes, but did so in a method which 
deliberately framed the outlet of said discontent as a violent entity which dissolved the very 
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foundation of the modern state in which authoritarianism was taking root.  While other 
regional protests demanded freedom, equality and social justice for the citizens of a state, the 
Islamic State summarily rejected this proposition and instead posited that the remedy for 
contemporary Sunni grievances lay in the transcendent image of citizenship according to 
Islamic prescripts.  Throughout 2012 the Islamic State released memos and speeches which 
reiterated this position, and violence in Iraq along sectarian lines and against centres of 
government power increased to levels not experienced since before the U.S. troop 
withdrawal.447 
 
9.6 Islamic State Expansion into Syria and the Fracturing of Jihadism 
On December 11th 2012, the United States State Department designated JN a terrorist 
group, and accused it of operating under the umbrella of the Islamic State.  To this, JN 
responded that it was a separate organisation; the Nusra Front.448  Although JN had claimed 
credit for over 600 violent attacks in Syria, the group continued its self-portrayal as a Syrian 
movement devoted to the overthrow of the Assad regime and had become a popular insurgent 
movement.  Whereas the manifesto by Naji, born out of the chaos of Iraq, had perhaps 
inspired al-Baghdadi’s strategic choices and rhetoric to this point, JN seemed guided primarily 
by another work published contemporaneously with “Management of Savagery”.  This work, a 
1,600-page tome entitled “The Call of the Global Islamic Resistance”449 had been written by 
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, a Syrian who had participated in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s 
uprising against President Hafez al-Assad that was recounted earlier.  Al-Suri had also 
participated in the struggles in Algeria and Afghanistan, and viewed the current jihadist 
movement as a failure due to insufficient religious knowledge which led to rash decisions and 
excessive violence, and he sought to heal jihadism through his manifesto.450  Whereas Naji 
stressed the importance of conquering and brutally defending territory, al-Suri promoted 
popular revolt under the mantle of jihadism as the only way to establish a Muslim society, and 
 
447 “Still Bloody”, The Economist, January 5 2013. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-
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this position was championed by leaders of JN.451  Any use of takfir, he argued, could be 
arbitrarily wielded to serve motives that would ultimately result in the destruction of any 
popular support or communal unity required to overthrow corrupt regimes.  This position 
stood in stark contrast to that taken by Naji which framed takfir as a useful and necessary 
multi-dimensional weapon which could be used to create the chaos necessary for the victory of 
violent jihadism, and subsequently harnessed to ensure the unity, homogeneity, and 
compliance of a population.    
The differences regarding ultimate ambitions and the use of takfir between JN and the 
Islamic State became increasingly evident as the latter expanded its operations into Syria.  
Whereas JN followed the al-Qaeda model and the prescripts given by al-Suri and sought to 
engage with Sharia committees and other rebel groups to provide services and settle disputes 
in the regions it captured, the Islamic State did not perceive itself as engaged in a war against 
the Assad regime and sought instead to dominate rather than collaborate with other rebel 
factions.  It instituted harsh Sharia governance, including severe penalties for those accused of 
non-compliance which extended to the pronouncement of takfir on individuals suspected of 
collaborating with either the regime or other rebel organisations.452  While the group did 
engage with local Sunni tribes, it did so to secure resources to be used to gain the necessary 
finances and infrastructure to operate a future state.  As part of this tactic, the Islamic State 
engaged in independent campaigns of warfare against local tribes that controlled areas vital to 
the extraction of oil and whose support could not be swayed.  By doing so, it simultaneously 
portrayed itself to the local populations as a dangerous yet more viable and sustainable 
alternative to the existing regime in its ability to secure resources required of a political 
stakeholder.453 
Differing methodologies and conflicting aspirations led to the demands of the Islamic 
State that JN announce loyalty to it in March 2013.  Al-Jawlani refused, stating that publicly 
claiming any allegiance would erode the group’s popular Syrian support, and al-Baghdadi 
unsuccessfully attempted to recruit the former’s top officials.454  A month later, in April 2013, 
al-Baghdadi released a public statement: “It’s now time to declare in front of the people of the 
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Levant and the world that Jabhat al-Nusrah is but an extension of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
part of it.  (…)  So we declare while relying on Allah: The cancellation of the name ‘Islamic 
State of Iraq’, and the cancellation of the name ‘Jabhat al-Nusrah’, and gathering them under 
one name, ‘The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham’.”455  Al-Jawlani responded immediately by 
publicly claiming allegiance to al-Zawahiri, which he had never done publicly and which al-
Baghdadi refused to do, and yet amidst this confusion many JN fighters defected to join al-
Baghdadi’s new organisation, ISIS.456  Al-Baghdadi meanwhile appealed to al-Zawahiri, 
urging him to recognise the merger in order to avoid fitna and the dangerous fracturing of 
jihadism and the umma.  In May 2013, however, al-Zawahiri voided the merger, called on 
both groups to cease infighting, and ordered the Islamic State to return to Iraq while JN should 
continue in Syria as al-Qaeda’s official affiliate.457  He further appointed a deputy, Abu Khalid 
al-Suri, to mediate compliance with his orders. 
  In June 2013, al-Baghdadi responded: “I have chosen the command of my Lord over 
the command in the message that contradicts it.”458  Furthermore, ISIS spokesman Abu 
Muhammad al-Adnani claimed that ISIS had never been contractually obligated to al-Qaeda, 
and crucially that al-Zawahiri had erred due to the fact that he had tried to partition jihadism 
and ISIS according to the artificial boundaries of Sykes-Picot and that therefore his ruling held 
no legitimacy.459  This conflict reverberated within the jihadist community.  Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdisi chastised ISIS in January 2014 for behaving like a state when in fact it had no 
legitimacy to do so, and harshly condemned the group’s excessive use of takfir and argued that 
this threatened the future potential of any eventual legitimate Islamic government.460   
ISIS fighters did not abandon Syria and in fact escalated violence against opposing 
rebel groups that did not declare fealty, arguing that this constituted allegiance with an enemy 
and therefore fundamental disbelief.  When called to submit to shura consultation to mediate 
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disputes, ISIS repeatedly refused because this would “infringe on the rights of the Muslim 
sovereign and his state”.461  ISIS leadership increasingly portrayed itself as a sovereign entity 
and many JN members as well as unaffiliated individuals both from within Syria and 
internationally joined its ranks as the group refused to abandon its methodology and claims to 
statehood.462  Unlike other Jihadist organisations, ISIS employed apocalyptic narratives to 
legitimise its existence.  Just as al-Qaeda had portrayed the war in Iraq as part of a continuum 
in the struggle between Islam and the Crusaders, so ISIS represented its emerging statehood as 
the indication that the end times were nearing and that the final confrontation between Islam 
and the West was approaching.  In order to be victorious this endeavour, the spiritual purity of 
the community was paramount and therefore ISIS leaders reiterated the urgency of utilising 
takfir and its violent repercussions to ensure the cleanliness and uniformity of the umma.463  
ISIS continued conquering territory, and in January 2014 it seized Raqqa which became the 
group’s de-facto capital.464  In conquered territories, ISIS leadership emphasised the 
abovementioned need to purify as well as prescriptions advocated by Naji by implementing 
social services such as police and educational as well as public services, but doing so in a 
manner that strictly adhered to the group’s stringent parameters in that punishments for 
nonconformity included death and mutilation, schools taught only authorised material, 
smoking was outlawed, and deviance was met with declarations of takfir.465        
On February 2nd 2014, al-Qaeda issued a statement formally disavowing ISIS, and 
bracketed the organisation’s name which clearly intended to delegitimise its claims to 
statehood.466  Two weeks later, ISIS leadership dispatched fighters to assassinate al-Zawahiri’s 
deputy, Abu Khalid al-Suri, and in the following months the group consolidated its power in 
Syria as the Assad regime redirected military efforts away from it due to the fact that it did not 
deliberately target the government itself.467  In April 2014, an ISIS spokesman hinted publicly 
that a major announcement was forthcoming from the group, and weeks later, its primary 
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apologist, Turki ibn Mubarak al-Bin’ali released a treatise which argued in meticulous 
theological detail that the prophesied caliphate would return, ISIS merited the title of 
caliphate, and that al-Baghdadi was qualified to lead it as caliph.468  The major announcement 
would be delivered months later in Mosul, Iraq, and will be the starting point for the next 
chapter. 
 
9.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated the potential for survival exhibited by ISIS in that the 
organisation endured despite suffering near catastrophic losses during the war in Iraq.  It had 
successfully reinterpreted a worldview that predated it which perceived history and 
contemporary events within a cosmic timeframe, and which did not frame military or 
territorial losses as ultimate defeats.  The Arab Spring had enduring effects on power 
dynamics in the Middle East that continue to resound into the present, but for the purposes of 
this thesis, it had two primary repercussions.  First, it physically led to power vacuums and the 
creation of space within which power and sovereignty could be contested.  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, it represented the possibility that change in entrenched authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East was possible through collective mobilisation that did not 
necessarily have to possess ambitions of democratisation or secularisation.  The power of 
individual agency and collective action in dictating the outcomes of inter-group dynamics in a 
competitive political context is tremendously powerful, and has been one of the pillars of 
revolutionary movements of varying orientations regardless of specific moments in history.  
This chapter has therefore explored the way in which pre-existing ideologies and plans that 
informed the ISIS worldview were able to be galvanised in the socio-political arena which 
resulted from the Arab Spring.  This section has also demonstrated the increasing 
methodological differences between al-Qaeda and ISIS regarding what a state resultant from 
jihad should be, and how it should be attained.  In this regard, this chapter has scrutinised how 
jihadist organisations reacted to external global and regional events, as well as to each-other, 
and how they incorporated lessons of previous failures and successes while maintaining a 
transcendent worldview as it related to sovereignty and methodology.  
 






 This chapter will cover the time period from the announcement of the ISIS caliphate in 
the summer 2014 to the territorial loss of the same by the summer of 2019.  Throughout this 
account, previous chapters will be emulated in that critical benchmarks in the group’s 
evolution will be chronicled as reflected in the use and understanding of takfir as a socio-
political weapon.  Furthermore, this evolution will be synchronised with a discussion of U.S. 
and international perceptions of and reactions to ISIS and the war on terror in order to 
demonstrate relative successes and failures.   
First this chapter will discuss the declaration of the caliphate and the reasons that it 
was so appealing in a socio-political context.  It will analyse the ideological purging that took 
place within ISIS regarding takfir and the way that the group portrayed itself to the world.  
Second it will explore international and jihadist responses to the ISIS caliphate and the 
repercussions that this had on the group’s physical capabilities, its ideological orientation, and 
the jihadisphere at large.  Third this chapter will scrutinise the 2017 internal schism that took 
place within ISIS which resulted from territorial losses and revolved around the utility and 
application of takfir.  This will be juxtaposed with contemporaneous external events in order 
to understand the salience and endurance of the evolving jihadist worldview as well as the 
entrenchment of takfir driven violence as a tool for achieving sovereignty within a social 
group context.  Finally, this chapter will recount disputes between al-Qaeda and ISIS from 
2019 in order to demonstrate the fracturing of jihadism, longevity of ideological platforms 
forged through the conduct of violence, and implications for the future of terrorism.   
 
10.1 Declaration of the Caliphate 
In early summer 2014, ISIS forces that had consolidated in Syria and capitalised in 
rhetoric on the grievances suffered by Sunnis under the al-Maliki regime swept through 
northern Iraq largely unopposed by government troops and seized Mosul relatively quickly.469  
 
469 Prior to seizing Mosul, IS forces captured Fallujah in January 2014, the site of extensive battles fought 
between insurgents and U.S. forces in 2004.  Gaining the city had become a key point for the U.S. in the turning 
157 
 
This occurred in part because Iraqi government troops had abandoned the city after learning 
about the ISIS advance, and because “ISI(S) had already won the support of the local Sunnis 
who joined the fight, this time on the side of ISI(S).”470  Upon entering Mosul, ISIS militant 
seized $US 429 million from the city’s bank, commensurate with the group’s strategic 
calculus to gain control of resources necessary to sustain state-like operations.471  On June 29th 
2014, ISIS spokesman al-Adnani released an audio message in which he announced that the 
group had decided to declare an Islamic caliphate, and that Abu Bakr-al Baghdadi had been 
chosen to be its caliph.472  He further emphasised that this decision had been deliberated on by 
a shura council of experts, and that all legal sharia requirements had been met to ensure 
legitimacy of rule and the validity of the declaration.473  By declaring a caliphate, ISIS 
proclaimed that it embodied the resurgence of the institution which had been absent in the 
Middle East since Turkish President Kemal Ataturk abolished it in 1924, and which in popular 
jihadist memory had served as the idyllic lost sacred canopy of Islam.474/475  In addition to the 
declaration of a caliphate, al-Adnani stated that the name ISIS would be abolished in favour of 
the designation “Islamic State” (IS), indicating that the group did not perceive itself as being 
constrained to the territory of Iraq and Syria and that it remained committed to its objective of 
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sovereignty beyond the confines of nation state borders dictated by the agreement of Sykes-
Picot.476 
In his message, al-Adnani utilised compelling and vivid imagery to rally the global 
Muslim community around shared grievances which revolved around the longstanding 
Islamist and jihadist platforms of a return to dignity, but he emphasised IS methodology and 
violence.  He began his message by stating "The time has come for those generations that were 
drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by 
the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come 
for them to rise. The time has come for the ummah of Muhammad...to wake up from its sleep, 
remove the garments of dishonour, and shake off the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for the 
era of lamenting and moaning has gone, and the dawn of honour has emerged anew. The sun 
of jihad has risen. The glad tidings of good are shining. Triumph looms on the horizon. The 
signs of victory have appeared."477  While this message was certainly couched in jihadist 
language, and appropriated the contextual opportunities afforded by the wars in Iraq and Syria, 
the grievances that al-Adnani referred to evoked the ambitions articulated by previous 
generations of Islamists and jihadists.  In this appropriation and by declaring a caliphate as the 
pinnacle achievement of jihad, IS also summarily nullified the legitimacy and validity of all 
jihadist organisations such as al-Qaeda, as well as its regional affiliates such as JN engaged in 
nationalistic struggles.478  This message further undercut the authority of competing jihadist 
organisations in that al-Adnani stressed the fact that due to the rightful office of the caliph, all 
Muslims must swear fealty to al-Baghdadi or be in violation of one of the communal and 
individual obligations of the religion.479  Just as previous Islamists had argued that only a 
return to Islamic belief reflected in practice could salvage the umma from living in a state of 
subjugation, so al-Adnani stipulated that fealty to the caliphate had become a forgotten 
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obligation, and the only way for the umma to return to dignity was the recognition of IS 
caliphal authority.  
Al-Adnani’s framing is poignant in that it reflected the language and worldview 
offered by Naji, but it also capitalised on classical Islamic guidance for the swearing of fealty 
which simultaneously would serve as a communal act of association meant to strengthen intra-
group bonds of demonstrative loyalty as was explored in Chapter 2.480 
Al-Adnani’s message continued to outline what IS considered markers of apostasy, 
which included democracy, secularism, and nationalism.  By enumerating these acts of 
apostasy, IS leadership made clear where the boundaries of group membership lay, and 
remained true to its ideological premise which stated that democratic institutions constituted 
modern polytheism and thus abiding by them represented fundamental disbelief.481  By linking 
the prevalence of democratic institutions to sinful behaviour which had caused the umma to 
suffer at the hands of foreign and corrupt powers, IS capitalised further on the rampant 
disaffection with both the al-Maliki regime in Iraq and corrupt democratic regimes in the 
Middle East that had birthed the Arab Spring.  The answer to this apostasy and corruption lay 
not in peaceful demonstration and theoretical demands for social justice, but through the 
violent establishment of legitimate Islamic governance in the form of a caliphate.  Throughout 
his message, al-Adnani utilised violent imagery, demonstrating the premise articulated in 
Chapter 3 that ideological worldviews forged through the conduct of violence will 
increasingly regard it as central to their foundation, existence, and longevity.  He stated: “'We 
spilled rivers of our blood to water the seeds of the caliphate, laid its foundation with our 
skulls, and built its tower over our corpses. We were patient for years in the face of being 
killed, imprisoned, having our bones broken and our limbs severed. We drank all sorts of 
bitterness, dreaming of this day. Would we delay it for even a moment after having reached 
it?' And say to them, we took it forcibly at the point of a blade. We brought it back conquered 
and compelled. We established it in defiance of many. And the people’s necks were violently 
struck, with bombings, explosions, and destruction...Our caliphate has indeed returned with 
certainty...”.482  Further, regarding any individual who did not accept the caliphate, or its 
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legitimacy to rule, al-Adnani declared “The Mujahideen Must Rally Around The Caliphate, 
And If Anyone Refuses, "Split His Head With Bullets And Empty Its Insides, Whoever He 
May Be...”.483 
Days after the release of al-Adnani’s message declaring a caliphate, al-Baghdadi 
delivered a sermon to assembled Sunnis at a Mosul mosque.  In his speech, he reiterated 
sentiments articulated by al-Adnani by stating that the establishment of justice through sharia 
was a communal imperative, and that God favoured IS in allowing it to establish the caliphate 
in order for religion to be properly in place.484  Furthermore, al-Baghdadi also tapped into 
Arab Spring disaffections by declaring that he would not treat his subjects as previous rulers 
had done, and that the umma should only follow him so long as he followed God’s commands.  
Perhaps the most enlightening information about the IS caliphate in its declaration can 
be gleaned from its Creed and Path, a compilation of statements released by the group which 
outlined its fundamental ideological orientation.  These did not focus on dismantling Western 
power structures, but rather on reinstating Islamic purity as the means to realise an immediate 
social utopia.  In nineteen distinct enumerations, IS articulated the grounds on which 
individuals should be considered believers or apostates, and reiterated its position that 
according to prophetic methodology, unbelievers were legitimate targets for violence and 
death.485  Furthermore, the Creed and Path portrayed IS as a unifier, predicated on the 
common acknowledgement of tawhid in that the group stated it embodied the middle ground 
between extremism and laxity, and proposed that in common embrace of tawhid the group 
could enjoin individuals from different races, nationalities and backgrounds, much as 
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10.2 Purge of Takfir Extremists 
Just as social groups, and emerging polities as revolutionary social groups must 
enforce ideological uniformity in order to survive in a competitive social space, so IS 
conducted an internal campaign designed to ensure the proper conceptualisation and utility of 
takfir within its ranks in the months preceding and immediately following the declaration of 
the caliphate.  This campaign had its roots in the teachings of Ahmad ibn ‘Umar al-Hazimi, a 
Saudi scholar who travelled to Tunisia during the Arab Spring and preached there in the wake 
of the revolts regarding a doctrine he called takfir al-‘adhir; excommunication of the 
excuser.487  In this doctrine, al-Hazimi sought to cleanse the Islamic community by 
eliminating not only those who engaged in acts of disbelief, but also those who failed to 
excommunicate those who did.488  According to this doctrine, otherwise devout Muslims who 
did not declare takfir on individuals who sinned by engaging in behaviour such as 
participating in elections, were themselves apostate and could be excommunicated and 
targeted with violence.  While al-Hazimi was not affiliated with IS, it is important to note that 
he preached a doctrine of takfir in Tunisia that equated democratic institutional participation, 
among other things, with disbelief and therefore capitalised on the grievances in that country, 
the hotbed of the Arab Spring, which were explored in the previous chapter.489   
This viewpoint gained endorsement within segments of IS leadership, most notably by 
Tunisian Abu Ja‘far al-Hattab, an early Sharia Committee member who enjoyed popular 
support among the ranks.490  Another member of the committee, however, Bahraini Turki al-
Bin‘ali, argued that takfir al-‘adhir was a sinful innovation, and that its application would lead 
to the majority of the world’s Muslim population being classified as disbelievers.  Further he 
argued, its use would result in takfir in infinite regress, or an endless chain of takfir, and that 
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this would detract from the ability of IS to portray itself as a middle ground caliphate and 
attract recruits.491  
An IS document dated November 14 2015 described the efforts undertaken by the 
group in 2014, and revealed that those who embraced the teachings of al-Hazimi and al-Hattab 
were perceived as dangerous extremists by IS leadership.492  These extremists had gone so far 
as to declare takfir on IS leaders due to their failure to excommunicate al-Zawahiri.493  IS 
leadership arrested and interrogated over 100 suspected extremists, and executed 
approximately 70 of them, including al-Hattab, while the remainder managed to flee to 
Turkey.494  While IS did not publicly make reference to the takfir purge while it announced the 
caliphate, in late summer 2014 its General Committee released a statement which outlawed the 
discussion of issues related to takfir al-‘adhir, and continued to monitor, arrest, and execute 
extremists who had formed cells in the wake of the large scale purge and were perceived as an 
imminent internal threat to caliphal authority, stability, and legitimacy.495  
The purge of extremists should not be interpreted as an effort on behalf of IS to temper 
violence within its ranks, rather it should be viewed in the context of social group dynamics in 
which a group’s worldview was crystallising into a self-identifying sovereign entity.  In order 
to maximise its potential and ensure its success, violence was directed inward on the group to 
cleanse itself of those who did not adhere to specific parameters pertaining to takfir, the 
primary ideological tool leveraged by the group in defining its identity and therefore by 
default its relationship with ‘the other’.   
 
10.3 Jihadist and International Responses to the Caliphate 
The announcement of the IS caliphate resounded around the world and within the 
jihadisphere.  Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a Doha-based cleric who had endorsed physical and 
financial support of terrorism as well as suicide bombings, and who had gained renown for 
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holding various prominent positions within Islamic organisations such as the European 
Council for Fatwa Research, denounced the IS caliphate and stated that it’s announcement 
violated Islamic law, and endangered the future of Iraq’s Sunni population.496  On July 1st, 
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi posted a lengthy statement on his website in which he called the 
IS caliphate illegitimate and deviant.497  While he acknowledged that the return of the 
caliphate and elimination of artificial borders remained paramount in jihadist aspirations, he 
argued that IS had rushed to do so and that the decision had not been adequately based on 
popular consensus.  He also articulated the opinion that extremism in takfir and the brutality 
exhibited by the group would have disastrous consequences for young aspiring jihadists and 
that it would detract from the mujahidin’s ability to maintain the unity necessary for a 
successful caliphate.498  Finally, al-Maqdisi argued that IS insistence on the pledge of fealty to 
al-Baghdadi would result in a population more driven by fear than the desire to achieve 
Islamic prosperity.499       
Al-Qaeda leadership also reacted to the declaration of the IS caliphate, but instead of 
simply writing refutations, al-Zawahiri released a 2001 video of Bin Laden in which the latter 
recognised Taliban leader Mullah Omar as commander of the faithful.500  By naming Omar as 
a pre-existing counter caliph to al-Baghdadi, al-Qaeda sought to undermine the ideological 
validity of IS and promote itself as the true adherent to the correct methodology for 
establishing an Islamic emirate.  In retaliation, numerous IS supporters dismissed these claims, 
stating that Omar was ineligible for the role of caliph due to the fact he was not of Quraysh 
descent, had participated in the United Nations, and did not espouse correct salafi ideology.  
Furthermore, these assertions held central the fact that the Taliban did not enjoy territorial 
sovereignty as did IS, a key component of caliphal authority.501 
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In September 2014, an open letter was addressed to al-Baghdadi from internationally 
renowned Muslim scholars.  This letter focused on the core claims of IS, and refuted their 
legitimacy according to scriptural law.502  The letter claimed that allegiance to one’s nation of 
origin was in fact permissible in Islam, that in considering legal rulings contemporary 
circumstances must be acknowledged, the reintroduction of slavery was illegal, there was no 
requirement to emigrate to the caliphate following the death of the prophet, and the violent 
atrocities engaged in by IS were all strictly forbidden under Islamic law.  Finally, the letter 
devoted significant attention to refuting IS conceptualisations of takfir, stating that individual 
belief must be accepted at face value without testing that faith.  It clarified that only intent and 
deeds combined could nullify faith according to prophetic teachings, and that killing 
individuals due to perceived disbelief was forbidden under Islamic law, and a heinous 
crime.503  Furthermore, the letter demonstrated cognisant knowledge of the methodology used 
by IS to declare takfir, as well as the different viewpoints within IS regarding the matter, and 
stated unequivocally that “it is forbidden to declare people who do not doubt the disbelief of 
others, or refuse to declare them non-Muslim, as non-Muslim.”504 
Roughly a month after the declaration of the IS caliphate, on August 9th 2014, a U.S. 
led coalition began conducting airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq.  In September, the U.S. 
House of Representatives voted in favour of giving the American military authority to train 
and fund Syrian Rebels to combat IS, and the U.S. led coalition began airstrikes on IS targets 
in Syria.505  During remarks in September 2014, U.S. President Obama vowed that the U.S. 
would take all steps necessary to dismantle the IS “network of death”.506  Kurdish forces were 
also among the first to join U.S. efforts in the military struggle against IS, and joined the fight 
in August 2014.   
 
10.4 IS Governance, Brutality, and Sophistication 
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Following the announcement of the caliphate, IS embarked on a mission to remain in 
power and expand in influence.  In July 2014 the group seized control of Syria’s largest oil 
field, al-Omar, as well as others, and set up refineries to produce raw oil and sell it illegally 
well below market price.507  This was not an isolated venture, as IS demonstrated its state like 
intentions alongside its brutal and extortionist tactics insofar as it gained control of up to 40 
percent of Iraq’s annual production of wheat, as well as major flour mills and grain silos in 
that country.508  IS was subsequently able to utilise these resources as commodities; delivering 
them beneficently to Sunni populations that supported it while withholding them from those it 
considered enemies.   
In areas that IS gained control of, the organisation demonstrated its penchant for 
violence against those deemed ‘other’.  Shortly after the declaration of the caliphate, 53 
individuals were brutally executed in the mostly Shiite village of Khamissiya, Iraq.509  In 
August 2014, IS fighters demanded that the Yazidi population of Kocho in northern Iraq 
convert to Islam or be put to death, and in eastern Syria 700 tribesmen were executed in 
retaliation for plotting an uprising against IS.510  That same month, IS seized Sinjar in Iraq 
near the Syrian border, and in the course of capturing the town killed 5,000 people and sold 
thousands of women into slavery.511  The decision to sell women into slavery certainly 
corresponded with the preference for brutality exhibited by the group and also served to 
further enhance the group’s economic position.  Notwithstanding, IS leaders justified their 
decisions with literalist interpretations of Sharia law which allowed for the selling of women 
seized in the abode of war who were sinners due to original disbelief.  In this case, disbelief 
was defined as opposition to the IS worldview, yet it was framed in such a way that equated 
the actions of the organisation with the methodology used in the times of Muhammad, and 
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thus due to Islam’s universal applicability could and should be considered beyond reproach.512  
Furthermore, in justifying their actions pertaining to slavery and mass murder, IS leaders 
demonstrated familiarity with current and historical scholarly debates regarding the 
permissibility of their actions, and thus presented their calculus in a rational and theological 
manner.513     
In these same areas, IS also demonstrated its adherence to the outlines set by Naji in 
that the group continued to lay the foundational groundwork for a state like entity in the 
provision of food, electrical services, and medical care, among others.  It also overhauled 
educational institutions in the abolition of subjects such as science and history, and 
emphasised the strict worldview of IS.514  These services, in turn, came with the 
acknowledgement of the IS Creed and Path, and behaviour that the group considered sinful.  
Public execution and torture were commonplace punishments for those deemed noncompliant, 
and many of these sentences were carried out on live streaming media and broadcast 
globally.515  
IS organisation was instrumental in coalescing its brutality and worldview into a state 
like entity, and distinguished it from groups like al-Qaeda and JN, as well as previous Islamist 
and jihadist organisations.  In a condensed hierarchical organisational structure, the caliph had 
two deputies; one for territories in Iraq and the other for territories in Syria.516  Under these 
deputies, were 24 provincial governors; 12 each for Iraq and Syria.  Al-Baghdadi also had a 
cabinet of advisors, each responsible for overseeing and reporting directly to the caliph on 
specific sectors of the organisation, as one would expect in a typical government 
bureaucracy.517  The organisation also had numerous oversight committees charged with 
managing affairs, and it is in these committees that the state-like nature of IS in its inception is 
 
512 This conceptual orientation is commensurate with the power of religious framing in social groups that was 
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best demonstrated.  Among the committees were the financial council charged with selling and 
procuring weapons and resources, the military council charged with establishing IS strategic 
plans, the leadership council charged with drafting law and policy, the security council 
charged with law enforcement, the intelligence council charged with gathering information on 
IS enemies, and the media council responsible for social and traditional media.518  Finally, the 
shura council existed independently and reported directly to al-Baghdadi.  This council was 
responsible for ensuring that all other councils, governors and deputies were properly adhering 
to the group’s vision of Islamic law, and it had the ability to remove the caliph.519  In many 
instances, local IS officials who were found to be in violation of the Creed and Path or the 
group’s vision of Islamic law were simply ‘disappeared’, demonstrating that those within the 
organisation were just as vulnerable to the group’s brutality as those outside it.520 
IS also employed elite troop units alongside its rank and file members.  New recruits 
were thoroughly indoctrinated, and existing troops engaged in continuing religious education 
where they were provided the manifesto by Naji, along with extracts from religious texts 
which emphasised violent proselytization of Islam.521  Alongside these, IS apologists such as 
al-Bin‘ali wrote handbooks for recruits to study which emphasised the achievement of 
narrowly defined tawhid through the deliberate application of IS methodology.  These 
handbooks included reiterations of the Creed and Path, and explored in detail nullifiers of the 
faith, grounds on which individuals and communities should be declared apostate, and the 
theological justifications for using violence to protect the umma from these apostates.522  The 
intensity of indoctrination depended on the perceived level of faith and commitment of a 
potential recruit.  By instructing recruits in this type of takfiri ideology, IS was able to clearly 
delimit the social boundaries of its redefined umma and simultaneously affirm the 
commitment of those who sought to join its ranks.  
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The complexity of the violence and statecraft employed by IS and its rapid expanse 
leading to and following the declaration of the caliphate represented a monumental shift in the 
Western led global war on terror, as the group seemed more determined to purify communities 
through violence to achieve sovereignty than on causing the immediate downfall of corrupt 
regimes or the United States.  In August 2014, U.S. Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel stated 
that “They’re beyond just a terrorist group.  They marry ideology, a sophistication of strategic 
and tactical military prowess.”523  General John Allen, the U.S. special envoy for countering 
the Islamic State observed that “We’re not just fighting a force, you know, we’re fighting an 
idea”.524  These were not understatements, as by the end of  2014 IS controlled roughly one 
third of Iraq’s territory and one third of Syria’s territory, an area roughly the size of Britain, 
and approximately nine million people lived under IS rule.525  
 
10.5 IS Self-Portrayal 
One of the primary ways IS distinguished itself from other jihadist organisations was 
its proficient use of multi-language media.  While Bin Laden had founded a media 
organisation in London in the 1990s which was dedicated to mobilising financial support for 
jihadist campaigns of liberation526, and al-Qaeda continued to publish its Inspire magazine527, 
IS began releasing issues of its magazine Dabiq immediately following the declaration of the 
caliphate.  In this magazine we are able to glean a great deal about how the group viewed 
itself, what it aspired to, and how it reacted to external events.  The name itself reflected the 
group’s eschatological worldview in that Dabiq was a town in Syria that featured prominently 
in Islamic end-times prophecies as the location where the Mahdi would return to bring victory 
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to the righteous over those who oppose Sharia.528  In November 2014, IS militants executed 
former U.S. Army Ranger and aid worker Peter Kassig, and chose to do so in Dabiq and 
broadcast a video message to the American government: “Here we are, burying the first 
American crusader in Dabiq, eagerly awaiting for the remainder of your armies to 
arrive”.529/530  This millenarian parallel that IS viewed itself as enacting reflected portions of 
hadith literature in which the last hour would come once the Romans were assembled at 
Dabiq.  In the hadith of Sahih Muslim, Muhammad was reported to have said: “The Last Hour 
would not come until the Romans would land at al-A'maq or in Dabiq. An army consisting of 
the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth at that time will come from Medina (to counteract 
them). (…) When the enemy of Allah would see him, it would (disappear) just as the salt 
dissolves itself in water and if he (Jesus) were not to confront them at all, even then it would 
dissolve completely, but Allah would kill them by his hand and he would show them their 
blood on his lance (the lance of Jesus Christ).”531  In IS interpretation, it was fulfilling this 
prophecy by using the execution of Kassig to lure the armies of the West, the modern day 
Romans, to the location at which the umma would prevail over its enemies. 
As a periodical publication, Dabiq focused on issues of tawhid, manhaj (the seeking of 
truth), hijrah (the mandatory migration of Muslims to the caliphate), jihad, and jama’ah 
(community).  It utilised romantic prose to illustrate a glorious Islamic past and link IS actions 
to it, in order to portray the group as part of the inevitable continuum of Islamic prosperity and 
superiority.532  In the first edition of the magazine, an extensive article was devoted to the fact 
that with the declaration of the caliphate, the world had been divided into two camps; that of 
faith and that of disbelief.  Due to the legitimacy of the caliphate, Muslims from around the 
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world were required to emigrate to the caliphate to demonstrate their loyalty to the righteous 
camp and participate in its victory.533  This seemingly simple division underlay the Manichean 
potency of religious worldviews, and also served to potentially identify friends and enemies in 
a social group context insofar as emigration could be considered a test of loyalty and group 
affiliation.  In this regard, IS continued its rhetoric which sought to de-legitimise the construct 
of states, proclaiming that Muslims should emigrate to caliphate territory because it 
represented Islam and its future; and that “Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the 
Iraqis”.534   Furthermore, IS emphasised Islam’s universality by stating that the caliphate had 
attracted soldiers from nations as diverse as France, Australia, China and India who had all 
chosen to abandon their polytheistic societies to recognise the truth inherent in the message 
and legitimacy of IS.535  Naji’s legacy was also strong in the debut edition in that its editors 
stressed the services provided by IS in areas it had conquered, and emphasised the group’s 
superiority in providing them over nation states.  Brutality was also highlighted in that graphic 
images of deceased enemies were prominently displayed in the edition’s pages, as were photos 
of innocent Muslims that had been killed by Syrian or coalition air strikes.536  A final poignant 
point about the first edition of Dabiq is that its editors devoted two pages to prominent 
Western thinkers, who had acknowledged that IS had carved a de-facto state amidst the chaos 
of the Syrian civil war.  Among these was Brian Fishman, former Director of Research for the 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, whose editorial work has been referenced 
numerous times throughout this thesis.537  By including this section entitled “In the Words of 
the Enemy”, IS sought to further validate its position as a sovereign entity and demonstrated 
the ability to comprehend the paradigms being articulated by its opposition that would form 
the foundations of strategic and diplomatic policies designed to weaken and eliminate it. 
The second edition of Dabiq included a lengthy reappraisal of the story of Noah’s Ark.  
In recitations, Muhammad had recast the story of the ark by focusing not on the historical 
account, but on the role of Noah as a warner.  The prophet had stressed the mercy of Allah, 
and stated that He had only sent the flood as a last resort once people had finally rejected Him 
and ignored Noah’s warnings.538  In Dabiq, IS portrayed its caliphate as the ark, and warned of 
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the horrific violence in the ‘flood’ that would follow for those who did not submit to its rule 
and worldview.539  Paradoxically, this article also spoke about the elimination of freedom of 
choice, by equating it with sinful democratic and Western paradigms.  While individuals were 
free to, and must, choose the Islamic State or the flood, there could be no half measures.  
Either outcome would be carried out in its absolute entirety; be it IS worldview in governance 
or absolute destruction.  This reflected not only the Manichean structuring of religious 
worldviews, but the power of religion to articulate itself in ways that enable social control over 
individual manoeuvrability.       
The seventh issue of Dabiq devoted significant attention to a subject that had not been 
featured prominently in previous editions.  In the section “Among the Believers are Men”, IS 
gave eulogies of fighters killed in battle, and included their biographies which highlighted 
their individual piety, dedication to jihad, and above all, their humanity.540  This section is 
poignant because it gave individual faces to IS members killed, and showed them to be brave 
and emotional warriors who had devoted their lives willingly to service and death in the way 
of Allah.  This type of media campaign was important to IS because it attempted to break 
down the Western dehumanisation of those affiliated with terrorist organisations.  In the war 
on terror, the U.S. and its allies eulogised their fallen heroes while they described the enemy 
as a faceless entity, and described casualty counts in bulk numbers by referencing things 
generically such as ‘drone strike kills 150 jihadists’.  This “othering” in a social group context 
served to dehumanise those who nations sought to rally public support against.  By including 
this section in Dabiq, IS both emulated the behaviour of nation stakeholders engaged in 
conflict by honouring its dead, and also showed the human face of those who embraced the IS 
worldview and who fought to ensure it would survive their individual deaths, thereby lending 
a sense of immortality to the IS cause and potentially attracting new recruits.541    
Later in this edition, IS featured a lengthy article entitled “The Extinction of the 
Grayzone”, and it is important for a number of reasons.542  This article reiterated sentiments 
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from the magazine’s first edition which had argued the world had divided into two camps, and 
credited former U.S. President George W. Bush with being correct in his 2001 assertion 
regarding the war on terror that “You’re either with us or against us”.543  In this article IS 
stated that the wars in Iraq and Syria had succeeded in dividing the world into two camps 
plunged into violence, much as Naji had argued was necessary, but that events such as the 
Arab Spring that proposed a peaceful and institutional way to find accommodation between 
Islamic culture and Western style governance had threatened this necessary division.544  The 
wavering of the Islamic community manifest in regional nationalist aspirations displayed by 
groups such as JN, as well as the military setbacks suffered by IS in early 2015 at the hands of 
the U.S. coalition required that the group both repeat its message and expand it to meet current 
challenges.545  In this article, IS repeated its message insofar as it continued to focus on the 
mandatory emigration to the caliphate as a legitimate stakeholder, but stressed that the 
extinction of the grayzone must be violently pursued to both de-moralise opponents and 
convince Muslims of the righteousness of the IS cause.  To illustrate this, the article discussed 
the necessity of killing disbelievers wherever they may be.  To do so, it cited the attack on 
Charlie Hedbo in Paris in January 2015, and argued that attacks such as these were necessary 
to enforce the extinction of neutrality and force the calamitous ultimate confrontation between 
the righteous and the disbelievers.546 
 
10.6 IS Allure 
From mid-2013 to 2015, IS eclipsed al-Qaeda in attracting foreign fighters, suggesting 
that its self-portrayal through the caliphate held a deeper attraction to potential recruits.547  
While IS responded to geopolitical specifics, its declaration of the caliphate represented a 
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continuation of the al-Qaeda, jihadist and Islamist platforms and also transcended them in a 
unique way.  The messages ensconced in Dabiq and the IS worldview appealed to individual 
needs for personal and collective significance, they relied on a narrative that portrayed 
violence as the road to that significance, and in broad distribution they enabled a networking 
process that made that narrative a shared reality.548  
After the declaration of the caliphate, IS strength was estimated at 30,000 troops.549  
Half of all IS foreign fighters arrived in 2015, suggesting that social and traditional media such 
as Dabiq was facilitating, but not primary, insofar as more recruits came from specific areas 
suggesting that pre-existing social networks also had a great impact on potential recruits.550  
Many foreigners that answered the caliphate’s emigration call were from Western nations who 
felt marginalised or at a loss for a sense of identity, and “building a utopian caliphate satisfied 
the need for a valued social identity or personal significance which one has been unable to find 
in his or her current communities.”551  In differentiating motivations among those who joined 
the caliphate, Westerners sought to escape their pasts and find personal validation, whereas 
individuals from Muslim states were more motivated by humiliation and the suffering of 
fellow Muslims under corrupt Middle Eastern regimes and Western states.552  The caliphate 
through is self-portrayal offered the means by which both of these disparate existential needs 
could be satisfied, and the fact that it offered violence as the means to do so gave individuals 
the physical agency they felt had been denied them. 
IS guaranteed individuals eternal group membership and the according benefits, which 
when framed in a transcendent narrative has sociologically proven to be attractive to 
individuals and demographics prone to existential anxiety and feelings of dislocation, 
powerlessness and subjugation.553  Beyond the transcendent appeal, IS successfully exploited 
the socio-political cleavages revealed in the Arab Spring and the crisis of the Middle Eastern 
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nation state, and marketed itself as capable of creating a holistic socio-economic system whose 
prosperity could rival that of the Western liberal democratic state.  In this regard, IS harnessed 
the power of social entativity that was unleashed following the Arab Spring in that it offered a 
means by which a collective could bind together to contest power structures in a turbulent 
vacuum to crystallise a vision of utopian governance.  The agency that IS offered gave 
individuals the ability to collectively pursue self-determination in a manner that was 
subjectively defined by an organisation that eschewed Western parameters for state building, 
and the group further gave individuals recognition for participating in an endeavour that was 
simultaneously worldly and transcendent.  Fundamentally, IS appealed to individuals by 
uncompromisingly declaring that it operated according to a different value system than that 
which had been institutionalised in nation states, and because this was rooted in Islam’s 
universal truth, was superior.  This appeal was strengthened sociologically due to the turmoil 
of war and political instability that created conditions in which violent religious identity 
politics could capitalise on insecurities by offering clear, tangible, safe, and transcendent 
solutions.554 
The attraction of the IS worldview did not limit itself to recruits that flocked to the 
Middle East, in what became the largest mobilisation of foreign fighters in decades.555/556  The 
allure of IS spread internationally to Africa and Asia where local insurgent and terrorist 
organisations pledged fealty to the group instead of al-Qaeda.  This level of attraction can be 
attributed in part to the fact that IS had demonstrated that it had succeeded where al-Qaeda had 
failed, and that its combination of realpolitik governance and uncompromising transcendent 
ideological narrative, combined with its message of universal applicability, could be easily 
inserted into regional conflicts as a vehicle for success.557 
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10.7 IS Setbacks and Re-Orientation 
 As IS attracted recruits on an unprecedented scale, the U.S. led coalition escalated 
efforts to counter the group under the banner of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), which had 
been established in October 2014.558  By March 2015 an estimated 8,500 IS members had 
been killed, and the following month the Iraqi army, with the support of the international 
coalition, recaptured the city of Tikrit from IS.559  Following over a year of silence since 
recognising Mullah Omar as a counter caliph, in September 2015 al-Zawahiri released an 
audio tape in which he accused al-Baghdadi of sedition, and stated that the violent 
methodology of the caliphate and its illegal claims threatened to divide the unity of the 
mujahidin in a such a way that would enable the U.S. to exploit and defeat jihadism.560  In 
December 2015, the U.S. sent 200 troops to Iraq to serve as tactical advisors, and that same 
month assisted the Iraqi army in the recapture of Ramadi.561 
The increasing fervour of OIR was manifest in the fact that by February 2016, 
coalition airstrikes had killed 26,000 IS members, and in April U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry declared that the U.S. was “definitely at war with ISIS”.562  This framing is poignant 
insofar as it built on the legacy of the Bush administration which had cited the necessity of 
pre-emptive self-defence as the means by which to bypass the conditions required to wage war 
ensconced in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.563  In June 2016, the Iraqi Popular 
Mobilisation Forces recaptured Fallujah, and the city was declared “fully liberated”.564  This 
assessment was critical in that Fallujah had been the first city to fall to IS in 2014, and the 
Sunni stronghold was viewed as essential in disrupting IS organisational capacity.565  Only 
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weeks later, in August 2016, IS spokesman al-Adnani, who had released the audio message 
declaring the caliphate and proclaiming its legitimacy and sovereignty, was killed in an 
airstrike in Aleppo, Syria.566  In December 2016, President Obama authorised deploying an 
additional 4,200 U.S. service members to Iraq, and it was estimated that 50,000 IS fighters had 
been killed by the coalition that had conducted airstrikes against 31,900 IS targets.567  
Coalition military victories were lauded in the U.S. political realm.  In May 2016, 
Justin Siberell, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism testified before the US Congressional 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, and he stated that significant progress had been made in 
reducing the territorial footprint of the caliphate, and that the coalition had succeeded in 
severely limiting IS access to and finances.  He further argued that empowering multi-national 
cooperation as well as community leaders, and the increased tightening of border and travel 
monitoring had reduced the ability of IS to gain new recruits in the conflict zone.  Mr. Siberell 
stated that although these measures were in their developmental stages, they should form the 
foundation of future policies aimed at defeating IS, and that in conjunction with successful 
military ventures like those carried out under OIR, had great potential for ultimately defeating 
IS.568  
Faced with these territorial, financial, and human losses, IS was forced to re-evaluate 
its narrative as well as its existence.  Dabiq ceased being published in 2016, and in its place IS 
began releasing periodic editions of Rumiyah.  This shift occurred in part because the town 
itself of Dabiq was lost to coalition forces in the summer of 2016, and in Rumiyah IS began 
preparing its followers for a post-caliphal future that seemed imminent.569  In Rumiyah, IS re-
orientation was demonstrated insofar as the title itself referenced the new Rome, or the West, 
as the emphasis of the group looking to the future.  In its editions, IS promoted engaging in 
battles in Africa, Asia, and attacks in the West, and it included instruction manuals for aspiring 
terrorists regarding methodology for carrying out devastating attacks in metropolitan centres 
in the West.570  Furthermore, those who carried out attacks were immortalised within the pages 
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of the periodical in that their names and eulogies were highlighted, demonstrating again the 
group’s devotion to the fulfilment of human validation in the search for meaning through 
violent jihadism that had begun in Dabiq.   
In the editions of Rumiyah, IS sought to reiterate its legitimacy despite the withering 
losses suffered at the hands of the coalition, and enforce loyalty to the group.  In the seventh 
edition, the group declared that any who strayed from IS affiliation to include family members 
and breakaway jihadist organisations were to be declared apostate and marked for death.  
Furthermore, the group re-affirmed the fact that this loyalty was owed because IS had 
succeeded in establishing a caliphate where all others had failed, and that steadfastly abiding 
by a true cause was more important than possessing a large army.571 
IS portrayed the coalition as intent on destroying Muslim identity, but remained 
staunch in its commitment to the ideals promulgated with the declaration of the caliphate.  In 
the ninth edition of Rumiyah, IS affirmed that a generation had been raised on the doctrine of 
takfir, and that by nurturing this generation and the jihadist family nucleus, memory of the 
caliphate would take its place in the transcendent Islamic narrative that future mujahidin 
would rally to revive.572   
Perhaps the most interesting re-orientation revealed in Rumiyah was expressed in the 
twelfth edition.  Here, IS apologists explained that perhaps the end state that was once centred 
on the caliphate in the Levant was unsustainable.  Instead, they posited that the caliphate in 
spirit was more ephemeral in time and place, and may actually be destined to take root 
elsewhere in the world where circumstances allow.  The argument continued to state that one 
of the primary objectives of the coalition was to demonstrate to the world that military 
victories could successfully eradicate IS, but countered by stating that the group had 
demonstrated its malleability and ability to endure catastrophic losses.  Additionally, IS 
affirmed its commitment to continue to engage in both conventional and guerrilla military 
tactics to ensure ultimate success, and because the world had heard the legitimate call of the 
caliphate, all who refused its message should be considered either apostates or enemies, and 
killed wherever they may be.573 
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10.8 Internal Schism on Takfir 
While IS was reorienting its narrative and self-portrayal to the public, it was grappling 
internall with ideological cohesion and attempting to explain the reasons that the group had 
failed to hold the territory it felt it had claimed by Divine grace.  In February 2016, al-Bin‘ali, 
as head of IS Office of Research and Studies composed a letter to the group’s Delegated 
Committee in which he stated that the problem of extremism he had helped eradicate in 2014 
had arisen anew.  He outlined the new emergence by identifying new extremist leaders as 
primarily Saudis, and explained that the issue they proposed was that takfir should be 
considered part of the ‘foundation of the religion’, as opposed to simply one of its 
requirements.574  This conceptualisation meant that if takfir were considered foundational, 
then individuals could not abstain from proclaiming it or they would themselves fall into 
disbelief.  Furthermore, individuals who did not agree with this assertion of takfir as 
foundational would similarly be declared apostate and marked for death.  This framing, al-
Bin‘ali argued, was simply takfir al-‘adhir stated another way.575     
Instead of agreeing with al-Bin‘ali, many senior figures within IS held the view that 
excessive restraint and moderation in takfir were to blame for the group’s shortcomings.  A 
special committee was formed in February 2016 to investigate doctrinal uniformity and its 
effects on group unity, and found that extremism in takfir within IS existed, but only in 
response to what was perceived as excessive laxity within the organisation’s senior ranks.  The 
committee was led by Abu Muhammad al-Furqan and staffed by his close personal associates, 
including Abu Sulayman al-Shami and Abu Khabbab al-Masri.576  Al-Bin‘ali was interrogated 
by the committee, and his views on takfir were assessed as being ‘inadequate’.577  
Furthermore, in May 2016 the committee released its findings in which it condemned all those 
who hesitated to excommunicate polytheists, but strove to embody the caliphate’s stance as a 
middle ground.  The committee was equivocal on whether takfir was part of the foundation of 
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the religion, as advocated by extremists, or was simply a requirement of the religion, as 
moderates such as al-Bin‘ali had argued. 
Still in May 2016, al-Adnani circulated a message to IS leadership before he was killed 
later that year as recounted above.  In it, he posited that territorial defeats were the means by 
which God had chosen to test the faith and resolve of IS, and argued that more physical 
hardships were sure to come.  This conclusion was reached logically by al-Adnani in that in 
2014 he had made a statement upon the declaration of the caliphate in which he had said:  “if 
this state be a state of Kharijites, then break its back, kill its leaders, bring down its flag, and 
guide its soldiers to the truth. O God, and if it be a state of Islam, ruling by Your book and the 
practice of Your prophet and waging jihad against your enemies, then fortify it, empower it, 
make it victorious, establish it in the land, and make it a caliphate on the prophetic 
methodology”.578  Under this pretence there could be only two explanations for the loss of the 
caliphate; either the group as a whole had erred in its quest for statehood through violent jihad, 
or IS leaders had acted in a way not befitting God’s will and the group was being punished as 
a result.   
After al-Adnani’s death, his successor, Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir released a statement 
in April 2017 which echoed the former’s sentiments by stating that  “If we are dispossessed of 
a city or an area or a village, this is only the testing and trying of the Muslim community, in 
order that the ranks may be purified and the filth expunged.”579  In this framing, al-Muhajir 
argued that through trials and tribulations, IS was being punished for failing to properly 
uphold God’s will and that to regain favour it needed to rid itself of elements which had 
caused it to stray.  This behaviour is commensurate with social group tendencies to tighten 
ranks and re-affirm delineating borders when faced with an existential threat as was narrated 
in Chapter 2.  It is also in keeping with the inward turn and professed need to purify the group 
to compensate for communal suffering at the hands of foreign aggressors that gained 
prominence during defensive modernisation and the rise of political Islam.  Although this 
proposition gained substantial traction within IS, many individuals asserted that it was not God 
who was punishing the group, but that the group had failed to maintain territorial integrity due 
to theological and methodological errors on behalf of senior leadership, most of which 
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revolved exclusively around issues of who to include within the chosen sect of the new umma 
by means of takfir.580  The extremist position on this issue incorporated the legacy of takfir al-
‘adhir and maintained that the misfortunes befalling IS had occurred due to excessive laxity 
on behalf of group leaders, and some went so far as to apply takfir to IS leaders and prominent 
figures such as al-Bin‘ali due to their perceived moderation.581   
Although the special committee had attempted to find a middle ground to preserve 
group cohesion when confronted with conflicting factions in the wake of territorial defeats, 
these efforts were short-lived in that al-Furqan, al-Shami and al-Masri were all killed in 
coalition drone strikes in late 2016 and early 2017.582  In response to these deaths, al-Bin‘ali 
wrote a letter to al-Baghdadi in January 2017 in which he warned the caliph against 
empowering extremists by appointing them to newly vacant positions in order to placate 
unrest.583  Despite these warnings, in early 2017 a young Saudi named Abu Hafs al-Wad‘ani 
was appointed to head the Delegated Committee to commence a reinvestigation of ideological 
uniformity among IS leadership to ensure group longevity despite tribulations.  Al-Wad‘ani 
made it clear in his appointment that he considered takfir to be part of the foundation of the 
religion and thus sided with the extremist faction within IS and sought to ensure that this 
would become the organisation’s official position.584   
In the course of the investigation to determine official ideological posture, the 
Delegated Committee was charged with answering the pivotal question of whether a Muslim 
who was not individually guilty of heresy, but who did not denounce those who were, in fact a 
heretic.  The attention given to this question demonstrates for posterity the emphasis the group 
placed on being a middle ground, accessible to all under conditions of ideological conformity, 
which sought to identify the most theologically and tactically sound way to exist between 
excessive extremity in takfir and its dangerous postponement.  Solving this question revolved 
partially around conceptualisations of WB and whether these were being correctly applied to 
groups and individuals tentatively deemed ‘other’.585  On this issue, IS was divided.  The 
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mainstream camp argued that those who refrained from proclaiming takfir on other heretics 
were not to be considered apostate if not found to be in violation of a nullifier of the faith, 
while the extremist faction disagreed.586   
In April 2017 al-Baghdadi gave the Delegated Committee caliphal authority to 
establish ideological uniformity within IS, and in May 2017 the latter released a seven-page 
memo.  In the memo, the Delegated Committee stated that tawhid that encompassed 
governance and social justice had been defined during the period of the rightly guided caliphs, 
but had fallen into obscurity, only to have its hope reinvigorated by jihadist Wahhabism in 
Saudi Arabia.587  It went on to argue that IS had been created to establish rightly guided rule 
on the prophetic methodology, and that discord between postponers (moderates) and 
extremists threatened the unity required of the umma.  It also clarified that extremists had 
strayed from the religion insofar as they accused IS members of apostasy, and that this 
betrayed the fundamental obligation of the Sunnah to demonstrate unquestioning obedience to 
the group and its appointed rulers.588  Finally, on the issue of takfir, the Delegated Committee 
memo reversed the stance previously taken by the Special Committee, and stated that it 
“regards the issue to be one of the clear principles of the religion, which must be known (to a 
Muslim) even before he knows (the rules) of prayer and other religious obligations”.589  By 
taking this position and declaring takfir to be foundational in Islam, not one of its 
requirements, the Delegated Committee demonstrated its propensity to act in accordance with 
social group dynamics insofar as by siding with extremist factions it sought to make even 
more stringent the parameters of group inclusion, and make more deliberately obvious the 
required acts of performative association that would ensure safety within the group.590 
On May 19th, al-Bin‘ali wrote a scathing critique to the Delegated Committee in which 
he accused the latter of relying on weak hadith references to formulate conclusions, noted that 
the memo was unprofessional in that it contained numerous grammatical errors, and finally 
that it had erred insofar as it sided with extremists and therefore threatened to plunge IS into 
an endless spiral of takfir.  On this final matter, al-Bin‘ali lamented that the Delegated 
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Committee’s memo had implied that all Muslims who lived outside the caliphate, in dar al-
kufr, were to be considered apostates and thus marked for death, and he included numerous 
previous speeches by IS leaders which contradicted this position.591  On May 31st, al-Bin‘ali 
was killed in a coalition airstrike along with others who supported his critical stance.592  Due 
to the fact that many of these supporters were imprisoned for their criticisms at the time of 
their deaths, rumours circulated that their locations had been leaked to the coalition in order to 
eliminate opposition.593  A final subtle point of observation is that al-Bin‘ali, who had been 
one of the most vocal and recognised IS apologists, was not eulogised by the group that had 
devoted such attention to immortalising its heroes.  Furthermore, his portrayal as an evil 
individual who condoned massacres and the slavery of women was highlighted in Western 
accounts of his death, and as such it was considered a great victory for the coalition in the war 
on terror.594  The foregoing is not intended to condone his brutality, rather it is meant to 
highlight the fact that his opposition to theological trends within IS that had the capacity to 
fuel increasing socio-political violence were not understood at the time of his death, nor was 
the potential for the strategic use in countering violent extremism of the increasing internal 
methodological and ideological cleavages he represented. 
Al-Bin‘ali had not been alone in criticising the Delegated Committee.  Notably, in July 
2017, Abu Muhammad al-Husseini al-Hashimi, who had sworn allegiance to IS in 2006 when 
the Islamic State of Iraq was formed, wrote a letter to al-Baghdadi in which he referred to the 
latter as the ‘emir of the Islamic State’, underlying the fact that he no longer believed al-
Baghdadi to be the rightful ruler over Muslims or a caliphate.595  He criticised IS leaders for 
not eulogising al-Bin‘ali, and argued that the elimination of opposition within the group 
resembled the Mu‘tazilite inquisition of the 9th century.596  In August 2017, another man, Abu 
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Abd al-Malek al-Shami wrote a refutation of the Delegated Committee’s memo in which he 
stated that its conceptualisation of takfir meant extremists had come to dominate IS, and 
scholars of Islam and the utility of takfir in forging a prosperous umma had been marginalised, 
persecuted, and killed.597  In this letter, al-Shami portrayed al-Baghdadi as a distant figure who 
relied excessively on individuals without sufficient knowledge of Islam, and urged him to 
oppose extremist tendencies within IS.  Furthermore, he criticised the organisation for 
mismanagement of funds, accused it of engaging in deceptive media campaigns which did not 
rely on scriptural mandates of applicability, and asserted that foreigners were gaining too 
much influence within the critical mass of the group.598        
Dissent within IS led al-Baghdadi to dissolve the Delegated Committee and 
reconstitute it with new members, and on September 15 2017 it released a statement which 
withdrew the seven-page memo on takfir and urged IS members to ‘return to the truth’.599  The 
members of the committee that had released the memo in May 2017 were imprisoned, and 
later fled IS, and al-Wad‘ani urged al-Baghdadi to reconsider his position due to the rapidly 
deteriorating circumstances facing IS.  He urged the caliph to repent and rectify his September 
decisions in order to rally fighter support anew, but he was eventually captured and executed 
on charges of being a ‘Kharijite’.600  Following the withdrawal of the takfir memo, Jordanian 
Abu Ya‘qub al-Maqdisi was appointed as al-Adnani’s successor as director of the Office of 
Research and Studies, and this entity released numerous audio tapes which further clarified 
institutional stances on takfir and described it as an obligation of the religion, not one of its 
foundations.  Despite this progress, al-Baghdadi himself withheld numerous instalments of the 
audio tapes which forbade excessive takfir, although these were eventually leaked by the 
Scholarly Heritage Establishment.601     
The perceived oppression of scholastic consensus created further dissent within IS 
ranks, and in March 2018, al-Maqdisi stated that IS leaders had usurped tawhid, spread 
oppression, and violated the core tenets of the inviolability of Muslim blood and property.  He 
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also argued that they had come to “equate themselves with God in commanding right and 
forbidding wrong.”602  He revived the sentiments posited earlier by al-Adnani that the group 
was suffering catastrophic losses due to sinful behaviour of its leaders, and that God was 
exacting vengeance on the group and causing it to suffer against foreign aggressors as a 
consequence.  For his statements, al-Maqdisi was executed in late 2018 on charges of 
apostasy.603 
In late 2018, the media group that had been launched earlier that year to give advice to 
al-Baghdadi and present a unified ideological front, al-Naisha, turned to outright opposition in 
the onslaught of the suppression of voices of moderation and ensuing executions.  The media 
releases by al-Naisha offered the view that extremism within the religion, and the lack of 
cohesion that ensued, was more detrimental to the jihadist project and aspirations of global 
sovereignty than foreign aggression.  In turn, al-Baghdadi’s leadership responded by stating 
that any and all who criticised the caliphate, its decision-making calculus, or rationale, were 
disbelievers because they presumed to know the will of God.  Al-Naisha outlets responded 
simply by stating that “oppression does not please God, that unwarranted killing does not 
please god, that extremism in religion does not please God”.604  This final point is interesting 
insofar as internal opposition to IS to leadership in 2018 began to resemble the popular voices 
against oppression that were raised during the Arab Spring against tyrannical rulers; the very 
symbols of democratic rule that IS had sworn to obliterate. 
What is crucial to observe regarding the IS schism over takfir is that it coincided 
perfectly with increasing losses suffered by the group, leading it to question itself, its 
methodology, and future.  The emphasis on takfir was emblematic of social group proclivities 
to desperately attempt to define the group and the mechanisms by which it could measure 
inclusivity and loyalty.  During the dispute between al-Naisha and IS leadership, online media 
outlets representing al-Qaeda welcomed this rift, and encouraged individuals who displayed 
more moderate tendencies to renounce the deviance of IS and join al-Qaeda.605     
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10.9 The End of the Caliphate  
The territorial and human losses suffered by IS encouraged the coalition, and in 
December 2018 U.S. President Trump announced that he would withdraw the 2,000 combat 
troops that had been deployed there to fight IS while leaving smaller specialised contingents in 
place.606  In March 2019, IS lost its final territorial stronghold in Syria, and coalition partners 
as well as the Syrian Democratic Forces triumphantly declared that the caliphate had at last 
been eliminated.607  This assertion rested, in part, on the U.S. strategic policy position in the 
war on terror which sought, first and foremost, to deny territorial save havens to terrorist 
organisations and equated the loss of these to the inability to conduct actions detrimental to 
U.S. national interests.  In a more abstract rendition, this proposition assumed that lacking a 
physical safe space in which to proliferate, violent ideologies would dissipate and lose 
cohesion as well as the ability to concertedly carry out violent attacks.608  Despite the 
deterioration of IS institutional control in the Levant, thousands of IS affiliated individuals 
remained in Iraq and Syria either in hiding or incarcerated.  Furthermore, many of these 
individuals had been part of the foreign fighter movement and thus presented a challenge to 
their home nations.609   
To keen international observers, IS was plagued by not only the loss of its territory, but 
also by how the group had handled it.  While the loss of territory certainly coincided with an 
increasing lack of ideological cohesion as was recounted above, the friction focused on 
reasserting the organisation’s identity and the theological means by which it could both justify 
its existence and survive catastrophic losses.  Following the territorial loss of the caliphate and 
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the ensuing schism over takfir, at least two factions existed within IS that believed al-
Baghdadi was ill suited to be caliph as the group deteriorated into a fragmented entity.610  To 
compensate for this development, the group focused increasingly on its global affiliates and 
online propaganda designed to spread the group’s message and confidence in it.611  IS media 
propaganda increasingly reflected the group at large in that it became more diffused and 
decentralised, and lacked an overarching command structure.612  Paradoxically, while the 
internal schisms in IS revolved around correct methodology for establishing group parameters, 
broadened virtual platforms designed to ensure the survival of a stringent ideology necessarily 
widened the scope of potential access and inclusion.  In a virtual world, a performative act of 
association could become as simple as accessing digital content. 
Virtual IS ideological proliferation and the survival of its worldview and the fractures 
within jihadism were exhibited in the summer of 2019 following the death of Egyptian Leader 
Mohamed Morsi, who had become that nation’s president following the ascendance of the 
Muslim Brotherhood following the Arab Spring.613  On June 27th 2019, al-Qaeda eulogised 
Morsi in an official communique and online support abounded.  The Taliban, and al-Qaeda’s 
affiliate in the Maghreb (AQIM) also issued official eulogies.  Al-Qaeda supporters argued 
that this demonstrated the universal and accessible appeal of the group, which was a part of 
the global umma, not distinct from it, and that it showed the jihadist community it had the 
ability to unify and identify with disparate elements of Islam and their struggles around the 
globe in moments of need.614  In online retorts, IS supporters stated that this memorialisation 
of an individual who supported and participated in democratic institutions demonstrated al-
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Qaeda’s weakness, and abandonment of jihadist principles.  Interestingly, the long-time al-
Qaeda ideologue, Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi wrote a letter in June 2019 in which 
he departed from that organisation’s position, and did not memorialise Morsi.  Instead, he 
called for a revision of jihadist methodology and appropriate usage of WB because he argued 
currents within jihadism caused not only division, but adulation for symbols and 
representations of institutions he perceived jihad as necessary in eliminating.  This stance 
taken by al-Maqdisi is critical because, while he did not endorse the IS position and had in fact 
condemned the group repeatedly as deviants, in a post-caliphal environment that had seen IS 
camps divided into extremists and moderates which then spilled into online forums, al-
Maqdisi appeared to side with the more extreme position.  The divisions regarding how to 
treat and identify disbelievers and those deemed ‘other’, as well as the contests over broader 
support bases for positions on this issue did not end with the theological disputes within IS, 
rather they transcended them in that they became part of the lexicon in discussions shaping the 
evolution of jihadism.   
In July 2019, the UN released a report in which it stated that despite territorial loses, 
groups such as IS and al-Qaeda still represented viable and enduring threats in terms of human 
capital, strength of ideology, and financial resources, and that the global community should 
not expect a decrease in terrorist violence as the result of the loss of the caliphate.615  On 
October 26th of that year, al-Baghdadi was killed in Barisha, Syria, in a raid by U.S. special 
operations forces.  One of his top officials, al-Muhajir, was also killed.616  While this was 
certainly a symbolic victory in the war on terror, its strategic implications were more complex.  
Previous assassinations of key al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and IS leaders such as Bin 
Laden and al-Zarqawi did not signify the end of their respective organisations, rather they 
forced them to adapt.  Given the ideological turmoil that IS had experienced, and the 
deepening rift between extremists and moderates in the broader jihadisphere championed by 
supporters of IS and al-Qaeda respectively, al-Baghdadi’s death created an opening in which 
these divisions could be deepened or healed.  Al-Baghdadi had been the first individual within 
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the jihadisphere to publicly condemn al-Zawahiri, and thus the elimination of a figure to 
whom individuals and groups had sworn personal fealty could possibly provide leverage to al-
Qaeda in attracting disaffected remnants from the caliphate.617 
Shortly following the death of al-Baghdadi, his successor was announced although 
there was initially confusion as to his identity.  Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-
Salbi, who was reportedly responsible for engineering the enslavement of ethnic Yazidis, and 
had met al-Baghdadi and joined the Islamic State of Iraq following incarceration at Camp 
Bucca during the Iraq War, was described as a loyal follower of the group’s worldview 
although little else was known about him.618  In December 2019, an IS affiliate released a 
video of a brutal execution of 11 Christian men in Nigeria, and stated that it was in direct 
retribution for the assassination of al-Baghdadi.619  Furthermore, the group remained active in 
its former conquered territories, where despite the continued presence of U.S. personnel and 
infrastructure, it carried out seven violent attacks in Iraq in the first half of April 2020 alone.620 
 
10.10 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has chronicled the IS caliphate from its announcement in 2014 to its 
territorial demise in the summer of 2019.  It has attempted to portray the ways in which IS 
capitalised on both contemporary evolving circumstances and longstanding aspirations of 
jihadism and political Islam in geo-politically specific ways.  By positioning itself as the 
rightful inheritor of prophetic methodology for establishing a sovereign entity in a socio-
political environment prone to existential anxiety that was experiencing the possibilities of 
effecting profound change through collective mobilisation, IS tangibly achieved what previous 
jihadist and Islamist organisations had failed to.  The declaration of the caliphate held deep 
resonance both in a transcendent narrative and on a temporal landscape, and the group set a 
crucial precedent in demonstrating that points of cultural resentment such as the agreement of 
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Sykes-Picot, in both actuality and symbolic representation, could be obliterated in favour of 
alternative models of sovereignty.   
This chapter discussed the absolutism demonstrated by IS in its self-portrayal and 
governance, and the reasons that this worldview was unprecedented in its appeal and success.  
This chapter crucially explored the dissonance between strategic blows dealt by the coalition, 
and the way that these losses were internalised by IS in such a fashion that combined 
theological precepts, realpolitik and social group behaviour in efforts to ideologically survive 
otherwise fatal attacks.  This section continued to briefly recount the repercussions within the 
jihadisphere following the territorial collapse of the caliphate, and the way that the group’s 
trajectory and ideological frameworks had transcended the physical operating space previously 
afforded by the same.  Furthermore, because these frameworks had been built on a legacy of 
violent social group formation mechanisms ensconced in theological constructs such as the 
reconfigurations of takfir, IS reoriented the lateral limits governing discussions regarding both 
the composition of the umma as a social group and the potential future of the jihadist project 
aimed at attaining sovereignty. 
The overarching aim of this chapter has been to explicate the rise and territorial fall of 
the IS caliphate within the context of the evolution of violent jihadism that was covered in 
previous chapters in order to understand its progression both as an institutional arc and a 
unique manifestation in the continuum in the quest for an idealised socio-political utopia that 
takes the form of an alternate sovereign governance.  Furthermore, this chapter emphasised 
that due to IS’s unique characteristics and achievements, its legacy has the potential to realign 
future social and ideological formation within jihadism, and profoundly alter models of violent 
political contestation.  Understanding the institutional arc in relation to itself, the narrative 
continuum in which it exists, and the global environment at large through a scrutiny of diverse 
actors and associated discourse and practice is a critical component of the deconstructive  







 Chapter 11 
Locating the Islamic State in Terrorism Frameworks 
 
 This thesis has explored the development of IS, and demonstrated the evolution of the 
group’s ideology both within its own cosmological narrative and against a backdrop of 
evolving socio-political regional dynamism.  This evolution took place within the context of 
competition within the jihadisphere to attain a specific model of sovereignty, and IS emerged 
to embody this utopian model against one which is upheld by secular Middle Eastern regimes, 
U.S. hegemony, and the global nation state system.  While chapter 1 of this thesis indicated 
that terrorism should be understood relative to the interests of the state, and despite the fact 
that IS championed a sovereign model that undermines both state structures and the regional 
interests of those states, the case study of IS has demonstrated that the group’s trajectory, 
existence, and future potential cannot be reduced to concise definitional parameters to either 
understand or combat it.  A deeper understanding, therefore, is required of how IS does and 
does not adhere to contemporary models for the conceptualisation of terrorism. 
 First this chapter will discuss the trajectory and existence of IS against Rapoport’s 
wave theory, as well as its alternatives, to demonstrate that the group does not necessarily 
adhere to a single conceptual framework.  Second it will survey selected publications that have 
argued that IS should not be conceived of strictly as a terrorist group and discuss the rationale 
for this position.   
 
 11.1 Locating IS in Rapoport’s Four Waves of Terrorism Theory 
 Rapoport’s theory attempted to find identifiable patterns in terrorism to understand 
how this fluctuating vehicle for violent agency mutated.  It was not intended to be a 
crystallisation of objective truth, rather it provided a framework that must consistently 
incorporate new knowledge.621  The enduring popularity of the wave theory as a reference 
point in terrorism studies makes it valuable in providing points of comparison against which to 
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scrutinise the IS case study.  Rapoport identified four common components to each wave: 
time, in that waves last approximately 40 years and represent the span of a generation; space, 
in that each wave originates in a specific geographic region; participating units, which possess 
lifecycles shorter than the wave itself; and purpose, which dictates that waves originate with 
hope generated by a catalytic event.622  Regarding time, IS certainly came into existence 
during the 40 year period that Rapoport identified as having begun in 1979, but the growing 
momentum of political Islam as resistance, radical ideological reconfigurations, and Salafi-
jihadism which IS both capitalised on and was a result of, had begun well before that year.  
Furthermore, time cannot adequately be a metric of constraint to analyse or predict IS 
behavioural patterns in that the group views itself as engaged in a struggle which 
simultaneously manifests itself temporally and cosmologically, as reflected in the statements 
of IS leadership as well as its publications of Dabiq and Rumiyah that were discussed in 
chapter 10.   
 Concerning space, the jihadisphere undoubtedly has its roots in the levant, as 
demonstrated by the commitment to initially include the region in the organisational name 
“Islamic State Iraq and Syria”.  The decision to eliminate Iraq and Syria from the group’s 
name in 2014 upon the declaration of the caliphate, however, indicated that IS did not view 
itself as being engaged in nationalistic regional struggles, but that its governing identity 
transcended a specific geographic region.623  This transcendent appeal fostered a collective 
mobilisation that yielded the most significant foreign fighter movement in recent history.  
These foreign fighters, in turn, have dispersed globally since the rise and territorial fall of the 
caliphate, and IS sympathisers have conducted violent attacks worldwide, and thus a delimited 
geographic area of operations cannot be applied to the group.624  Furthermore, following the 
territorial collapse of the caliphate in 2019, IS leaders stated in Rumiyah that perhaps the 
future of the caliphate lay in some yet-to-be-discovered conflict zone or area of operations. 
 Regarding participating units, previous chapters of this thesis juxtaposed IS narratives, 
ambitions, and methods with those of al-Qaeda, and briefly JN, to explore the deep cleavages 
between the organisations.  Despite the facts that al-Qaeda and IS share aspirations of Islamic 
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sovereignty, and that due to their temporal and geographic co-location in the levant during and 
following the U.S. led war in Iraq were subjectively combined in Western strategic and policy 
decisions to form the image of a tangible enemy in the war on terror, IS and al-Qaeda are and 
have been two distinct organisations with more ideological and methodological differences 
than similarities.625  The drastic differences and increasing hostility between the two 
organisations that endure to the present, as well as the polarising nature of the conflict that 
reflects the religious absolutism espoused by both groups, should make it impossible to 
conceive of IS and al-Qaeda as equivalent organisations in a wave characterised by religious 
violence simply because they both profess to be Islamic.  Doing so neglects the importance of 
potential future violence inherent in intra-jihadist competition that was witnessed in IS 
assassinations of al-Qaeda emissaries that was recounted in Chapter 9, as well as the ability to 
comprehend the underlying meaning of these actions in the pursuit of a group’s ambitions.   
 Finally, concerning purpose, chapter 7 recounted the war in Iraq, and how this was 
viewed by al-Zawahiri as a ‘golden opportunity’ to plant the seeds of an Islamic emirate in the 
Levant.  Furthermore, chapter 8 described the role of the Arab Spring in the reimagination of 
the realm of the possible through collective action.  Just as the movements within Islam which 
IS capitalised on predated the beginning of the fourth wave, IS was not spawned organically as 
the result of either the Iraq war or the Arab Spring.626  In fact, and more importantly for 
posterity, the declaration of the caliphate in 2014 represents its own hope enshrined in a 
tangible event.  Although the territorial composition of the caliphate failed, its declaration and 
tentative attainment now forms part of the legacy of the jihadist project, which can be framed 
in memory and emulated in the future as a lost hope to be reinvigorated. 
 Despite the fact that Rapoport’s theory seems to be useful in providing parameters for 
contemplating  IS, yet insufficient for fully comprehending the group’s nuances and potential, 
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the waves that he delineated are valuable in that their analytic use can be harnessed to 
demonstrate how IS narratives and methodology have drawn on both Islamic ideology and the 
evolution of modern terrorism.  Chapter 1 of this thesis recounted that Rapoport’s first wave 
terrorists argued that modern society was full of artificial conventions, and immoral tactics in 
the present would be perceived as righteous in the future due to their use in righting egregious 
wrongs.  IS adopted this framework insofar as its premise, regarding the illegality of artificial 
constructs such as national borders and their relationship with Western hegemony enshrined in 
the agreement of Sykes-Picot, was and remains foundational to the group’s worldview.  
Furthermore, IS brutality was framed as immoral and an assault on fundamental human rights 
by Western observers, but also simultaneously justified in IS speeches and periodical 
publications that conceived of it as necessary to bring about the end of institutional immorality 
ensconced in Western statehood manifest in the Islamic world.  This justification of violence 
is commensurate with the socio-philosophical argument which stipulates that violence may be 
morally justified despite not having exhausted other avenues, if the violence rectifies 
egregious wrongs and is used to advance the agenda of social reform which benefits the social 
group wielding said violence.627  Additionally, IS framed its violence as a duty both to the self 
and the collective, in a manner which drew on Islamic concepts of loyalty such as ba’ya, but 
in doing so it also emulated the first wave proclivity to do the same which was based on 
Nechayev’s “Revolutionary Catechism” that was discussed in Chapter 1.628  Just as first wave 
groups relied on the advent of mass communication to broadcast this collective obligation, IS 
relied on its multi-language publications, as well as social media and live streaming 
capabilities to both disseminate fear and attract supporters.629 
 Rapoport’s second wave began due to the perceived abuses of colonial power manifest 
in regional mandates and their incongruence with Western ideals of self-determination.  The 
adamant rejection of Sykes-Picot and its legacy, which was first articulated in 2006 in Iraq by 
IS’s precursor as was discussed in Chapter 8, should be understood as a contemporary 
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rejection of institutional remnants of colonialism as well as in the context of the increasing use 
of Islamic frames of resistance relied on since the beginning of defensive modernisation that 
was narrated in Chapter 7.  IS also emulated second wave tactics in its deliberate targeting of 
police, military, and security services associated with hegemonic Western actors and their 
regional proxies.  This tactic can be considered all the more holistic given the fact that it drew 
on both the tactical legacy of the second wave, and the ideological reconfigurations within 
jihadism which argued that all those who associated with structures and institutions of a 
modern state were disbelievers and thus marked for death.630  IS also emulated second wave 
ideological orientation insofar as it argued that it utilised violence in order to achieve freedom 
from oppression.  In the first edition of Dabiq, IS leadership framed the wielding of violence 
in the pursuit of statehood as the mechanism by which to reclaim Muslim freedom, abolish 
dishonour, and self-extricate from the bonds of cultural humiliation and disgrace.631  By thus 
framing violence, IS also adopted the paradigm offered by Frantz Fanon, which was 
summarised in Chapter 3, that argued violence was both useful and necessary in that by 
appropriating its use from colonial monopoly, its performative conduct could serve to 
inculcate personal and collective freedom even in the absence of the achievement of tangible 
objectives.  
 The third wave began after the catalyst of the Vietnam war, which represented the idea 
that a superpower could be defeated by a smaller, technologically inferior force.  Al-Zarqawi 
clearly understood this in his selection of tactics and prediction of an ultimate U.S. withdrawal 
from Iraq that was discussed in Chapter 8.  While Rapoport argued that the third wave was 
defined by nationalist terrorism, and IS violently rejects ideas and structures of nationalism as 
artificial and heretical, it is worthwhile to note that IS did and does advocate its own brand of 
nationalism.  If a nation is defined as “a large group of people with strong bonds of identity – 
an “imagined community,” a tribe on a grand scale”632, then IS certainly fits the definition, and 
the group engaged in consistent efforts to define that identity and forge bonds within an 
imagined community that drew on transcendent narratives and contemporary geopolitics 
simultaneously.  Furthermore, IS pursued its own version of nationalism insofar as it sought, 
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and tentatively achieved, governance in the form of a caliphate.  The pertinent point to observe 
here is that while IS rejected and continues to reject the structures of the modern nation state, 
and utilises takfir to excommunicate Muslims who engage in practices associated with 
democracy, it strives for nationalism in the sense that it pursues a vision of governance to 
ideally encompass a self-defined communal identity in sovereign self-sufficiency.   
 The fourth wave began in 1979, and while IS does espouse one of its defining 
characteristics in that it hopes to unite the umma in a global caliphate, its ideas regarding how 
to achieve, define, and govern this caliphate and its relationships with ‘the other’ are unique 
unto itself.  Reducing IS aspirations to the achievement of the caliphate is to dilute both the 
symbolic significance of the caliphate in Islamic historical memory and as a representation of 
cultural resistance against the gradual encroachment of modernity inherent in political Islam.  
This reduction, while valuable when attempting to discover similarities which lead to 
generalisations, risks further ‘othering’ the image of Islamic governance manifest in a 
caliphate to a Western audience prone to receiving divisive narratives in the course of the 
global war on terror which locates Western democracies in an existential struggle against 
irreconcilable ideologies which are inimical to values such as freedom and liberty.633    
 The above discussion is not intended to dismiss the significance of Rapoport’s 
contribution to the study of terrorism, rather it is intended to utilise a prominent model to 
assist in answering the research question which asked whether it is useful to label IS a terrorist 
organisation, and study it within established frameworks.  It therefore suggests that IS, as a 
flexible and mutating organisation, cannot neatly be placed in a temporal wave defined by its 
similarities with coterminous organisations.  It utilises mechanisms and tactics that were 
central to all of the waves and continues to evolve, indicating that the group is able to 
effectively learn from both historical precedent and contemporary dynamics.634 
 
 11.2 Locating IS in Alternate Frameworks    
 
633 This reference is taken from Chapter 8 which included a speech by then U.S. President Bush delivered to 
Congress in which he stated al-Qaeda hates the West and the U.S. for their inherent freedoms.   
634 For more on the learning curve of terrorist organisations, see Clarke, Colin P, “How Terrorist Groups Learn: 
Implications for al Qaeda”, RAND, March 14 2019.  https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/03/how-terrorist-groups-
learn-implications-for-al-qaeda.html  (Accessed 1 June 2020) 
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 Jeffrey Kaplan wrote in 2010 that contemporary terrorism was fundamentally different 
than previous movements of political violence.  He argued that terrorism cannot be reduced to 
an amalgamation of tactics, rather it represents a fundamental war of ideas, and is in essence a 
value-neutral term.635  He offered the idea of the existence of a unique fifth wave of terrorism, 
stressed the importance of local and cultural dynamics in spawning terrorist violence, and 
stated that groups themselves could become catalysts for ongoing violence.  Although the fifth 
wave theory predated the formal establishment of IS and the caliphate, certain points of 
comparison are worth noting. 
 If morality itself is a construct that is defined as a consensus regarding acceptable 
social behaviour within the delimited bounds of a self-identified social group, then terrorism is 
indeed a value-neutral term in that its morality cannot be absolutely determined according to 
the moral constructs of one society’s norms relative to those of another.636  IS devoted 
significant time and energy to reshaping the limits of morality and accepted behaviour both as 
it related to performative violence and ideals of governance.  By engaging in this social 
architecture and tentatively institutionalising it in a caliphate, IS became a catalyst for future 
violence and introduced expanded parameters for what should be considered moral behaviour 
according to its worldview in the pursuit and justification of Islamic sovereignty based on 
selected theological readings and lessons from previous terrorist movements.  
 Kaplan argued that fifth wave groups were acutely aware of their own history, and in 
this regard IS proved itself to be consistent.  Although international scholars and Western 
opponents of IS dismissed the theological reasoning of IS violent justifications, especially 
regarding the killing of innocents as was narrated in Chapter 9, in its publications and 
narratives IS demonstrated intrinsic awareness of Islamic, jihadist, and Western history, as 
well as its own perceived place within these intersecting trajectories.  Finally, Kaplan argued 
that fifth wave groups were defined by their aspirations of attaining a social utopia within this 
lifetime, and IS adheres to this standard in its desire to see the caliphate reinstated in the 
present. 
 
635 Kaplan, 17-18. 
636 This is commensurate with both the construction of morality that was discussed in Chapter 2 and the 
paradigm which states that the legitimacy of any act of violence lies somewhere in the triangle of relationships 
and perceptions between the aggressor, audience, and victim of violence that was narrated in Chapter 3.   
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 Parker and Sitter argued in 2016 that terrorism did not occur in waves, rather that it 
manifest itself in distinct strains of nationalism, socialism, religious extremism, and social 
exclusion, all of which existed simultaneously.  Regarding this theory, IS embodied all of 
these strains insofar as it advocated its own brand of nationalism, provided social services in a 
manner which reflected socialist agendas related to the state control of resources, religious 
extremism in its reconfigurations of takfir and violence, and social exclusion in that the group 
consistently engaged in efforts to define itself relative to ‘the other’, identified as both 
heretical Muslims and Western democratic structures.   
 In 2019 Honing and Yahel proposed that the evolution of terrorism had led to the 
emergence of terrorist semi-states (TSS), and in its governance and structuring IS resembled 
the model offered by the authors.  Honing and Yahel argued that the driving motivation for 
TSSs was the fact that the political avenue for gaining power was effectively blocked.  While 
this may have been true in informing IS approaches especially in its recruitment of former 
Ba’athist officers who were precluded from Iraqi reconstruction, IS distanced itself from the 
TSS paradigm in that it placed emphasis not on the inaccessibility of political avenues, but on 
the fact that those very avenues were heretical and could not lead to the visions of sovereignty 
and governance it aspired to.  Honing and Yahel concluded that TSSs were self-defeating by 
nature in that they would cling to stringent revisionist ideology despite changing 
circumstances, and in this regard IS did not behave like a TSS.  IS demonstrated through its 
reimagination of the caliphate as fulfilling itself in a yet-unknown location, as well through its 
meticulous deliberation regarding the utility of takfir in defining the group and achieving 
tangible objectives, that it could change according to immediate and shifting realities.  
Similarly, Honing and Yahel surmised that the greatest legacy of TSSs would be their ability 
change the nature of interactions between terrorist organisations, and in this regard IS 
embodied the premise insofar as it continues to engage in hostile rhetoric with other 
organisations that share its long term aspirations and ideologies of violence such as al-Qaeda, 
and this socio-political outbidding has already changed the dynamic between the two groups 
and numerous junctures and will therefore likely continue to do so.637   
 
637 For more on the debate surrounding outbidding and the proposition that competition between terrorist 
organisations leads to increased levels of violence, see Nemeth, Stephen, “The Effect of Competition on 
Terrorist Group Operations”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 58:2 (March 2014), 336-362. 
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 By scrutinising the trajectory of IS against the frameworks provided by the alternatives 
to the wave theory, it is clear that while the group may share similar characteristics with each 
of their defining features, it cannot be placed exclusively in any of them at the risk of ignoring 
cogent aspects of the group’s identity and aspirations.   
 
 11.3 Locating IS Outside the Frameworks 
 In 2015, Cronin proposed that IS should not be considered a terrorist group, due to the 
fact that the U.S. had built a counterterrorist platform tailored to the fight against al-Qaeda and 
its application to IS would be ineffectual.638  She argued that mechanisms designed to contain 
the caliphate such as border monitoring and collective international bargaining should be 
adapted and put into the service of a strategy designed to counter state-like actors.  While this 
assessment was given immediately following the declaration of the caliphate, it is worth 
remembering in that although the caliphate no longer exists in territorial form, its aspirations 
of sovereignty have not changed. 
 On a more abstract level, in 2015 Sullivan posited that IS should be regarded as a 
millenarian mass movement.639  He stated that it was not a terrorist movement in that it 
“attracts and holds a following not by its doctrine and promises, but by the refuge it offers 
from the anxieties, barrenness and meaninglessness of individual existence”.640  Furthermore, 
Sullivan argued that IS should be considered a revolutionary movement within the complex 
arena of jihadism which remains the leading platform for anti-Western hegemony.  He 
concluded his assessment by drawing parallels between the experiences of Muhammad and 
those of IS, which are all the more relevant given IS reliance on scriptural justifications and 
the desire to emulate the standards of the Prophet and salaf.  He stated that Muhammad had 
succeeded in establishing a new model for sovereignty at a time when the Persian and 
Byzantine empires were exhausted from over-extended warfare and could no longer 
promulgate their hegemony or governing structures by proxy.  Linking the legacy of the 
Byzantine and Persian empires to the experience of prolonged U.S. and Western military 
 
638 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadi 
Threat”, Foreign Affairs 94:2 (March / April 2015), 87-98.  P.87. 
639 Sullivan, Edward R., “The Islamic State: Terrorists or Millenarian Mass Movement?”, in Miller, Larry D. (ed), 
The Army War College Review, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2015, 13-25. 
640 Hoffer, Eric, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (London: Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2010).  First Published 1951.   
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intervention in the Middle East provides a powerful continuum in the transcendent narrative of 
jihadism, according to Sullivan, and IS therefore should be understood as a revolutionary 
movement able to galvanise history to rally continued support.   
 In 2018, Krause also framed IS as a revolutionary movement, because “revolutions do 
not simply seek to replace presidents and generals; they aim to overturn the existing social 
order and replace it with a vision for how life should be for individuals, their community, and 
their polity.  (…)  The loss of territory may help cripple ISIS’s state, but not necessarily its 
revolution.”641  He also focused on the importance of the IS caliphate and how those involved 
in its construction and provision of public goods and services considered it to be a legitimate, 
sovereign state.  Finally, Krause concluded that the complex nature of IS requires a 
combination of a war of bombs, a war of governance, and a war of ideas to defeat it.642  
 
 11.4 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has demonstrated the difficulties inherent in attempting to intellectually 
locate IS in the major frameworks for generalising and understanding terrorism in attempts to 
understand both its complex nature and potential for the future.  While the caliphate no longer 
exists in territorial form, IS demonstrated its resilience and reorientation capabilities in its 
increased emphasis on small scale attacks against the West within the West itself in its 
publications of Rumiyah, its network of regional affiliates, and transition to an online 
presence, that were recounted in Chapter 10.  By drawing points of similarity and difference 
between IS and the conceptual frameworks for terrorism, it is clear that the group is a 
manifestation of a long trajectory of jihadism, political Islam, and global political violence as 
well as the representation of a unique phenomenon which responded to local and transcendent 
grievances.  This assessment and the nature in which it was reached correlates with the 
genealogical method for inquiry in that it attempted to emulate Foucault’s analytics by first 
examining a series of practices infused with cultural meaning, and then passing an 
understanding of these through a grid of assumed universals; in this case, existing prominent 
frameworks for conceptualising terrorist groups and patterns.   
 
641 Krause, Peter, “A State, and Insurgency, and a revolution: Understanding and Defeating the Three Faces of 
ISIS”, in al-Istrabadi and Ganguly, 223-246, 233. 
642 Krause, 236. 
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While military campaigns and fostering productive local governance to counter the 
legitimacy of IS remain paramount in a multi-pronged approach as advocated by Krause, the 
research question this thesis presented in its introduction intends to address the war of ideas he 
argued was necessary because an exploration of the complexity of IS and how it should be 
understood should inform the subsequent wars of bombs and governance.  This chapter 
addressed an aspect of the research question by revisiting a multiplicity of prominent 
frameworks and arguing that IS cannot be understood in its entirety according to the 
theoretical limitations of any of the frameworks provided.  It also discussed alternate ways that 
IS has been conceived of as a revolutionary, state-like actor, and these assessments will form 
the foundation of the final concluding chapter.          
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 This thesis has engaged in an in-depth case study of IS and demonstrated the intrinsic 
problems in attempting to place the group in any of the prominent frameworks in current 
usage for studying terrorism.  The discussion of the complexity of the war on terror, rise of IS, 
and significant academic attention devoted to understanding and countering terrorism illustrate 
the fact that terrorism is assumed to be a normal fact in the global state of affairs, and 
significant social problem.  Furthermore, this problem was and is framed in the war on terror 
as ‘us vs. them’, and an existential struggle between liberal democratic values and a fanatic 
religious ideology inimical to the same.  Terrorism itself, however, along with its framing, is a 
social construct and should therefore be understood as such.  In order to finalise the 
genealogical problematisation of IS and address the research question posed in the 
introduction, this chapter will question the very foundations of how terrorism is and should be 
understood.   
First this chapter will discuss the emergence of terrorism as a social construct 
intimately linked to the birth of the nation state, social identities and political views regarding 
legitimacy and power during the French Revolution.  Second it will explore the manner in 
which this social construct was adapted and used by the United States preceding and during 
the war on terror in a social manner both commensurate with precedents set during the French 
Revolution and in novel ways.  Third this chapter will propose an alternate system of labelling 
to describe actors in a contested geopolitical environment which is consistent with the 
genealogical method of problematising social dynamics in order to then adequately confront 
them with thorough understanding.  This proposal will constitute the genealogical conclusion 
regarding the research question.  Finally, this chapter will discuss why this alternate labelling 
may be useful in guiding discussions related to political violence in the future, as groups 
currently labelled as terrorist organisations show no signs of disappearing despite decades of 
protracted military engagement and counterterrorism operations. 
  
 Terrorism as a Concept in the Rise of the Nation State      
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 Terrorism as it is articulated today traces its roots to the French Revolution and is 
therefore intricately connected to the notions of power and contestation that took form there.643  
In the context of the relationship between power and knowledge, it was a world changing 
event in that it drastically altered models of political legitimacy and the means by which to 
achieve and justify them, proved that those models could be moulded according to social 
consensus, and provided the environment in which terrorism could be theorised in relation to 
those models and fluid social conditions.  In its original inception, terrorism referred to terror 
from above, in that during the period 1793-1794, the regime of terror under Maximilien 
Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety violently targeted French citizens who were 
perceived as enemies of the state, and who had no right to live in the newly imagined sacred 
canopy of the French body politic due to their rejection of revolutionary values.  While this 
body politic attempted to make Enlightenment ideas of popular sovereignty a reality, the terror 
under Robespierre was wielded to both advance popular sovereignty embodied by the 
revolution and also eliminate opposing political factions who vied for power and control of the 
budding revolutionary government.  In this regard, “The French Terror served as both the 
founding act of modern state terror and as the model defining and delineating the strategic use 
of violence by a state apparatus.”644  
 Terror as the psychological mechanism by which to instil a deep fear was subsequently 
practiced violently in executions and incarcerations to ensure compliance with revolutionary 
values that aligned with the Jacobin faction.645  The justification for this was the idea that to 
achieve popular sovereignty ‘the people’ had to be reborn in a certain way, and for this to take 
place any who opposed this process had to be eliminated.646  This became problematic insofar 
as definitions of ‘the people’ in practice became increasingly narrowed to only reflect core 
members of the Committee for Public Safety and their political allies, and increasing violence 
was directed at perceived enemies.  This perception is reflected in Robespierre’s justification 
for the execution of King Louis XVI, where he argued that the replacement of the old order 
with a civic society based on Enlightenment ideals was only possible through the elimination 
 
643 For more on the revolution, its enabling conditions as well as its repercussions in the modern global 
hegemonic order, see Bukovansky, Mlada, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions 
in International Political Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).  
644 Chaliand, Gerard and Arnaud Blin, “The Invention of Modern Terror”, in Chaliand, Gerard and Arnaud Blin 
(eds), The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS (Berkley: University of California Press, 2016), 95-112, 101. 
645 Chaliand and Blin, 102. 
646 Richardson, 29. 
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of all those who upheld and represented said old order.  In Robespierre’s estimation, the 
Republic could only live if the King; and thereby all that he represented, did not.647 
 In the way that it first originated as part of the public political lexicon of modernity, 
and insofar as violent terrorism was portrayed as the mechanism by which to achieve the 
revolution’s aspiration of popular sovereignty, “terrorism constituted a social identity that 
could be assumed and cultivated by way of an active commitment to certain beliefs, values 
and principles.”648  Furthermore, revolutionary terror relied on the same practices of violence 
as the old order such as public executions, but it harnessed their use for new purposes.  In this 
regard, the use of violence through revolutionary terror aligns with Foucault’s analysis that 
individual acts may appear identical in practice, but in their ability to embody divergent 
meanings and aspirations should be understood as social functions according to the physical 
and intellectual contexts in which they occur.649  In the context of the nascent French 
Republic, Robespierre upheld the notion that systematic terrorism wielded for political 
purposes was the only way in which new codes of civic morality and virtue could be 
institutionalised in popular sovereign structures designed to guarantee the pinnacle of human 
socio-political development and freedom.  This was therefore a moral and political imperative 
in that it was intended to support the salvation of a people.650  The use of terror was further 
justified in that the constitutional structures the Jacobins advocated were framed as being 
unattainable without first achieving a homogeneous population that shared beliefs of popular 
sovereignty.  Lack of homogeneity and proliferation of faction were understood as constituting 
a crisis, and due to the yet-unfulfilled nature of desired political structures, this crisis was 
existential in nature.  This crisis regarding the future direction of a polity, in turn, followed the 
crisis of sovereignty of the preceding century, which Foucault argued was the result of new 
Enlightenment ideals and the discovery of immutable laws of nature which undermined the 
indisputable right of a monarch to rule unilaterally.651  To ensure the survival of revolutionary 
 
647 McPhee, Peter, Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012), 142. 
648 Erlenbusch-Anderson, 23. 
649 Erlenbusch-Anderson, 26-27.   
650 For the necessity of violence in the attainment of moral and political imperatives, especially during 
foundational and tumultuous periods, see Benjamin, Walter, “Critique of Violence”, in Bullock, Marcus and 
Michael W. Jennings (eds), Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 1, 1913-1926 (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 236-252. 
651 See Foucault, Michel, The Order of things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1994), 
xxiii-xxiv.   
See also Parker, Geoffrey and Lesley M. Smith (eds), The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, (London: 
Routledge, 1997).   
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models of governance, therefore, violence and terrorism were necessary, according to 
Robespierre: “Revolutionary government owes good citizens full national protection; to 
enemies of the people it owes nothing but death.  (…) Virtue, without which terror is 
disastrous; terror, without which virtue is powerless.”652 
 Robespierre was executed in the summer of 1794, and leading Thermidorian Jean-
Lambert Tallien coined the term ‘terrorism’ to describe the systematic use of terror employed 
under the former.  This development was significant in that the social revolutionary movement 
that succeeded Robespierre’s regime of terror did so after growing organically out of it as a 
moderate faction that viewed itself as susceptible to falling prey to the expansive reprisals and 
killings of declared enemies of the revolution.653  Tallien broke with the model embodied by 
Robespierre in that he argued that terrorism was an “extreme affection” and its institutional 
practice by the state only served to weaken the ultimate survival of that state.654  He further 
proposed that only by the enforcement of egalitarian law could revolutionary government 
succeed, and that mechanisms of terrorism should only be used selectively to target hidden 
dissentious factions within the body politic, rather than to categorically define and punish 
individuals that existed outside of the revolutionary social group despite their status as French 
citizens.  This paradigm shift was significant in that it reshaped the boundaries of inclusivity 
regarding the body politic, and framed terrorism as essential in targeting an internal ‘other’ 
that threatened the integrity of the social whole rather than identifying the ‘other’ as an 
external enemy in its rejection of revolutionary ideals.655  These legal and philosophical 
transformations shaped the discussion regarding the appropriate mechanisms by which popular 
sovereignty should be defined, achieved and exercised, and therefore created the intellectual 
conditions under which terrorists could be portrayed as threats to the integrity of the nation 
which required their violent removal from society. 
 Despite these intellectual transformations, terrorism itself remained a contested term in 
relation to power and legitimacy and Thermidorian revolutionaries engaged in many of the 
same practices that Robespierre had.  In 1795, the National Convention, which by that point 
 
652 Robespierre, Maximilien, “On the Principles of Political Morality”, in Slavoj Žižek (ed), Robespierre: Virtue and 
Terror (London: Verso, 2007), 115 
653 For more on this transition in context, see Baczko, Bronislaw, Ending the Terror: The French Revolution after 
Robespierre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  
654 Erlenbusch-Anderson, 39. 
655 Erlenbusch-Anderson, 41. 
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was dominated by anti-Thermidorian sentiments and pro-Girondins, promulgated a new 
constitution and established the Directory, which was charged with reconciling revolutionary 
principles with democratic order.656  The Directory argued that egalitarian laws must protect 
the body politic, that violence should only be used by the government to punish legal 
violations, and finally that laws should target both royalists and populist terrorists in order to 
safeguard nascent revolutionary statehood.  This stance represented another important shift in 
that “the term terrorism now designated a political stance one could choose.”657  Furthermore, 
this choice indicated self-ascribed opposition to egalitarian laws designed to protect the 
integrity of the body politic, and therefore by framing populist revolutionaries and otherwise 
patriots as terrorists, the new constitution portrayed their actions as illegal violations of human 
rights enshrined in and protected by law.  In this way, the portrayal of terrorism as a direct 
political assault on the freedoms guaranteed protection by the state was born.   
Many prominent individuals who had participated in the fluid framing of the meaning 
and utility of terrorism in relation to both the body politic and a set of values were imprisoned 
as a result of their intellectual stances, and one of the most notable was François-Noël Babeuf, 
a journalist who wrote under the pen name Gracchus.658  After his imprisonment, Babeuf 
wrote that terrorism had come to be a somewhat magical word, in that it functioned to justify 
the persecution of political opponents under the guise of legality in order to save the nation, 
and that in this regard it was the means by which to justify pre-existing institutional interests 
and practices of power.659   
The above discussion is intended to demonstrate the fluidity of the term terrorism, and 
how it evolved parallel to nascent Republicanism in the French Revolution which sought to 
establish the correct manner in which to define and protect a socio-political body.  Terrorism 
began as the way to violently establish the body politic and castigate those determined to be 
‘other’ by their non-adherence to revolutionary values.  The problem of defining what 
constituted those values and a lack of consensus among revolutionary factions led to terrorism 
being expansively used against perceived enemies of the state.  As the revolutionary state 
 
656 For more on this transition, see Brown, Howard G., Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and 
Repression from the Terror to Napoleon (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2007).   
657 Erlenbusch-Anderson, 48. 
658 For more on Babeuf and his legacy which influenced egalitarian Marxism, see Rose, Robert Barrie, Gracchus 
Babeuf: The First Revolutionary Communist (California: Stanford University Press, 1978). 
659 Erlenbusch-Anderson, 51. 
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evolved, terrorism gradually became a term of derision used to describe those who presented a 
threat to the integrity of the state and therefore needed to be violently removed from it.  In this 
regard, terrorism became a term of differentiation and exclusion, used to discriminate between 
good individuals who abided by the egalitarian laws of the state and bad individuals who held 
contradictory views and had to be eliminated to ensure the longevity of the state.660 
The legacy of the French Revolution for posterity is twofold, in that it proved that 
radical socio-political change through agency was possible in the immediate term, and that for 
this change to occur, obsolete and corrupt institutions as well as their participating members 
that embodied worldviews incompatible with revolutionary values had to be destroyed in order 
for society to flourish in a manner commensurate with man’s innate rights.661  Comprehending 
the dynamic nature of the origins of terrorism as an intellectual concept rather than a concrete 
practice within this ideological context of possibilities, and the way in which it was 
appropriated by various actors during the French Revolution requires understanding its 
symbiotic relationship with individuals as well as nascent laws and institutions that shaped the 
modern state in relation to popular sovereignty and the protection of the body politic.  Viewing 
it thus, terrorism ceases to be a defined category of political violence, and instead should be 
understood in light of these relationships as a deliberate mechanism of social construction and 
defence. 
 
U.S. Social Defence and Framing in the War on Terror 
The origin of terrorism as it is presently understood in the context of the global war on 
terror lies in a combination of the continuation of its dynamic utilitarian framing in the birth of 
the modern state and American neoconservatism.  Neoconservatism in the U.S. emerged as a 
political rationality that held that American democracy could not survive in a global 
environment hostile to its values, because in an increasingly interconnected world, economic 
and political relations abroad had the ability to profoundly impact domestic American 
prosperity and therefore the longevity of its political system.662  This ideological posture 
gained traction after Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man 
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which built on his previous works.663  In his book, Fukuyama argued that the end of the Cold 
War represented the end of grand struggles between ideological worldviews, and that liberal 
democracy had become universally accepted as the pinnacle of human socio-political 
development.  Furthermore, the ultimate success of American style liberal democracy rested 
on its international recognition and emulation insofar as reciprocal relationships between 
states predicated on universal understanding of economic freedom and human equality before 
liberal democratic laws was fundamental to the peaceful longevity of the liberal democratic 
order.664  Under this perception, the role of the U.S. would need to transcend its borders and 
protection of its national body politic.  Instead, the international recognition of human freedom 
and equality ensconced in democratic institutions became intertwined with the government’s 
domestic role in that its sovereignty rested on its ability to ensure the universal safety of innate 
human rights and their legal guarantee.  It is poignant to note the postural similarities between 
French Revolutionaries and Neoconservatism in that they both perceived their systems of 
sovereignty as the pinnacle of human socio-political development that reflected the flourishing 
of individual rights, and assumed a vanguard role in the protection of the same.  The key 
difference is that Neoconservatism perceived America’s national fate as inextricably linked to 
the global proliferation of the same universal values under which it operated. 
The institutionalisation of Neoconservatism is perhaps best reflected in the U.S. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), which was first issued in 1987 during the Reagan 
presidency.  Since its inception, the NSS has adopted a Neoconservative worldview in that it 
embodies a teleological view of historical and political development, an eschatological view 
of history as a struggle between liberalism and totalitarianism, and stipulates that the U.S. is 
ultimately on the righteous side of this struggle due to its embrace of liberal democracy, 
framed as the only viable political option to ensure freedom, peace and prosperity.665  By the 
late 1990s, the annual issue of the NSS reflected the fact that following the Cold War, U.S. 
policy makers perceived the nation as being embroiled in a fight against global terrorism.666  
Whereas previously terrorism had been used in U.S. policy narratives to describe state-
sanctioned Soviet efforts to undermine liberalism, it now described the actions of various state 
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and non-state actors who sought to use violence to threaten the global stability which was vital 
to U.S. survival.  NSS 1995 stated that the lines between domestic and foreign policies were 
disappearing.667  Furthermore, this document was entitled A National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement, and this title bears a striking resemblance to the IS self-
declared posture of ‘remaining and expanding’ that was adopted by the group following its 
declaration of the caliphate that was discussed in Chapter 10.  Also in 1995, the U.S. 
Counterterrorism Act was introduced to congress.  It did not succinctly define terrorism, rather 
it described it as deadly problem comprised of violent crimes that threatened global and 
regional stability.  While the act did not pass a congressional vote, altered portions of it were 
included in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.668  This inclusion is all 
the more pertinent due to the fact that it gave the U.S. federal power to prosecute international 
acts of terrorism in a fashion similar to domestic crimes that threatened the state, and in this 
stance the perception of the necessity of international enforcement of universal values to 
protect the sovereignty of a state and its body politic is evident.   
NSS 1998 built on this foundation, and described terrorism as being intricately linked 
to Osama Bin Laden in that while different groups existed, they were united by a shared 
“hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible distortion of their 
religion to justify the murder of innocents.  They have made the United States their adversary 
precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against.”669  This framing is critical 
to recognise because it effectively created a distinct political ‘other’, defined by its violent 
opposition to intangible values championed by the U.S.  It left no room for discussion of the 
intricacies, aspirations, motivations or contexts of groups or individuals, rather it presented 
terrorism as a singular enemy that could manifest itself in various locations and that was 
engaged in an ideological struggle aimed at destroying the intellectual foundations for 
governance on which the U.S. was built.   
NSS 2002 was the first instance in which platforms of Neoconservatism that had 
gained momentum in the previous decades were used to justify a war on terror following 9/11.  
 
667 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlarging, February 1995.  
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While this document equated terrorism with the institution of slavery and the practice of 
genocide to demonstrate its disastrous potential effects on a global population, it specifically 
portrayed terrorists as enemies of civilisation.670  It also framed 9/11 as an opportunity for the 
U.S. to confront the enemy of terrorism.  This point is highly relevant in that it reflects the fact 
that U.S. strategists viewed the coming war as an opportunity to implement visions of 
governance and national security that relied on an increasingly homogenised global 
community and acceptance of universal values, and later al-Zarqawi would similarly frame the 
invasion of Iraq as a golden opportunity to establish an Islamic emirate in the Levant and 
pursue alternate models of statehood, as was recounted in Chapter 8.  Just as al-Zarqawi would 
later frame his cause as a righteous quest to eliminate evil from Islam and the Middle East, 
NSS 2002 proffered the view that following 9/11 America had a responsibility to history to 
both “rid the world of evil” and defend “our democratic values and way of life.”671 
As of late 2020, U.S. policy for counterterrorism relies on a combination of restricting 
freedom of movement of suspected terrorists, repatriating former foreign fighters, and 
combatting online radicalisation.  It also utilises the increased designation of individuals and 
groups as terrorist actors to enable financial sanctions, and has increased the operational pace 
of special operations forces internationally to foster local security and governance 
conditions.672  Due to the prolonged nature of the conflict, numerous international entities 
have been established such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum which is comprised of 29 
member states and the European Union, and these embody the very mutual recognition of 
international structures and shared human rights and freedoms that Neoconservatism holds is 
essential to the survival of liberal democracy.673  While the above discussion does not intend 
to enumerate the developments of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the nearly two decades since 
9/11, it seeks to explain the ideological roots that informed its institutional onset. 
 
The Secular War on Terror Paradox  
 
670The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 31  
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (Accessed 8 June 2020) 
671 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 7. 
672The White House, The U.S. Policy in Countering Terrorism, September 25 2019.  https://www.state.gov/the-u-
s-policy-in-countering-terrorism/ (Accessed 9 June 2020) 




The framing of the war on terror in a Western and Neoconservative context as explored 
above presents an interesting paradox.  The values championed by strategists in documents 
such as NSS 2002 were based on specific paradigms regarding innate human rights and their 
relationships with state structures that emerged at a time during which religion was relegated 
to the private sphere following the 17th century crisis of sovereignty and the French 
Revolution.  In this regard, those identified as terrorists were living in a time that modernity 
had eclipsed insofar as they advocated a worldview in which God-given law played a central 
role.  Thus understood, terrorists were living in a world in which history still existed, to use 
the terminology of Fukuyama, and in which intellectual battles regarding the relative 
supremacy of ideological governance could still be waged.674  According to the consistency 
displayed in annual releases of the NSS as recounted above, this worldview amounted to a 
fanatical ideology incompatible with the values that had developed and superseded it in the 
course of socio-political evolution.  The paradox emerges in the fact that although U.S. 
strategy was informed by a historical trajectory that had outgrown religious governing 
worldviews, and distanced itself from religious rhetoric in statecraft, it was framed in a 
manner which in many ways mirrored the worldview of its adversary.675   
The war on terror was portrayed as an existential struggle between good and evil, and 
one in which the U.S. would be responsible to history for leading.  This initial framing lends a 
similar narrative of transcendence to that employed by IS that was recounted in detail in 
previous chapters.  Once framed in a manner which posits good against evil in an existential 
struggle, the only outcome can be undisputed victory or undeniable defeat and annihilation.  
Just as IS leadership declared in its periodical Dabiq “its either me or the flood”, referencing 
the story of Noah’s ark to illuminate the Manichean struggle it was engaged in, U.S. framing 
of the war on terror posited its structures and universal values as the ark, and thus created an 
intellectual framework that was predicated on the same stark divisions of irreconcilability as 
those it sought to defeat.  
The above paradox can perhaps assist in explaining one of the questions raised in the 
introduction, regarding why policy fails to understand the complexity and longevity of current 
 
674 Erlenbush-Anderson, 158. 
675 For more on the separation of religion and statecraft in U.S. policy and the paradoxical ways in which 
American foundational religious beliefs permeated key policy initiatives, see Sands, Kathleen, America’s 
Religious Wars; The Embattled Heart of our Public Life (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2019).   
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terrorist organisations in order to adequately confront them.  The answer may lie partially in a 
sociological and subsequent political understanding of the overlapping narratives of both IS 
and foundational U.S. policy.  Chapter 2 explained that social groups require both allies and 
enemies in order to survive; it is precisely the presence of an identifiable ‘other’ which creates 
boundaries of inclusivity which in turn serve to strengthen intra-group bonds of solidarity by 
the recognition of sameness.  Furthermore, within these boundaries, social groups will 
construct a sacred canopy which is dependent on both a concertedly created universal 
worldview based on a value system framed as absolute, and individual action to uphold it 
against those deemed to be other.  In this social construction, any opposing worldview will be 
perceived as a danger because by definition there can only be a single universal absolute, and 
until it exists uncontested, opposing worldviews must be treated as existential threats.  
According to Fukuyama, this dynamic was manifest in the relationship between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  Following the end of the Cold War, terrorism became 
the social ‘other’, the existential threat in an absolutist social worldview in which forces of 
good and evil would compete until one reigned supreme, and this language was clearly 
reflected in both NSS 2002 and IS leadership statements that were recounted in previous 
chapters.  Understood in this way, a deep comprehension and scrutiny of the aspirations of 
groups like IS may soften the perception of it as an irreconcilable ‘other’ so vital to group 
survival.676  Engaging in this type of exploration may threaten the potential endurance of the 
Western sacred canopy in the mind of a social being, and furthermore risks being perceived as 
condoning the brutality exhibited by groups like IS.677  While this proposition cannot account 
for the complexity of the problems confronted when dealing with political violence, its 
consideration may prove useful in understanding why individuals in positions of authority 
behave in a manner commensurate with the dynamics of social groups. 
 
Locating IS Relative to the Fluidity of Terrorism in a Western Narrative 
The above discussions illustrate the inherent intellectual complexity of terrorism when 
it is theorised in relation to power structures as the result of specific socio-political agendas.  
Although U.S. National Security Strategies were discussed above, the issue is further 
 
676 See Bourdieu, Pierre, “The Social Space and Genesis of Groups”, Theory and Society 14:6 (1985), 723-744. 
677 Miller, A., A. Gordon and A. Buddle, “Accounting for Evil and Cruelty: Is to Explain to Condone?”, Personality 
and Social Psychology Review 3 (1999), 254-268. 
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complicated when recognising that as of 2014, different U.S. organisations with different 
mandates and jurisdictions to counter terrorism such as the National Counterterrorism Centre, 
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defence, all operate under different 
variations of a terminological definition of the phenomenon.  For instance, the FBI use the 
definition “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives”, while the U.S. State Department defines terrorism as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents”.678  These definitions are commensurate with the 
manner in which terrorism evolved to be thought of following the legal and philosophical 
transformations of the French Revolution which pitted it and its use against the safety of the 
state and those it was charged with protecting.  It is useful, therefore, to recall the definition 
provided by Griffin that was noted in Chapter 1 which states that terrorism is “the deliberate 
use by a movement, group, or individual of extreme violence against either human or 
symbolically significant material targets associated by the perpetrators with a demonised 
‘Other’”.679   
Although these definitions are different, and intended for different purposes regarding 
law enforcement, diplomatic policy creation, and academic inquiry, it is evident that IS can be 
labelled a terrorist organisation relative to these operative definitions.  While this may be the 
case, definitions such as those offered above have formed the foundation of both intellectual 
vantage points and policy proposals which have been used to counter IS and worldwide 
terrorism.  While there have certainly been great victories on that front as evidenced in greater 
international cooperation and the territorial elimination of the caliphate, it may be useful to 
scrutinise IS and its methodology as well as aspirations against the refence points provided by 
the discussion of the emergence of modern terrorism and its intellectual contestation relative 
to radical models of governance that took shape during the French Revolution. 
As was recounted above, Robespierre believed that the conduct of violence was 
essential, as was the proliferation of fear and terror, in the establishment of the revolutionary 
state.  According to Griffin’s definition of terrorism, Robespierre’s violence was directed at a 
 
678 “Organisational Definitions of Terrorism”, Secbrief.  https://www.secbrief.org/2014/04/definition-of-
terrorism/ (Accessed 10 June 2020) 
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demonised ‘other’, and was deliberate in the sense that it sought to establish particular 
viewpoints regarding what the state should be and represent.  Furthermore, Robespierre 
stipulated that terrorism was essential in moulding the ideological homogeneity of a body 
politic as a necessary precursor to the institutionalisation of that same ideology.  Naji 
understood and emulated this position in his manifesto that was discussed in Chapter 9, when 
he argued for the necessity of the creation of savagery in order to shape it into an eventual 
state: “The word “state” is a universal expression and of all the states, even those that are 
democratic, are established after oceans of blood – proves that we need the solution which we 
have set forth.”680  Al-Zarqawi also argued for the necessity of targeting the Shia in order to 
rally the Sunni masses, and through violent action, establish bonds of political and religious 
unity.  IS also stated repeatedly in its publications of Dabiq that homogenous unity of correct 
belief and practice in tawhid was necessary in order for it to form the basis of a state capable 
of surviving.  While Robespierre and the Committee for Public Safety framed their mechanism 
for accomplishing their objectives as terror, and IS framed its as justified jihad following the 
application of takfir to distinguish between those within and without the self-defined body 
politic, both Robespierre and IS sought to wield fear and violence to result in a cohesive social 
body capable of sustaining a novel sovereign structure.  While Robespierre’s sovereign entity 
would be grounded in enlightenment ideals and that of IS would be founded on Islamic 
precedent, it is crucial to note that while the ideals and values pursued were the result of 
different historical trajectories, the framing of necessary violence in relation to a homogenous 
social body and eventual governance was identical.  
In the pursuit of its new state, French revolutionaries relied on similar methods and 
tactics as those employed under the old order, but utilised them to achieve different social 
objectives, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter.  Similarly, IS mirrored Middle Eastern 
authoritarian regimes in its caliphal governing structure, as well as in its use of detentions and 
interrogations that was explored in Chapter 10.  In this regard, both French revolutionaries and 
IS demonstrated their abilities to harness pre-existing techniques of violence and change their 
underlying meaning by using them in relation to novel values systems.  This in turn reflects 
the philosophical capability violence has to forge social identities in its communal 
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appropriation from pre-existing oppressive powers, and underlies the position that similar acts 
of violence can convey vastly different meanings in different contexts.  
In many ways the French Revolution was the result of a crisis of sovereignty that 
undermined the legitimacy of existing regimes of power.  Similarly, the agreement of Sykes-
Picot and coexisting narratives of the lost grandeur of Islamic prominence manifest in the 
caliphate can be understood as constituting a crisis of sovereignty in its ability to raise 
poignant questions regarding the reconciliation of cultural trajectories that led to diametrically 
opposed models of government, one which had been superimposed onto the other.681  The 
erosion of traditional government and the Sharia in the Middle East as the result of the gradual 
encroachment of Western bureaucracies and legal institutions in the 19th century led to the 
cultural redundancy of a holistic system predicated on its ability to be flexible and 
accommodate diverse social settings.  The Sharia as a comprehensive series of institutions was 
meant to ensure the applicability of core Islamic social values to a wide range of cultural and 
localised contexts, and in this regard functioned according to the patterns of social groups in 
that they will be flexible to ensure survival.  Over the course of Western intervention in the 
19th century, the Sharia was replaced with Western structures which were founded precisely 
on the universal applicability of a series of laws and practices that should be consistent with 
innate human rights as elaborated during the Enlightenment and enshrined in the nation state, 
and which should be applied equally across social boundaries regardless of cultural context.682  
This conflict did not solely represent political oppression, it also embodied the 
institutionalisation of a system of values that had not evolved organically, and as was 
discussed in Chapter 7, led to the development of defensive modernisation and political Islam.  
Despite its different manifestations, this series of events should be understood socially as a 
similar crisis of sovereignty to that which was experienced in Europe in the 17th century, and 
which therefore resulted in the foundations for a lack of credibility in the legitimacy of 
political regimes which followed it. 
In the early stages of the French Revolution, terrorism shifted from being a state 
prerogative to being understood as a dangerous political ‘other’ that threatened the integrity of 
 
681 For more on the image of the caliphate in historical memory, see Hassan. 
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the body politic.  This transformation occurred due to the growing moderate faction within the 
revolution that feared it would be targeted with the same violence it had participated in.  As 
was recounted above, Tallien argued that violence only begot violence and therefore could 
never be an efficient way to sustain a social body or its representative state.  Similarly, 
Chapter 10 narrated in detail the schisms within IS regarding takfir which pitted moderates 
against extremists.  As a specific point of comparison, al-Bin‘ali warned of the danger of takfir 
al-‘adhir, takfir in infinite regress, and argued that its expansive application would result in 
the majority of the world’s Muslim population being declared apostate, and thus marked for 
death.  Just as original members of the Revolution were executed due to their beliefs regarding 
who should be considered part of the social body to be represented in a state, and the manner 
in which to violently target those who should not, Chapter 10 explored the ways in which IS 
leadership responded to the takfir schism of 2017 and ultimately executed those who had been 
responsible for the Delegated Committee Memorandum on takfir.  Additionally, just as 
intellectuals such as Babeuf were imprisoned following levelling accusations of terrorism and 
illegitimacy towards the budding French government, so individuals like Abu Ya‘qub al-
Maqdisi were marginalised after accusing IS leadership of violating core tenets of Islam, 
engaging in self-serving excessive violence, and usurping the role of Allah.   
While the states advocated by French revolutionaries and IS represented political 
structures and social values that were the results of different cultural contexts and historical 
trajectories, it is pertinent to note the underlying similarities of the intellectual orientation of 
their proponents.  In their meticulous deliberations regarding the mechanisms by which to 
define a social group, and the grounds on which to calculate the necessity of violence in 
relation to both that social group and the governing structures meant to represent it, both 
French revolutionaries and IS leadership demonstrated devotion to the establishment of a 
government designed to embody values which were framed as universal and indisputable. 
The legacy of the French Revolution was twofold, first in that it demonstrated that 
radical change was possible in the immediate term.  In this regard IS most closely aligns with 
Kaplan’s fifth wave terror groups, which are defined partly by a belief in the achievability of a 
utopia in this lifetime, as was discussed in Chapters 1 and 11.  Beyond this framework, 
however, Chapter 9 discussed the role of the Arab Spring in reshaping the realm of the 
possible, and in this sense IS capitalised on both the legacy of the French Revolution and 
contemporary realisations within the Middle East that radical change was indeed possible.  
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Despite its territorial demise, the declaration of the caliphate in 2014 represented this legacy 
insofar as it combined contemporary realities with a philosophy which stated that through 
violence, a new form of sovereign government could emerge. 
The second aspect of the French Revolution’s legacy is the idea that for the 
abovementioned radical change to occur, institutions and individuals incompatible with values 
meant to be the foundations of new structures must be violently eliminated.  For Robespierre 
this was widespread, but symbolised by the execution of King Louis XVI, who represented not 
only the old political order but also values portrayed as inimical to popular sovereignty.  For 
IS, this paradigm has been demonstrated in previous chapters which outlined the evolution of 
the doctrine of WB.  The codifications of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi have led to a worldview 
in which WB can be used to portray all structures of democracy, as well as individuals who 
participate in or support them, as embodiments of absolute depravity and irreconcilable with 
Islamic values and governance.  Additionally, this revisionist interpretation of WB has created 
an environment in which hatred of those structures and individuals is a necessary condition of 
being Muslim, and their violent destruction is necessary for the ultimate establishment of 
Islamic sovereignty.683  
The above discussion is not meant to question or alternatively confirm the validity of 
positions taken by IS regarding takfir, or those framings of WB as elaborated by al-Maqdisi 
and his supporters.  These issues have been confronted from both within and without the 
umma.684  It instead intended to illustrate the underlying socio-political objectives shared by 
French revolutionaries and IS.  While Robespierre and his successors adamantly pursued a 
state to represent a body politic defined by Enlightenment values popular sovereignty, and IS 
championed the revival of Islamic grandeur in the form of a caliphate, both of these models 
were presented by their advocates as the pinnacle of human socio-political achievement.  
Furthermore, both groups demonstrated a high level of awareness regarding the utility of 
violence in both shaping and governing their ideal polities.  In this context, a single definition 
of terrorism becomes increasingly irrelevant.  At its most fundamental, both groups devoted 
significant attention and resources to the institutionalisation of a particular set of beliefs; the 
 
683 Al-Maqdisi’s ideology has been referenced previously in this thesis, but for more see Wagemakers, Joas, 
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unification between knowledge and power in a socio-political context.  The violence displayed 
by both groups was perceived as necessary, and due to the fact that it was enacted to realise a 
worldview predicated on absolute values, was able to be framed by opponents as abhorrent 
and detrimental.  What is crucial to note in the above discussion is that in many ways, IS 
replicated the methodological aspirations of French revolutionaries and engaged in the same 
sort of ideological manoeuvrings regarding the utility of violence in defining a people and 
creating a state based on a certain set of shared values and its resultant identity.   
 
Alternate Categorisation for the Future of International Relations 
The research question posed in the introduction asked whether it is accurate and useful 
to label groups like IS as terrorist organisations in order to study and counter them accordingly 
within frameworks derivative of this labelling.  This chapter has argued that terrorism is more 
profound than a set of behaviours or motivations, and is even more difficult to quantify in an 
environment in which those behaviours and motivations are judged against hegemonic 
frameworks that define what a state is and what its responsibilities are.  It is further 
complicated in the present operating environment insofar as an increasingly global 
community, U.S. National Security Strategies, and Neoconservatism have effectively 
redefined the role of liberal democratic states in the proliferation of values systems.  Terrorism 
should not be understood as something that is employed by non-state actors and deliberately 
targets civilians for political purposes.685  While this describes terrorism, its contemporary 
manifestations, and the global intellectual and political realm it currently exists in, it does not 
define it.  Terrorism instead should be understood as a powerful physical and intellectual tool 
in the arsenal of socio-political architects which can be wielded in power struggles across time 
and space.  Its latent potential in this regard is further increased in that its rhetorical use as a 
pejorative accusation to vilify those deemed ‘other’ can serve to enhance the morality and 
legitimacy of the accuser in specific contexts.  This fluidity and dynamic utility is what makes 
it such an enduring and powerful force in socio-political construction and contestation.  
States, regimes, and empires have never been pinnacles of socio-political progress, 
although most revolutionary and radically new ones have claimed to be.  One has only to 
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study the narratives surrounding the Roman or British Empires, the early Islamic Caliphates, 
the abovementioned French revolutionary and American states, or European Union, to 
recognise that these entities perceived themselves as the highest manifestation of political 
organisation.686  Upon observation of the past and present, however, what emerges is not a 
single trajectory towards a political pinnacle, rather a cascading temporal multi-dimensional 
mountain range punctuated by peaks which represent the highest levels of attainment within a 
certain context, and which were built on the foundations of a unique culture replete with its 
own social perceptions, realities, and worldviews.  What makes these peaks similar is their 
proposition that they embody the ideal manner in which to implement a sacred canopy in 
governance that is universal in time and space, and due to this similarity of proposed universal 
superiority, they are paradoxical in that they often do not recognise other peaks as equivalent 
or universally valid due to their lack of grounding in reciprocal values.  
Viewed in this manner, the assertion of this thesis is that it is neither accurate nor 
useful to label groups like IS as terrorist organisations, and study as well as counter them 
within existing frameworks.  Instead, this thesis proposes that IS should be regarded as an 
ambitious emerging sovereign entity, and that this descriptor may be useful to categorise 
future movements that advocate models of sovereignty and nominally possess the resources, 
relevant ideological structures, and cultural capital to achieve them.  While this categorisation 
may clash with internationally recognised classifications of sovereignty, it is important to note 
in this conclusion that Western constructs of popular sovereignty are relatively young 
compared to the span of human political evolution, and the values underlying the international 
proliferation of liberalism embodied by Neoconservatism is even younger.  Furthermore, the 
primary power of this young framework is the ability of the state to “produce and impose 
(especially through the school system) categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all 
things of the social world – including the state itself.”687  The ability to transcend the 
purported normalcy and eternality of the present hegemonic system and recognise the meaning 
 
686 These narratives are numerous, but the narrative surrounding the ideal governance encapsulated in early 
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and potential of alternate models of sovereignty in order to incorporate this knowledge in a 
manner that effectively contextually comprehends political violence is the underlying premise 
in the above assertion to the research question.  
This assertion can further be justified in the fact that modern trends of globalisation, 
when juxtaposed with local contexts and conflicts, have led to both a questioning of the 
endurance of a crystallised role of the nation state, and a resurgence of identity politics.  
“Contemporary identity politics is driven by the quest for equal recognition by groups that 
have been marginalised by their societies.”688  Identity politics, its role and appeal when 
intertwined with transcendent human social yearning for dignity, which in turn is socially 
constructed and temporally dependent, has become a contributing factor in understanding and 
studying movements that exist, or seek to exist outside of state’s realms of influence.689  
Furthermore, it is poignant to consider the way in which states themselves develop in this 
context of resurgent identity politics, and the proposition of this thesis as stated above intends 
to contribute to the discussion regarding the way in which states can and should incorporate 
new knowledge and frameworks, and understand them within their own socially constructed 
frames of reference.690  An understanding of the power of identity politics, and in the case of 
this thesis, the recognition of the subjectively valid socio-political model of sovereignty 
advocated by IS, leads to the conclusion of this thesis that IS should be considered an 
ambitious emerging sovereign entity.  Creating this categorisation allows for a deeper 
cognition of human social motivations, and may help create an environment in which the very 
values championed by the West that decry violence and herald freedom may be more widely 
and effectively embraced in manners commensurate with pre-existing ideological structures 
and socio-political norms.   
Foucault himself argued for this paradigmatic approach in his study of prisons relative 
to the power of the state to mould behaviours and perceptions as was briefly noted in the 
chapter of this thesis on Methodology.  By deconstructing the problematisation of crime and 
punishment in light of the relationship between presumptively existing power and knowledge 
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in socio-political formation, Foucault illuminated aspects of cultural and behavioural 
relevance that would otherwise have been lost.  This thesis has attempted to approach the 
study of IS and its problematic framing within extant paradigms regarding the supremacy of 
the nation state and its relationship with terrorism in order to demonstrate the validity of 
relative, although not reciprocal, visions of a utopian socio-political pinnacle manifest in 
Islamic sovereignty.  It has used a genealogical case study of IS to demonstrate the depth and 
cultural resonance of an alternate model of statehood, and its viability in the minds its 
proponents as well as its symbolic significance for posterity in the declaration of the 
Caliphate.  Further, by exploring the trajectory and objectives of IS relative to socio-political 
developments which occurred independent of it in the French Revolution, the ideological 
platforms that inform the U.S. National Security Strategy, and the contested complexity of an 
overarching jihadist ideology that advocates the eventual attainment of Islamic sovereignty, 
this thesis has concluded that IS should not be considered a terrorist organisation according to 
existing intellectual parameters that dictate what terrorism is, what it seeks to accomplish, and 
how it behaves. 
According to Paul Wilkinson, terrorist groups engage in symbolic acts of violence in 
order to publicise their cause, and coerce a specific government to accede to their aims.691  
James Woolsey argued in 2001, however, that “terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they 
want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”692  This claim may categorise the 
appearance of IS violence to a table represented by state stakeholders, but does not serve to 
thoroughly understand the intricacies within IS.  The above discussion has explored the fact 
that states are not universal crystallisations of values, although one of their defining features is 
that they purport to be.  Additionally, it has discussed the dynamic process of forming a 
sovereign state according to socio-political practices meant to represent universal values, and 
the utilitarian framing of terrorism in this process.  Thus understood, IS can and should be 
understood as an ambitious emerging sovereign entity in that it has engaged, and continues to 
engage in a socio-political process of institutional construction that aspires to the enshrinement 
of universal values in governance.  “The prophetic method in its essence is the universal 
method in establishing states  (…) “State”, which is given to a single existing thing and the 
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existing thing is the “predestined law” (al-sunna al-qadariyya), something that all people have 
regardless of their religion and their values”.693       
 
Thesis Limitations 
This thesis has been, by design, a multi-disciplinary project which included historical, 
sociological, and political approaches to craft an intellectual history of IS in context, and 
problematise its ‘terrorism’ within the context of the global war on terror.  This design also 
began by examining the relevant material needed to successfully understand IS and the 
dynamic environment in which it exists, reflected in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.  While this 
approach is new in the field, and necessary, it is also limiting.  This thesis did not account for 
IS specifics as related to recruitment strategies or battle-field tactics which evolved alongside 
the group’s trajectory.  While this thesis commented on the ongoing relationship between al-
Qaeda and IS, it did so to amplify the case study of the latter and thus did not attempt to 
explore the relationship in its entirety.  The same is true of the relationship between IS and its 
global affiliates, in that the focus of the thesis has been on worldview and the utility of 
justified violence to attain sovereignty.  A critical component in the future of political 
violence; global affiliate proliferation and consequences of the same, therefore, was not 
explored in detail. 
The same can be said of U.S. and Western counterterrorism policy.  While this chapter 
outlined the NSS and Neoconservatism, this thesis did not examine specific mechanisms in the 
construction of counterterrorism policies, or the details of strategic policies designed for either 
al-Qaeda or IS.  Instead, this thesis focused on the macro-level problematisation of IS and 
terrorism, and competing visions of sovereignty through the lens of competitive social 
dynamics.  The focus, therefore, has been on the thorough examination of relevant material in 
a multi-disciplinary approach. 
 
Thesis Proposition Utility for the Future 
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Chapter 10 stated that IS fighters still pose a danger in their conduct of violent attacks 
in Iraq and Syria, former foreign fighters pose a security concern to their host nations, the 
online presence of IS in its virtual caliphate has global reach, and international IS affiliates 
remain engaged in disparate local struggles.  Despite the territorial collapse of the caliphate, 
Western powers should be cautious in claiming this as a decisive victory over IS and 
terrorism.694  The ongoing battle against IS and Islamist violence has led to calls for new ways 
of approaching terrorism, and this thesis has attempted to do precisely that.695  By approaching 
IS according to methodological prescriptions and objectives as articulated by Foucault, this 
thesis has attempted to answer the above calls.  Numerous academic studies have scrutinised 
the work of Edward Said, and this thesis further attempted to reshape the future of discussions 
regarding Islamist political violence by building on his proposition that “orientalism stakes its 
existence (…) on its internal repetitious consistency about its constitutive will-to-power over 
the orient.”696  By overlapping Said’s notions of orientalism onto current manifestations of 
Neoconservatism and strategies of national security, this thesis attempted to deconstruct the 
object of scrutiny to comprehend IS the way Said proposed was necessary.  This thesis, 
therefore, scrutinised IS according to its own articulated reference points, and by doing so 
presented its discourse as a “self regulating system for the production of ideas about a 
designated object or field of objects”.697  Understanding IS discourse and the intellectual 
environment in which it exists in relation to its own perceptions of rightful sovereignty may 
help detangle images of terrorism from Islamic causation, and assist in perceiving its violence 
as acts of collective rationality, engaged in as a logical means to achieve desired ends.698 
Renowned scholar of terrorism and political violence Walter Laqueur stated in 2018 
that IS had defined the nature of terrorism for the foreseeable future, primarily because it 
forced nation states to reconsider the universality of popular sovereignty.699  He argued that 
the accomplishments of the caliphate and its symbolic feasibility as well as failures would 
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serve as reference points for future organisations, and that IS affiliates as well as al-Qaeda 
were actively incorporating them in creating governing institutions within power vacuums in 
areas such as Libya and Yemen.  Laqueur proposed that IS had failed but that its legacy would 
inform terrorist evolution in the future.  He concluded this argument by linking IS to patterns 
of modern terrorism by stating that “the history of terrorist groups shows that those with 
realistic, limited aims had a chance of some success.  Those who intended to change the world 
profoundly did, as a rule, fail.”700  While this may be true regarding modern terrorist 
movements of the past, and Chapter 10 argued that IS had indeed reshaped jihadism through 
its declaration of the caliphate and ongoing ideological struggles with al-Qaeda, this thesis has 
attempted to repudiate the above notion by deconstructing the very institutional premises of 
Laqueur’s argument.  French revolutionaries employed terrorism in various dimensions both 
physical and rhetorical to achieve a specific vision of sovereignty, and ultimately did change 
the world profoundly.  Rather than viewing IS within the context of terrorist movements of the 
modern era that began with Rapoport’s first wave, future studies of political violence and 
trends in governance should rather broaden the scope of what constitutes sovereignty in 
different cultural contexts, and how their resultant discourses manifest themselves in an 
increasingly interconnected and dependent world. 
In the introduction to her seminal work What Terrorists Want, Louise Richardson 
described the relationship between U.S. counterterrorism policy makers and the research 
community dedicated to the study of political violence before 9/11 as one based on distance, 
distrust, and discord.701  She argued that distance was necessary in that she believed 
government involvement in academia would be detrimental to research integrity.  Following 
the events of 9/11, however, Richardson stated that “Had the American government’s policy 
in the past few years been informed by the views of the terrorism studies community, it would 
have been a very difference policy indeed.  Lives have been lost because of our government’s 
failure to understand the nature of the enemy we face and its unwillingness to learn from the 
experiences of others in countering terrorism”.702  While in the decades since 9/11 academics 
have played a much more active role in informing counterterrorism policy, this thesis seeks to 
further contribute to this effort by offering an alternate conceptualisation of groups like IS 
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which recognises their intellectual and cultural trajectories as well as relative aspirations, to 
ultimately bridge the gap between policy and research; power and knowledge; to assist in 
averting future catastrophic loss of life. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has attempted to discuss the fact that terrorism is not a set of concrete 
behaviours and practices relative to the state, nor is the state an eternal crystallisation of 
universal ideals.  It discussed the French Revolution and the ways in which violence was 
framed as necessary, and harnessed in the pursuit of popular sovereignty to abruptly break 
with the old established socio-political order.  Further, it elaborated the notion that in this 
context, terrorism emerged as a concept whose power lay in its physical and rhetorical ability 
to categorically define and target a socially constructed ‘other’ which did not share a set of 
institutionalised values.  This chapter then discussed the emergence of American 
Neoconservatism and how this ideology transformed the role of the state from one charged 
with domestic protection of a body politic to one responsible for the international proliferation 
of universal freedom.  It additionally discussed the way this intellectual platform informed 
U.S. national security strategy and policies of counterterrorism that took form before 9/11.  
This chapter then discussed the similarities between IS and the French revolutionaries in their 
shared aspirations of sovereignty which were both predicated on a set of absolute ideals. 
This chapter then progressed to address the research question, and offered the view that 
it may be useful to conceive of IS not as a terrorist organisation, but as an ambitious emerging 
sovereign entity that draws on overlapping narratives of socio-political contestation, and 
strives towards a unique model of sovereignty.  Finally, it explained that while the multi-
disciplinary approach and objective of this thesis inherently produced necessary limitations, 
the conclusions which led to the above-mentioned alternate framing may assist future research 
regarding Islamic political violence.  This was further justified by asserting that no existing 
framework of sovereignty represents the pinnacle of socio-political achievement by 
embodying universal values and innate human rights.  Although they purport to, this chapter 
demonstrated that universal values and innate human rights are and should be considered 
cultural constructs which are relative to both the environments which produced them and the 
cultural ‘other’ with which they interact.   
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A key objective of this thesis has been to deconstruct and explore fundamentals in the 
most objective way possible to articulate the idea that a recognition of the relative validity of 
models of sovereignty which do not align with our own does not constitute an entire dismissal 
of the latter.  This thesis evaluated social dynamics which inform group behaviour and the 
individual desire to contribute to a meaningful existence, and explored the power of religious 
framing and how it intertwines with violence in a simultaneously transcendent and worldly 
purpose to create meaning.  It then scrutinised IS within the parameters of its own socio-
cultural reference points and in juxtaposition to a hegemonic state-centric order.  By doing 
this, and drawing comparisons between IS and fundamental precepts of social dynamics and 
the power of religiously inspired violence, this thesis deconstructed the problematisation of 
modern terrorism to re-orient the lens of inquiry into the same.  This thesis has argued for an 
enhanced understanding of cultures, perceptions, and motivations in order to hopefully and 
humbly contribute to the study of political violence within the ever-fluctuating mountain range 
of competing aspirations towards the institutional enshrinement in government of culturally 
absolute values in a utopian sacred canopy.            
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